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ARTICLES
THE EARLY YEARS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM
Jeremy K. Kessler*
From Citizens United to Hobby Lobby, civil libertarian
challenges to the regulation of economic activity are increasingly
prevalent. Critics of this trend invoke the specter of Lochner v. New
York. They suggest that the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, and other legislative “conscience clauses” are being
used to resurrect the economically libertarian substantive due process
jurisprudence of the early twentieth century. Yet the worry that
aggressive judicial enforcement of the First Amendment might erode
democratic regulation of the economy and enhance the economic power
of private actors has a long history. As this Article demonstrates,
anxieties about such “First Amendment Lochnerism” date back to the
federal judiciary’s initial turn to robust protection of free exercise and
free expression in the 1930s and 1940s.
Then, it was those members of the Supreme Court perceived as
most liberal who struck down economic regulations on First Amendment
grounds. They did so in a series of contentious cases involving the
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who challenged local peddling taxes as burdening
a central aspect of their missionary faith—the mass sale and
distribution of religious literature. In dissent, Justice Robert Jackson
warned that the new “liberal” majority’s expansive conception of First
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Amendment enforcement repeated the mistakes of the “liberty of
contract” jurisprudence of the Lochner era, undermined democratic
regulation of the economy, and imposed the beliefs of some on “the rights
of others.”
Justice Jackson’s warnings sound strikingly similar to contemporary critiques of First Amendment Lochnerism. Yet today’s critics treat
recent case law as a novel, economically libertarian co-option of an
otherwise progressive project: the judicial enforcement of civil liberties.
In contrast, the Justices and scholars who objected to the 1940s
peddling-tax decisions perceived an inextricable relationship between
judicial civil libertarianism and judicial interference with economic
regulation. By recovering the origins and sketching the aftermath of the
peddling-tax debate, this Article argues that contemporary critics of
First Amendment Lochnerism tend to overstate the phenomenon’s
novelty and underestimate the difficulty of curing judicial civil
libertarianism of its “Lochnerian” tendencies. This argument, in turn,
counsels a reorientation of contemporary advocacy. Rather than
defending an illusory tradition of economically neutral First
Amendment enforcement, critics of today’s First Amendment Lochnerism
might more accurately and persuasively position themselves as
reformers. They could then set to work breaking with a legal tradition
long insensitive to the deleterious effects of judicial civil libertarianism
on political regulation of the economy.
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INTRODUCTION
From Citizens United to Hobby Lobby, civil libertarian challenges to the
regulation of economic activity are increasingly prevalent.1 Critics of this
trend invoke the specter of Lochner v. New York.2 They suggest that the
First Amendment, the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
other legislative “conscience clauses” are being used as doctrinal
substitutes for the economically libertarian substantive due process jurisprudence of the early twentieth century.3 As campaign ﬁnanciers, food
and drug companies, right-to-work activists, and religious employers
defend their economic autonomy on civil libertarian grounds, the
discourse of “First Amendment Lochnerism” has become widespread
among dissenting judges and legal scholars.4 In 2011, for example,
Justice Stephen Breyer warned that the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment invalidation of a state law restricting the sale of medical
information had “reawaken[ed] Lochner’s pre–New Deal threat of
substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary
economic regulation is at issue.”5 Five years later, such comparisons ﬁll

1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Other recent examples include: Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct.
1557 (2016) (per curiam); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per
curiam); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434
(2014); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399
(4th Cir. 2015); Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2014); Eternal Word Television
Network, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.
2014); Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014); Korte v. Sebelius,
735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Newland v. Sebelius, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); CTIA-Wireless Ass’n v. City & County
of San Francisco, 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012); Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F.
Supp. 3d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For the symbolic power of Lochner in constitutional argument, see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 417–22 (2011).
3. See infra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (citing recent judicial and scholarly
examples).
4. For earlier instances of this discourse, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About
Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 384;
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 Mich. L. Rev.
281, 286–88 (2000); Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 30–32 (1979);
Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in
the Modern Era 175, 178 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 883–84 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Lochner’s Legacy]; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1387 (1984)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Rights]; Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner : Some
Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 421, 458 (2006).
5. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Korte, 735 F.3d at 693
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (describing the invalidation of the Affordable Care Act’s
contraceptive-coverage mandate on religious liberty grounds as “reminiscent of the
Lochner era”).
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the law reviews.6 “Today,” one scholar remarks, judicial “interpretations
of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act . . .
replicate the commitment to private ordering and resistance to redistribution that were at the heart of Lochner.”7
The prevailing sense among these critics is that we are in the midst
of a relatively recent, economically libertarian “hijacking”8 of civil
liberties law. Yet the worry that aggressive judicial enforcement of the
First Amendment might enhance the economic power of some private
actors at the expense of other private and public interests has a long
history. As this Article demonstrates, anxieties about such First
Amendment Lochnerism date back to the Supreme Court’s initial turn to
robust protection of free exercise and free expression in the 1930s and
1940s. Then, it was those Justices perceived as most liberal who struck
down economic regulations on First Amendment grounds. They did so
in a series of contentious cases involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who
challenged local peddling taxes as burdening a central aspect of their
missionary faith—the mass sale and distribution of religious literature.9
In June 1942, soon after the Supreme Court declared commercial
speech unprotected by the First Amendment,10 it also rejected the
Witnesses’ peddling-tax challenge.11 But less than a year later, a new
“liberal”12 majority—Chief Justice Stone along with Justices Douglas,
Black, Murphy, and the recently appointed Rutledge—reversed the
earlier peddling-tax decision. In doing so, this majority held for the ﬁrst
time that the First Amendment occupied a “preferred position” in the

6. E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodations Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1205 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G.
Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in The Rise of
Corporate Religious Liberty 323 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson
eds., 2016) [hereinafter Gedicks & Van Tassell, Burdens and Baselines]; Leslie Kendrick,
First Amendment Expansionism, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1199 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper,
Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1453 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New
Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133; Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9
Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 25 (2015); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism
for a New Economy, 77 Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 195; Tim Wu, The Right to
Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, New Republic
(June 3, 2013), http://newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-ﬁrstamendment-evade-regulation [http://perma.cc/CMM6-UPJY].
7. Sepper, supra note 6, at 1453.
8. Wu, supra note 6.
9. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944); Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S 157 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. City of Opelika
(Opelika II), 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (mem.) (per curiam).
10. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
11. Jones v. Opelika (Opelika I), 316 U.S. 584, 598–99 (1942).
12. Wallace Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger—from Schenck to Dennis, 52
Colum. L. Rev. 313, 332 (1952).
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constitutional order.13 Coined by Chief Justice Stone, the “preferred
position” doctrine was understood by contemporaries to be a gloss on
Footnote Four of Carolene Products,14 another Stone innovation.15 In
Footnote Four, then-Justice Stone had suggested several circumstances in
which the “presumption of constitutionality” that generally applied to
“ordinary commercial” regulation might be “narrow[ed],” including
when such regulation “appear[ed] on its face to be within a speciﬁc
prohibition of . . . the ﬁrst ten amendments” to the Constitution.16 The
“preferred position” doctrine struck many jurists as a dangerously broad
interpretation of the Footnote’s ambiguous language, capable of subjecting a great deal of “ordinary commercial” regulation to heightened
judicial scrutiny on First Amendment grounds. In the May 1943
peddling-tax decisions, the Court’s ﬁve most “liberal” Justices conﬁrmed
the danger, declaring that the First Amendment’s “preferred” constitutional status meant that even an indirect and attenuated ﬁnancial
burden on free exercise or free expression—even when that exercise or
expression took the form of commercial activity—was forbidden.17
Hailed at the time as “one of the most notable acts” in the Supreme
Court’s history,18 the 1943 peddling-tax decisions occasioned ﬁerce
dissents from four Justices who considered themselves every bit as “civil
libertarian” as the new majority. The problem, the dissenters explained,
was that prohibiting indirect regulatory burdens on activities that were
both expressive and commercial in nature threatened to reverse the New
Deal’s victory over judicial meddling in the economy, while transforming
the First Amendment into a tool of economic libertarianism.19 The
majority’s First Amendment “transcendentalism,” Justice Jackson warned,
repeated the mistakes of the “liberty of contract” jurisprudence of the
Lochner era, threatened to undermine political regulation of the
economy, and risked imposing the beliefs of some on “the rights of
13. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115.
14. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
15. For contemporaneous understandings of the relationship between Footnote Four
and the “preferred position” doctrine, see Samuel J. Konefsky, Chief Justice Stone and the
Supreme Court 215–34 (1945); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Core of Free Government,
1938–40: Mr. Justice Stone and “Preferred Freedoms,” 65 Yale L.J. 597, 625–26 (1956);
Herbert Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 764, 795–99 (1946);
Edwin Borchard, Book Review, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 336 (1946) (reviewing Konefsky,
supra). For later commentary on this relationship, see G. Edward White, The Constitution
and the New Deal 128–63 (2000); Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of
the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. Tex. L. Rev. 163, 202–10 (2004); Peter Linzer, The
Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky
and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 Const. Comment. 277, 277, 301 (1995).
16. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 148, 152 n.4.
17. See infra section III.B. (discussing the debate surrounding the 1943 decisions).
18. Irving Dilliard, About-Face to Freedom, New Republic, May 24, 1943, at 693, 693
[hereinafter Dilliard, About-Face].
19. See infra section III.B (discussing the dissenting opinions of Justices Roberts,
Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson).
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others.”20 Justice Frankfurter agreed, insisting that “[t]here is nothing in
the Constitution which exempts persons engaged in [expressive] activities from sharing equally in the costs of beneﬁts to all . . . provided by
government.”21 Similarly, Justice Reed lamented that the “liberal”
majority’s “late withdrawal of the power of taxation over the distribution
activities of those covered by the First Amendment ﬁxes what seems to us
an unfortunate principle . . . capable of indeﬁnite extension.”22
These seventy-year-old dissents sound strikingly similar to
contemporary liberal critiques of First Amendment Lochnerism.23
Today’s critics, however, tend to treat recent “Lochnerian” case law as an
economically libertarian perversion of an otherwise commendable
project—aggressive judicial enforcement of civil liberties. In doing so,
many rely on Professor Cass Sunstein’s strikingly narrow interpretation of
Lochner’s error. This interpretation traces the ills of the Lochner era to a
judicial worldview in which common law property and contract rights
provided a politically “neutral” regulatory “baseline.”24 Statutory departures from this baseline were thus inherently suspect. By narrowly
identifying “Lochnerism” with the commitment of individual judges to
such an outdated, economically libertarian worldview, however, legal
liberals may overlook—or seek to evade—tensions between their critique
of First Amendment Lochnerism and their own commitment to the
20. Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S 157, 179, 181–82 (Jackson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
21. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 140 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 133 (Reed, J., dissenting).
23. See supra notes 5–6 (collecting contemporary liberal critiques); see also
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 343, 379 (2014); Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden:
Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 Drake L. Rev. 433, 454–55
(2014); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2587 (2015); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 393, 423–
27 (2015).
24. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 4, at 874; cf. Gedicks & Van Tassell,
Burdens and Baselines, supra note 6, at 332 (describing Hobby Lobby’s “adoption of a
negative-liberty or libertarian baseline for assessing whether religious exemptions impose
third-party burdens” as “the very baseline that underwrote the justly maligned ‘liberty of
contract’ jurisprudence enshrined in Lochner v. New York”); Sepper, supra note 6, at 1456–
57 (identifying “free exercise Lochnerism” with the judicial belief that “the existing
market forms a legally and economically neutral baseline”); Tebbe, supra note 6, at 57–58
(arguing that religious exemptions from antidiscrimination law for businesses that decline
to serve same-sex couples privilege a “common law baseline” in the tradition of Lochner).
For a critique of Professor Sunstein’s historical analysis and its adoption by progressive
legal scholars, see generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(2003). For an overview of competing interpretations of Lochner-era case law, see Luke P.
Norris, Constitutional Economics: Lochner, Labor, and the Battle for Liberty, Yale J.L. &
Human. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10–14) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
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judicial enforcement of expansively deﬁned, constitutionally privileged
civil liberties.25
In contrast, the Justices who dissented from the 1943 peddling-tax
decisions perceived an inextricable relationship between judicial civil
libertarianism and judicial interference with economic regulation. They
worried that judicial enforcement of civil liberties risked reinstalling
courts in their pre–New Deal role as antidemocratic arbiters of economic
life.26 Prescient voices in the legal academy agreed, pointing out that
neither Footnote Four nor the “preferred position” doctrine contained
any principle that prevented courts from scrutinizing economic
regulation for incidental civil libertarian burdens; nor did these
doctrines provide courts with a template for distinguishing clearly
between “preferred” civil libertarian activity and unprotected economic
activity.27
These structural and doctrinal diagnoses of the relationship between
judicial civil libertarianism and First Amendment Lochnerism contrast
with the latter-day, Sunsteinian explanation, which identiﬁes Lochnerism
with the subjective judicial preference for common law modes of
economic regulation. Such a subjectivist explanation, however, was
implausible at the dawn of First Amendment Lochnerism precisely
because the liberal Justices who struck down the peddling taxes and
protected the Witnesses’ commercial activity were themselves veteran
New Dealers. They had little love for economic libertarianism or patience
with the idea of the common law’s political neutrality. The initial
controversy over the economically libertarian tendencies of Footnote
Four and the “preferred position” doctrine thus played out among jurists
who all dispensed with “Lochnerism” as Professor Sunstein and his
successors deﬁne it. These jurists nonetheless disagreed over the
question as to whether aggressive judicial civil libertarianism could
coexist—as a matter of legal structure, not judicial subjectivity—with
25. See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 6, at 1460 (explaining her critique of “Free Exercise
Lochnerism” does not “seek to criticize the endeavor of judicial review of legislation or
examine the role of unenumerated rights in the constitutional system”); Sunstein,
Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 4, at 874, 904, 906 (focusing on “an important element in the
Lochner Court’s approach . . . that has little to do with an aggressive judicial role in
general” and rejecting the conclusion that “constitutional courts ought to play little or no
role” in changing “the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements”). For two
important, if partial, exceptions to the Sunsteinian approach, see Kendrick, supra note 6,
at 1210–19 (arguing the “opportunistic” use of free speech to protect business interests is
dependent on the inherent expansiveness of the category of “speech” and the unstable
nature of legal rules); Shanor, supra note 6, at 137–38, 164, 188 (arguing the “libertarian
turn in commercial speech doctrine” differs from the “old” Lochner in that it emphasizes
the “naturalization of speech” rather than the “naturalization” of the common law).
26. See infra sections III.B, IV.A (discussing judicial and scholarly responses to the
1943 peddling-tax decisions).
27. See infra section IV.B (discussing early interpretations of Footnote Four and the
“preferred position” doctrine).
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judicial deference to political regulation of the economy. This
disagreement would haunt the Supreme Court for decades to come.28
Today, as the ghost of the peddling-tax cases seems to have taken on
newly ghoulish proportions, there is much to learn from the history of
earlier, failed exorcisms. By recovering that history, this Article argues
that contemporary critics of First Amendment Lochnerism have overstated the phenomenon’s novelty and understated the economically
libertarian tendencies that may be intrinsic to judicial enforcement of
civil liberties, regardless of the politics of individual judges. Insistence on
the novelty and political contingency of today’s First Amendment
Lochnerism allows progressive critics to cast themselves as the
traditionalist defenders of a civil libertarian status quo dating back to the
1940s. The history of the peddling-tax cases, however, suggests that the
creation of a truly non-Lochnerian First Amendment would require a
fundamental break with that status quo.
Part I of this Article traces the emergence of our judge-centered
vision of civil libertarianism to the 1930s. Before that time, most civil
libertarians were political leftists who saw courts as the guardians of
private property; accordingly, they focused their energies on encouraging
administrative and legislative enforcement of civil liberties, especially the
civil liberties of labor activists.29 But in response to progressive and New
Deal regulation of corporations, probusiness lawyers offered an alternative account that linked civil liberties to the rights of employers and
reframed the judiciary as a civil libertarian check on a potentially
totalitarian New Deal state. Although the anti–New Dealers’ litigation
campaign stalled in 1937,30 elements of their civil libertarian vision
became embedded in Footnote Four of Carolene Products.31
Part II describes how the initially conservative celebration of judicial civil libertarianism gained bipartisan support among lawyers and
judges.32 When President Roosevelt launched his plan to pack the
28. See infra section IV.C (discussing the legacy of the peddling-tax cases).
29. See generally Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty (1966); William E. Forbath,
Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 139–66 (1991); Jeremy K. Kessler,
The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties, 114 Colum. L. Rev 1083 (2014)
[hereinafter Kessler, Administrative Origins]; Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and
Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86
Va. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 297 [hereinafter Weinrib, Civil Liberties]; Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism’s
Hard When You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to the Courts, 42 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 367, 371–75 (2008).
30. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128–30 (1937); see also infra notes
127–129 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s rejection of the anti–New
Dealers’ argument).
31. See infra section I.B (detailing the origins of Footnote Four).
32. This argument builds on Professor Laura Weinrib’s work on the role that
conservative proponents of judicial enforcement of the First Amendment played in the
transformation of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in the 1930s. See Laura M.
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Supreme Court in 1937, Wall Street lawyer (and former Roosevelt
supporter) Grenville Clark took the lead in framing court packing as a
threat to the institution that could best defend the civil liberties of rich
and poor alike—the judiciary. After the defeat of President Roosevelt’s
plan, Clark and the American Bar Association (ABA) continued to press
this vision of judicial civil libertarianism, joining forces with a group that
ostensibly exempliﬁed the sort of Americans most in need of judicial
protection: the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Witnesses’ eccentric expressive
practices—their refusal to salute the American ﬂag, their aggressive,
door-to-door peddling of apocalyptic tracts—led to a ﬁerce, and
sometimes violent, backlash.33 This backlash bore a faint but ominous
resemblance to the contemporaneous suppression of German Jehovah’s
Witnesses at the hands of the Nazi regime. Emphasizing this dark
parallel, Clark and the ABA helped Witness lawyers develop their
argument for aggressive judicial enforcement of an expansive First
Amendment.
Part III recounts how the Witnesses gradually overcame the
resistance of President Roosevelt’s Supreme Court, helping to constitute
a new “liberal” majority in the process. With the powerful American
Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) at their side and the rhetoric
of antitotalitarianism on their lips, Witness lawyers persuaded ﬁve Justices
that taxes on the door-to-door sale of goods and services impermissibly
burdened the Witnesses’ ability to distribute and sell religious literature.
It did not matter that these taxes were nondiscriminatory, ﬁnancially
nonprohibitive, and levied on all forms of peddling. Nor did it matter, as
the four dissenting Justices loudly protested, that the use of the First
Amendment to shield commercial activity from economic regulation
seemed to work the same economically libertarian effects as the
substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner era. Because First
Amendment rights occupied a “preferred position” in the constitutional
order, the new liberal majority reasoned, their exercise was shielded from
even incidental economic obstacles.
Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the Limits of State Power,
1917–1940, at 408–56 (May 2011) [hereinafter Weinrib, Liberal Compromise]
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review). For further background on these conservative civil libertarians, see Gerald T.
Dunne, Grenville Clark: Public Citizen 78–118 (1986); Edwin Emery, History of the
American Newspaper Publishers Association (1970); Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing
Roosevelt’s Government 55–78 (1966); George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives
(1962); Jared A. Goldstein, The American Liberty League and the Rise of Constitutional
Nationalism, 86 Temple L. Rev. 287 (2014); Jeremy K. Kessler, A War for Liberty: On the
Law of Conscientious Objection, in 3 The Cambridge History of the Second World War
447, 459–61 (Michael Geyer & Adam Tooze eds., 2015); John W. Wertheimer, A “Switch in
Time” Beyond the Nine: Historical Memory and the Constitutional Revolution of the
1930s, 53 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc’y 3 (2010).
33. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the
Constitution in Modern America 19–33 (2010); Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s
Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution 18–45 (2000).
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Part IV sketches the aftermath of the peddling-tax cases at the
Supreme Court and within the legal academy. Almost immediately, the
liberal majority began to struggle with the implications of victory,
disturbed to ﬁnd the 1943 peddling-tax decisions invoked to justify ever
more extravagant First Amendment attacks on government regulation of
health, safety, and commerce.34 When three of the ﬁve members of the
liberal bloc died between 1946 and 1949, however, this tumultuous
period looked like it might come to a quick end. In the late 1940s and
early 1950s, former dissenters worked to marginalize the peddling-tax
decisions, the “preferred position” doctrine, and the entire Carolene
Products framework of bifurcated review.35 In doing so, they followed the
lead of legal scholars who had spent the past decade warning of the
economically libertarian tendencies of the Court’s civil liberties
jurisprudence.36 But judicial and scholarly efforts to put the peddling-tax
era to rest met with only partial success. During the 1950s and 1960s, the
peddling-tax precedents intermittently reemerged in politically liberal
Supreme Court decisions invalidating economic regulations or protecting the economic autonomy of private actors on First Amendment
grounds.37 Then, in the 1970s, the liberal wing of the Burger Court
invoked the authority of the peddling-tax cases to extend robust First
Amendment protection to “commercial speech,” precipitating a second
generation of First Amendment Lochnerism scholarship.38 We are now
living through a third generation of crisis and critique concerning the
relationship between judicial civil libertarianism and judicial supervision
of economic regulation.
This history cautions against treating First Amendment Lochnerism
as a recent corruption of an otherwise progressive project of judicial civil
libertarianism. Contemporary critics are not wrong to identify a new
judicial zeal for immunizing corporations from economic regulation on
civil libertarian grounds. But today’s economically libertarian judicial
34. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); infra section IV.A (discussing the immediate impact of the peddling-tax
decisions).
35. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641–45 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 90–92 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. See Henry Steele Commager, Majority Rule and Minority Rights (1943)
[hereinafter Commager, Majority Rule and Minority Rights]; George D. Braden, The
Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 Yale L.J. 571 (1948) [hereinafter Braden,
Search]; Walton H. Hamilton & George D. Braden, The Special Competence of the
Supreme Court, 50 Yale L.J. 1319 (1941); infra section IV.B (discussing scholarly critiques
of Footnote Four and the Hughes Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence).
37. See infra section IV.C (discussing the legacy of the peddling-tax cases).
38. See Michael J. Graetz & Linda Greenhouse, The Burger Court and the Rise of
the Judicial Right 245–55 (2016); Balkin, supra note 4, at 384; Jackson & Jeffries, supra
note 4, at 30–31; Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 4, at 883–84; Tushnet, Rights,
supra note 4, at 1387–88; infra section IV.C (discussing the legacy of the peddling-tax
cases).

2016] EARLY YEARS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM

1925

“activists” are leveraging an ambiguity that has been constitutive of
judicial civil libertarianism since its inception: the ambiguity between the
aggressive protection of civil liberties and the searching review of
economic regulation for incidental restrictions on expressive activity.
While certainly not the dominant trend in First Amendment jurisprudence, judicial suspicion of economic regulations that incidentally
restrict the exercise of First Amendment rights—even when that exercise
takes the form of commercial activity—has a long doctrinal pedigree,
dating back to the peddling-tax cases themselves. Accordingly,
contemporary critics of First Amendment Lochnerism risk underestimating the difficulty of their task when they characterize it as the defense
of a doctrinally stable, economically neutral tradition of First
Amendment rights enforcement. Contemporary critics might more
accurately and persuasively position themselves as reformers, seeking to
break with a legal tradition long insensitive to the deleterious impact of
judicial civil libertarianism on political regulation of the economy.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM IN THE 1930S
A.

The Anti–New Deal First Amendment

The most steadfast proponents of judicial enforcement of the First
Amendment in the 1930s were corporate lawyers tasked with fending off
New Deal economic regulation. The early nexus of this effort was the
ANPA, a trade group controlled by the nation’s largest newspaper chains.
Founded in 1887, ANPA ﬁrst took an official interest in the First
Amendment in 1922.39 The immediate occasion for this embrace of civil
libertarian advocacy was a congressional effort to criminalize the
publication of news about sports betting.40 A classic piece of Progressiveera protective legislation, the betting bill reﬂected the spirit of
maximum-hours laws and Prohibition more than that of the Palmer
Raids. Yet the time was ripe for civil libertarian critique. The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had formed two years earlier and already
boasted a roster of legal elites on its board, despite the organization’s
commitment to the defense of labor radicals and other political
extremists.41
Indeed, when ANPA ﬁnally established a Committee on the
Freedom of Press in 1928, it chose as chairman Robert McCormick, the
publisher of the Chicago Tribune who had recently distinguished himself
by coming to the defense of a highly controversial, small-time paper. The
Saturday Press, an independent Minneapolis tabloid, had dedicated its
short print run to accusing public officials of conspiring on behalf of
39. Emery, supra note 32, at 221.
40. Id.
41. See Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United
States 25–31 (1979) (noting the emergence of new civil liberties groups).

1926

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:1915

Jewish gangs who “practically rul[ed]” the city.42 After one of the named
officials brought suit under a public-nuisance law, the Minnesota state
courts permanently enjoined the Press for its defamatory and antisemitic
content. At that point, McCormick stepped in, offering to fund an appeal
to the Supreme Court. There, the Press’s publisher, J.M. Near, won a
momentous victory. For the ﬁrst time in history, the Court struck down a
law on First Amendment grounds.43
If Near v. Minnesota proved that McCormick was willing to look out
for the unpopular (antisemitic) little guy, ANPA’s ﬁrst major litigation
effort under his stewardship suggested a different focus. Having established the presumptive unconstitutionality of content-based prior
restraints in Near, McCormick sought to vindicate a more expansive
vision of press freedom in Grosjean v. American Press Co.44 With the help of
ANPA’s general counsel, Elisha Hanson, McCormick argued that
Louisiana’s license tax on all newspapers with a circulation of over 20,000
copies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.45 The factual circumstances of Grosjean made it quite clear that the tax was discriminatory
in intent, aimed by Governor Huey Long at his press critics.46 Yet ANPA
wanted to strike a more general blow against public regulation of the
increasingly consolidated newspaper industry and thus pursued a facial
challenge. Justice Sutherland was willing to oblige.47
In holding that the circulation tax violated the American Press
Corporation’s press freedom, Justice Sutherland’s unanimous opinion
did allude to the case’s “present setting” and a “long history” of
intentionally discriminatory circulation taxes.48 But the heart of the
opinion argued that a tax on high circulation was unconstitutional on its
face:
[Such a tax] . . . operates as a restraint in a double sense. First,
its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from
advertising, and, second, its direct tendency is to restrict
circulation. This is plain enough when we consider that, if it
were increased to a high degree, as it could be if valid . . . it well
might result in destroying both advertising and circulation.49
42. Fred W. Friendly, Minnesota Rag: The Dramatic Story of the Landmark Supreme
Court Case that Gave New Meaning to Freedom of the Press 40–54 (1981).
43. Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 735–38 (1931).
44. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
45. Emery, supra note 32, at 222–23; Samuel R. Olken, The Business of Expression:
Economic Liberty, Political Factions, and the Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of Justice
George Sutherland, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 249, 301 (2002).
46. Emery, supra note 32, at 222–23.
47. Olken, supra note 45, at 301.
48. Grosjean, 297 U.S at 250.
49. Id. at 244–45 (citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934)). Professor
Samuel Olken suggests that this part of Justice Sutherland’s opinion closely followed
Hanson’s oral argument. Olken, supra note 45, at 301.
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The logic of Justice Sutherland’s second sentence was striking in that
it could potentially apply to any regulatory tax levied on a particular
mode of commercial activity. In fact, Sutherland’s original opinion
treated Grosjean as a pure economic liberty case, one of many in which he
and the Court’s conservatives saw “unequal taxation of similarly situated
persons” as an unconstitutional form of class legislation. 50 Justice
Sutherland eventually, however, rewrote the opinion to emphasize its
First Amendment dimensions in order to avoid a concurrence from
Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone.51 Because of this compromise,
which combined a general aversion to regulatory taxation with a speciﬁc
defense of press freedom,52 Grosjean would later provide ammunition for
ANPA and the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the peddling-tax cases.53
Even at the time, some liberals warned of the danger that ANPA and
Justice Sutherland’s civil libertarian vision posed to New Deal economic
reform.54 Reporting on a speech that ANPA’s Hanson gave in the wake of
Grosjean, the Nation highlighted the lawyer’s argument that “to control a
newspaper’s revenue through an attack on advertising or circulation
constitutes a direct threat” to press freedom.55 “By this deﬁnition,” the
magazine’s editors worried, “any strike, not only against a publisher but
against a business organization that advertised in his paper, would
constitute a threat to the freedom of the press.”56 “Mr. Hanson seems to
suggest,” they concluded, “that when an old lady in Dubuque accepts a
government pension—if she gets a chance—she too will be endangering
our free press.”57
The Nation had good reason to doubt the purity of Hanson’s civil
libertarianism. Between Near and Grosjean, ANPA had developed an
openly hostile stance toward New Deal regulation, “argu[ing] that
business activities of newspapers either were exempted under the First
Amendment from government regulation, or should be protected
against any adverse effects of federal general business laws.”58 For
instance, after the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in
1933, ANPA took charge of drafting a code for daily newspapers that New
Deal administrators viewed as “completely out of harmony with the
50. Olken, supra note 45, at 296.
51. Id. at 299–300.
52. Id. at 300 (“Although much of Sutherland’s published opinion in Grosjean
seemingly relied upon the First Amendment, it also contained several oblique references
to economic liberty, which the author probably muted in order to appease Cardozo and
maintain what was otherwise a fragile consensus.”).
53. See infra section III.B.
54. See Sam Lebovic, Free Speech and Unfree News: The Paradox of Press Freedom
in America 85–86 (2016).
55. Editorial Paragraphs, Nation, Feb. 26, 1936, at 234.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Emery, supra note 32, at 223.
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intent of the entire [National Recovery Administration] system.”59 Under
Elisha Hanson’s leadership, the drafting committee made the code “the
only voluntary code in the country”60 and included open-shop provisions
and exemptions from child-labor laws. Hanson also inserted a ﬁnal clause
stating that the adoption of the code should not “be construed as
waiving, abrogating, or modifying any rights secured under the
Constitution . . . or limiting the freedom of the press.”61
While most big newspaper chains cheered Hanson’s tactics,62 there
were some revelatory dissents. The New York Evening Post, for instance,
called Hanson’s code “a chiseling performance.”63 “Big business,” the
Evening Post argued, “has merely raised the freedom of the press issue as
a smokescreen.”64 In the end, the Roosevelt Administration accepted the
voluntary code, though only after striking the open-shop and child-labor
provisions.65 President Roosevelt also insisted on issuing a statement
announcing that the freedom of the press clause was “pure surplussage”:
“The freedom guaranteed by the Constitution is freedom of expression
and that will be scrupulously respected—but it is not freedom to work
children, or to do business in a ﬁre trap or violate the laws against
obscenity, libel and lewdness.”66
As the relationship between President Roosevelt and the newspaper
industry deteriorated in the spring of 1934,67 corporate lawyers and their
clients in other industries were considering how best to attack the
legitimacy of the New Deal. Although former Solicitor General and
Democratic presidential candidate John W. Davis had endorsed
Roosevelt in the 1932 election, by December 1933 Davis was despondent.
Reﬂecting on the past year, he told a friend that the National Industrial
Recovery Administration had “advocated things little short of a universal
reign of terror.”68 That same month, two of Davis’s old political allies,
John Raskob and Jouett Shouse, were discussing what to do in the wake
of their successful campaign to repeal Prohibition.69 Like Davis, Raskob
and Shouse had seen Prohibition as an affront to the free market and a
harbinger of an expanding federal police power.70 After the passage of
the Twenty-First Amendment on December 5, 1933, Raskob, Shouse, the
du Pont brothers, and other corporate leaders of the anti-Prohibition
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Lebovic, supra note 54, at 70–71.
Id. at 70.
Emery, supra note 32, at 225.
Alfred McClung Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America 242 (1937).
Lebovic, supra note 54, at 71.
Id.
Id.
Lee, supra note 62, at 243 (quoting March 12, 1934, order).
See Graham J. White, FDR and the Press 49–66 (1979).
William H. Harbaugh, Lawyer’s Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis 343 (1973).
See Wolfskill, supra note 32, at 54.
See id. at 39, 55; Goldstein, supra note 32, at 292 & nn. 31–32.
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campaign agreed to “continue to meet from time to time” and consider
“the formation of a group . . . which would in the event of danger to the
Federal Constitution, stand ready to defend the faith of the fathers.”71
By the summer of 1934, it was clear to the corporate antiProhibitionists that the New Deal was just such a threat to the “faith of
fathers.” In July, Davis traveled to the University of Virginia to decry the
rhetoric of “emergency” that had licensed the rejection of “the basic
American doctrine of a limitation on the powers of government.”72 The
next month, he returned to New York to meet with Raskob, Shouse,
former presidential candidate Al Smith, and a host of industrialists,
ﬁnanciers, and lawyers. The purpose of the meeting was to establish a
new organization, modeled on the anti-Prohibition campaign, but with a
broader goal: to challenge the “constitutional validity of the New Deal.”73
In debating what to call the organization, most members proposed
names reﬂecting the immediate ﬁnancial interests that drove their
opposition to the New Deal. Alfred Sloan suggested “Association
Asserting the Rights of Property,” Shouse the “National Property
League,” and E.F. Hutton the “American Federation of Business.”74 But it
was Davis’s idea to give the new group a more ideologically capacious and
ambiguous name: “the American Liberties League.”75 Shouse, who
became the League’s president, got the point. On August 24, he
convened a press conference at which he announced the formation of
the American Liberty League (ALL), emphasizing that it was a
nonpartisan organization and that its acronym, “ALL,” represented the
fact that “the League spoke for all of the American people, whose
liberties were under attack by the New Deal.”76
Despite Shouse and Davis’s appeals to the liberty of all, many saw the
League’s universalism as a thin veil for self-interest. Newsweek announced
that “[t]he Tories have come out of ambush,” and the Christian Century
considered it foolish to interpret “the stated aims of the League as
implying anything less than a concerted attack upon the main features of
the President’s policies.”77 President Roosevelt himself “compared the
league with a mythical organization formed to uphold strongly two of the

71. Wolfskill, supra note 32, at 54–55.
72. Harbaugh, supra note 68.
73. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 294; see also Wolfskill, supra note 32, at 25–28.
74. Robert F. Burk, The Corporate State and the Broker State: The Du Ponts and
American Politics, 1925–1940, at 138 (1990).
75. Id. at 141. Davis proposed “the Liberty League” as an alternative, which the
group eventually adopted in becoming “the American Liberty League.” Id.
76. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 294; see also Shouse Elected by Liberty League, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 7, 1934), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=990DE1D
F103CE23ABC4F53DFBF66838F629EDE (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing the ALL as “undertaken to appraise the ‘New Deal’ for the public”).
77. Wolfskill, supra note 32, at 29.
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Ten Commandments but disregarding the other eight.”78 “[T]he tenets
of the organization appear[] to be to ‘love thy God but forget thy
neighbor,’” Roosevelt explained, only “‘God,’ in this case, appear[s] to be
property.”79 Four days later, the Times reported that Arthur Garﬁeld Hays,
general counsel of the ACLU, had sent the League a series of questions
concerning “how far the organization would go in protecting the
constitutional rights of radicals and liberal minorities.”80 Hays asked:
“Will you protect the right of assemblage for people to express views with
which you violently disapprove—for Communists, for instance? Will you
insist upon the right of a free press in the same sense?”81
It is tempting to share this contemporaneous skepticism about the
ALL’s invocations of liberty. Yet Davis was no fair-weather civil libertarian.
In 1931, he had taken to the Supreme Court the case of a Canadian
theologian denied naturalization because of his paciﬁst beliefs.82 And just
months after his 5-4 defeat in that case, Davis agreed to defend Theodore
Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and other members of the National Committee
for the Defense of Political Prisoners, who were facing potential
extradition from New York to Kentucky for their role in the coal
miners’ strike in Harlan County.83 The meaning of civil liberties in this
period was truly up for grabs,84 and Davis’s decision to help found the
ALL in 1934 was one of the many plausible paths available to a civil
libertarian faced with the social, political, and economic upheaval of the
Great Depression.
As Grosjean demonstrated, no issue better exempliﬁed the slippery
boundary between civil and economic liberty in the 1930s than press
freedom. Unsurprisingly, then, Davis soon found himself in the midst of
a major free press case, in which the Associated Press (AP) argued that
the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB’s) oversight of newsroom
78. Roosevelt Twits Liberty League as Lover of Property, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 1934),
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=9F07E6D6133CE23ABC4D51DFBE668
38F629EDE (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
79. Id.
80. Pledges Pour In at Liberty League, N.Y. Times (Aug. 29, 1934), http://query.
nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=9402E7DF123FE53ABC4151DFBE66838F629EDE
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
81. Id.
82. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). The ACLU had wanted the case,
and one of its founders, Felix Frankfurter, provided advice and encouragement
throughout the proceedings. See Ronald B. Flowers, To Defend the Constitution:
Religion, Conscientious Objection, Naturalization, and the Supreme Court 154–55 (2003);
Letter from Charles Clark to Alan Wardwell (May 1, 1930) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in John W. Davis Papers, Yale Univ., series IX, box 175 [hereinafter JWDP]; Letter
from Charles Clark to Charles Poletti (May 5, 1930) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review),
in JWDP, supra, series IX, box 175; Letter from Charles Poletti to Felix Frankfurter (May 6,
1930) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in JWDP, supra, series IX, box 175.
83. Letter from Theodore Dreiser to John W. Davis (Nov. 21, 1931) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in JWDP, supra note 82, series VII, box 162.
84. See generally Weinrib, Civil Liberties, supra note 29; Zackin, supra note 29.
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employees violated the First Amendment. Davis’s path to the Supreme
Court in Associated Press v. NLRB 85 began in June 1935 when he joined
with Earl F. Reed—who would later argue the more famous NLRB case,
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.86—and ﬁfty-six other prominent attorneys to
establish the ALL’s Lawyers’ Vigilance Committee.87 The purpose of the
Committee was to analyze the constitutional validity of various New Deal
programs and to prepare test cases to topple them. Its ﬁrst action was to
declare, by unanimous vote, the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce and a violation of the Fifth Amendment rights of
employers and employees to contract freely.88
That same fall, lawyers at the NLRB were also looking for cases to
test the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. In particular, they needed a
case involving interstate transportation or communication, in addition to
the manufacturing test cases they already had in play.89 The Board’s
lawyers found one in the plight of Morris Watson, an editor as well as an
American Newspaper Guild organizer at the AP.90 Watson was ﬁred
shortly after the nearly unanimous vote of AP employees to bargain
collectively under the Guild’s stewardship.91 While AP General Manager
Kent Cooper had written that Watson’s dismissal was “solely on the
grounds of his work not being on a basis for which he has shown
capability,”92 the NLRB’s regional director Elinor Herrick discovered a
memorandum in Watson’s ﬁle stating, “He is an agitator and disturbs
morale of staff at a time when we need especially their loyalty and best
performance.”93 On this basis, the NLRB initiated a proceeding against
the AP for illegal labor practices in its effort to forestall unionization.94
On January 17, 1936, Davis, as the AP’s outside counsel,
unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction against the NLRB,
repeating the arguments that ALL’s Vigilance Committee had outlined
the previous fall.95 Then, on April 8, the NLRB trial examiner, Yale Law
School Dean Charles Clark, “denied [Davis’s] motion to dismiss the case

85. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
86. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
87. Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 244 (1982); Wolfskill, supra note 32, at
70–71.
88. Nat’l Lawyers Comm. of the Am. Liberty League, Report on the Constitutionality
of the National Labor Relations Act (1935).
89. Irons, supra note 87, at 265.
90. Harbaugh, supra note 68, at 373.
91. Id.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Irons, supra note 87, at 265.
94. Id.
95. Harbaugh, supra note 68, at 374; Irons, supra note 87, at 266.
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on constitutional grounds,” at which point Davis withdrew, claiming that
Clark lacked jurisdiction to hear the case at all.96
Pending appellate review of Clark’s decision, the AP’s General
Manager Kent Cooper reported to Davis that many members of his board
felt that the underlying constitutional issue was not Fifth Amendment
property and contract rights but the First Amendment’s protection of
press freedom.97 Some AP members had already ﬂoated this argument in
their editorial pages, suggesting that Watson had been ﬁred for
“deliberately color[ing] the news reports.”98 Cooper himself insisted that
the central question was whether the news would remain “‘unsullied’ by
the bias of self-interested employees.”99 These views echoed those of
ANPA and its general counsel, Hanson, who had been arguing since 1933
that closed shops infringed on press freedom.100 And in December 1936,
ANPA addressed the Associated Press case directly: “[T]he inclusion of all
editorial employees in the guild,” Hanson warned, “would lead to biased
news writing and consequently to the violation of freedom of the
press.”101 Hanson would ﬁle an amicus brief reiterating these arguments
when Associated Press reached the Supreme Court a few months later.
Back in the spring of 1936, however, Davis remained skeptical that
“employee-employer relations fell under the purview of the First
Amendment.”102 He nonetheless asked an associate assigned to the case
to “work up a First Amendment argument.”103 Both men were uncertain
whether the activities of the AP, which was not itself a publisher, could be
characterized as exercising a “press” function.104 Yet they agreed that if
the court accepted that the AP was “press,” “they could properly argue
that the Wagner Act violated both the First and Fifth amendments.”105 At
the Second Circuit oral argument, Davis did make the First Amendment
point but spent most of his time on the Fifth Amendment.106
On July 13, a unanimous three-judge panel rejected the AP’s appeal;
the opinion did not even address the First Amendment argument by

96. Irons, supra note 87, at 266–67.
97. See Letter from Kent Cooper to John Davis (June 11, 1936) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in JWDP, supra note 82, series IX, box 176.
98. Id.
99. Letter from Kent Cooper to Frank Noyes (Dec. 13, 1935) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in JWDP, supra note 82, series IX, box 176.
100. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
101. Emery, supra note 32, at 235.
102. Harbaugh, supra note 68, at 377; see also Letter from John Davis to Kent Cooper
(June 12, 1936) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in JWDP, supra note 82, series IX,
box 176.
103. Harbaugh, supra note 68, at 377.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.

2016] EARLY YEARS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM

1933

name.107 Following this defeat, however, the AP board only became more
convinced that Davis should foreground the First Amendment defense.
On July 17, Davis got word that Cooper “still reiterates his view that their
real defense . . . lies in the fact that they cannot satisfactorily maintain
their standards of impartiality in news service without a free hand in the
selection of their so-called editorial employees.”108
Filed in January 1937, Davis’s Supreme Court brief included a sixpage First Amendment argument.109 In it, Davis ﬁrst noted that the
NLRB’s “order to reinstate Watson presupposes, and is wholly dependent
upon, the power to regulate [the AP’s] gathering, production, and
dissemination of news for the American press” as an aspect of interstate
commerce.110 This being so, NLRB was treating “[n]ews and intelligence . . . as an ordinary article of commerce, subject to Federal
supervision and control”—“in disregard of the First Amendment to the
Constitution.”111 “Logically, and on principle alone,” Davis concluded,
“the National Labor Relations Act, as applied to The Associated Press, is
thus an infringement upon that freedom of expression which is the
essence of free speech and of a free press.”112 He also added a First
Amendment absolutist grace note: “Freedom of the press and freedom of
speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, means more than
freedom from censorship by government; it means that freedom of
expression must be jealously protected from any form of governmental
control or inﬂuence.”113
In drafting his response to Davis’s free press argument, Charles Fahy,
the NLRB’s general counsel, acknowledged a broad free press right:
“[T]he right to publish the news, without previous or subsequent
restraint and without government interference with free and general
expression of opinion or circulation of news.”114 But, he continued, the
Wagner Act “is not concerned with this right” and “is not legislation
directed to the press as such.”115 “What it does do,” Fahy concluded, “is
to prevent the petitioner from destroying the freedom of its employees.”116 As discussed below, the tendency of expansive civil libertarian
107. NLRB v. Associated Press, 85 F.2d 56, 61 (2d. Cir. 1936).
108. Letter from Harold Bissell to John Davis (July 17, 1936) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in JWDP, supra note 82, series IV, box 176.
109. Brief for Petitioners at 96–102, Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937)
(No. 356), 1937 WL 40512.
110. Id. at 99.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 100.
114. Charles Fahy, Freedom of the Press 1 [hereinafter Fahy, Freedom of the Press]
(draft of reply brief) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Charles Fahy Papers 1,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum, Hyde Park, N.Y., box 50.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2.
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arguments to encroach on the rights of others would become a central
issue in the Jehovah’s Witness license-tax cases.117 Of course, this question
of the just distribution of rights—the political economy of liberty—was
also one of the central questions that Lochner-era case law raised for a
generation of progressive lawyers.118 Fahy recognized the link. In a draft
of his brief, below the ﬁnal, type-written line warning of the destruction
of employee freedom, Fahy noted by hand, “Whole freedom of press
argument is really a due process argument.”119
On February 8, while heading down to Washington for oral
argument, Davis remarked to an associate that he believed that they
would actually win the case on freedom of the press. “It was quite
possible,” he explained, “that the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation
might lose the companion case on the commerce clause and Fifth
Amendment arguments; but of all the Wagner Act appellants, the AP
alone was in a position to invoke a First Amendment argument.”120 One
reason for Davis’s newfound conﬁdence in the First Amendment
argument may have been President Roosevelt’s announcement of the
court-packing plan three days earlier.121 If moderate Justices were looking
to set some outer limit on FDR’s imperious designs, the First Amendment
provided as “liberal” a limit as any. Davis’s good friend from Wall Street,
Grenville Clark, would soon make a similar calculation, turning to First
Amendment advocacy as a way to relegitimize judicial review.122
In any event, Davis’s performance before the Supreme Court
conﬁrmed that sometime between July 1936 and February 1937, he had
shed his diffidence toward the First Amendment argument. As legal
scholar Peter Irons reports, “Davis ended [his oral argument] by
cloaking himself with the First Amendment,” calling the NLRB’s
reinstatement order “a direct, palpable, undisguised attack upon the
freedom of the press.”123 Characterizing the editorial employee ﬁred by
the Associated Press as “the writer, the reporter, the rewriter, the
composer of headlines,” Davis insisted: “The author and the product are
one and inseparable. No law, no sophistry can divide them; and if you
restrict the right to choose the one you have inevitably restricted the

117. See infra Part III.
118. See generally Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897). For scholarly discussion of the progressive reaction to these cases, see William
E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 25–64 (1999); Greene,
supra note 2, at 446–56; Norris, supra note 24, at 23–46.
119. Fahy, Freedom of the Press, supra note 114, at 2.
120. Harbaugh, supra note 68, at 378–79.
121. Id. at 379.
122. See infra notes 183–203 and accompanying text (discussing Clark’s turn against
the Roosevelt Administration after the introduction of the court-packing plan).
123. Harbaugh, supra note 68, at 379; Irons, supra note 87, at 284.
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right to choose the other.”124 “[I]f there is one ﬁeld which, under the
Constitution of the United States, escapes congressional intrusion,” Davis
went on, “that ﬁeld is the freedom of the press.”125 Presaging the antitotalitarian ideology that would soon become the normative foundation
of judge-centered civil libertarianism, Davis “[i]nvok[ed] the specter of
Nazi and Communist press restrictions”:126 “‘What more effective engine
could dictatorial power take than to name the men who shall furnish the
food of facts upon which the public must feed?’”127
On April 12, 1937, the Supreme Court handed down 5-4 decisions in
two major challenges to the NLRB. While Chief Justice Hughes resolved
the Fifth Amendment issue in his Jones & Laughlin Steel majority
opinion,128 Justice Roberts confronted Davis and Hanson’s additional
First Amendment challenge in Associated Press.129 Unlike the Second
Circuit, Justice Roberts squarely faced the issue, rejecting the argument
that in ordering the Associated Press to reinstate an editorial employee,
the NLRB had violated the company’s freedom to control the content of
its publications:
The regulation here in question has no relation whatever to the
impartial distribution of news. The order of the Board in nowise
circumscribes the full freedom and liberty of the petitioner to
publish the news as it desires it published or to enforce policies
of its own choosing with respect to the editing and rewriting of
news for publication, and the petitioner is free at any time to
discharge Watson or any editorial employee who fails to comply
with the policies it may adopt.130
In dissent, Justice Sutherland and the three other remaining
“conservatives” slammed the majority’s narrow view of press freedom.
One year earlier, Sutherland had written the Court’s unanimous decision
in Grosjean, and he now doubled down on that decision’s expansive First
Amendment vision:
In a matter of such concern, the judgment of Congress—or, still
less, the judgment of an administrative censor—cannot, under
the Constitution, be substituted for that of the press
management in respect of the employment or discharge of
employees engaged in editorial work. The good which might
come to interstate commerce or the beneﬁt which might result
to a special group, however large, must give way to that higher
good of all the people so plainly contemplated by the
124. Olken, supra note 45, at 313–14 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
app. at 734 (1937)).
125. Harbaugh, supra note 68, at 380 (quoting Associated Press, 301 U.S. app. at 734).
126. Irons, supra note 87, at 284.
127. Id.(quoting Associated Press, 301 U.S. app. at 733).
128. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43–49 (1937).
129. Associated Press, 301 U.S. 103.
130. Id. at 133.
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imperative requirement that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom . . . of the press.”131
With these words, Sutherland offered his own, avant la lettre account
of bifurcated review. Even if one accepted—as the new majority effectively had—that class legislation with a rational basis was constitutionally
sound, the judiciary should not defer to such political and economic
calculations if they interfered with the exercise of First Amendment
rights.132 At the time Grosjean was decided, some liberals had worried that
the case might authorize just such an argument, transforming government efforts to create a fairer economic order into civil libertarian
violations.133 The Associated Press majority cut off that possibility for the
time being, but the Associated Press dissent—the Four Horsemen’s last
gambit against the New Deal order—would come to play a surprisingly
important role in the peddling-tax debate of the early 1940s.134
B.

From the Anti–New Deal First Amendment to Footnote Four

In a strange but telling twist of fate, Justice Sutherland’s Associated
Press dissent previewed the mix of formalism and functionalism that, one
year later, would undergird Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co.135 By that time, Justice Sutherland had retired, and the legal
131. Id. at 137 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
132. See id. at 135.
Legislation which contravenes the liberties of the First Amendment
might not contravene liberties of another kind falling only within the
terms of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, we have held that the
governmental power of taxation, one of the least limitable of the powers,
may not be exerted so as to abridge the freedom of the press albeit the
same tax might be entirely valid if challenged under the “liberty”
guaranty of the Fifth Amendment, apart from those liberties embraced
by the First.
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936)).
133. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (describing the Nation’s critique of
Grosjean on this basis).
134. See infra Part III.
135. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a speciﬁc prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the ﬁrst ten
amendments, which are deemed equally speciﬁc when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny . . . . [O]n restraints upon the dissemination of
information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson; Grosjean v. American Press
Co.
Nor need we enquire . . . whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied

2016] EARLY YEARS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM

1937

threat to core New Deal programs seemed to have subsided. An
increasingly aggressive Nazi regime, however, was providing a horrifying
example of the danger that majoritarian, single-party rule could pose to
the rights of minorities and dissenters. This example deeply affected
Justice Stone and inﬂuenced his composition of what would become
paragraphs two and three of Footnote Four, suggesting heightened
scrutiny of legislation interfering with the political process or motivated
by “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”136 It was the
inﬂuence of Chief Justice Hughes, however, that prompted Justice Stone
to include the Footnote’s ﬁrst, most formalistic paragraph.
In April 1938, Chief Justice Hughes told Justice Stone that he was
“somewhat disturbed” by an early draft of “Note 4.”137 Was it really true
that “different considerations”—different from those that gave rise to an
economic regulation’s presumption of constitutionality—“apply in the
instances” Justice Stone had initially singled out for heightened scrutiny?138 “Are the ‘considerations’ different,” Hughes asked, “or does the
difference lie not in the test but in the nature of the right invoked?”139
The Chief Justice was suggesting that Stone’s reasons for withholding the
presumption of constitutionality were really rooted in formal,
constitutional rights:
When we say that a statute is invalid on its face, do we not mean
that, in relation to the right invoked against it, the legislative
action raises no presumption in its favor and has no rational
support? Thus, in dealing with freedom of speech and of the
press . . . the legislative action putting the press broadly under
license and censorship is directly opposed to the constitutional
guaranty and for that reason has no presumption to support
it.140
While Chief Justice Hughes’s letter focused on the judicial protection of the First Amendment, the logic of his argument was broader
and entailed no necessary distinction between civil liberties and other
constitutional rights. Notably, in the spring of 1938, Chief Justice Hughes
upon to protect minorities [citing cases rejecting economic
discrimination against out-of-state businesses].
Id. (citations omitted).
136. For the impact that Nazism had on Justice Stone while drafting Carolene Products,
see William E. Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology in New York,
1920–1980, at 121–37 (2001).
137. Letter from Charles Evans Hughes, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan
Fiske Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 18, 1938), in Louis Lusky, Our Nine
Tribunes: The Supreme Court in Modern America 179 (1993) [hereinafter Hughes to
Stone (Apr. 18, 1938)]; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 713, 743–44 (1985); Linzer, supra note 15, at 282–83; Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A
Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1106 (1982).
138. Hughes to Stone (Apr. 18, 1938), supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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was resisting calls from within the legal academy as well as from new
Roosevelt appointees to roll back the constitutional-fact doctrine that
had long been a central pillar of his vision of limited yet active judicial
review.141 Aimed at administrative fact-ﬁnding, this doctrine sought to
ensure that even as the courts ceded a substantial degree of discretionary
authority to agencies, judges would retain a crucial role in protecting
individual constitutional rights from illegitimate political interference.
Some New Dealers, such as Justice Frankfurter, felt that the doctrine
should be eliminated altogether, lest it provide a formalistic yet inherently indeterminate vehicle for future judicial encroachments on the
political branches.142 Other New Dealers, including Justices Murphy,
Black, and Douglas, felt the doctrine could be safely transformed into a
tool for promoting a narrow set of privileged constitutional rights—
”personal liberties” that did not include economic rights in property or
contract.143 This suggestion, often attributed to Justice Brandeis’s 1927
concurrence in Whitney v. California,144 had become something of an idée
ﬁxe among those New Dealers who thought of themselves as representing
a new breed of “liberal.”145 Chief Justice Hughes and the moderate
corporate lawyers he represented, however, refused to abandon the
doctrine or limit its application to noneconomic rights.146
While prevailing on Justice Stone to recognize that textually
enumerated rights could negate Carolene Products’s “presumption of
constitutionality,” Chief Justice Hughes was also putting the ﬁnishing
141. For a thorough discussion of the legal development and political implications of
these doctrines, see generally Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare 35–51, 56 (2014);
Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 939 (2011); Mark Tushnet, The
Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in Federal Courts Stories 359 (Vicki
C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
142. See Ernst, supra note 141, at 70–71.
143. See Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 Harv. L. Rev.
1116, 1131–32 (1942) (noting in the context of administrative fact-ﬁnding that Justices
Murphy, Douglas, and Black “would retain substantive due process only in connection with
protections contained in the Bill of Rights” and “civil liberties”). See also Emerson and
Helfeld arguing:
[W]here rights under the First Amendment are at stake—rights to which the
courts have consistently given a preferred constitutional status—the negative
features of judicial review serve an especially useful purpose. In such situations
the presumption of administrative legality is reversed, or at least neutral, and
careful scrutiny by a second agency becomes of positive value.
Thomas I. Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 Yale
L.J. 1, 112 (1948).
144. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally Vincent Blasi,
The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v.
California, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 653 (1988).
145. See Louis Jaffe, Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 984
(1957).
146. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 Harv. L.
Rev. 718, 767–69 (2016) (reviewing Ernst, supra note 141).
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touches on another opinion that would raise doubts about the degree of
deference that judges should afford the New Deal state. Handed down
the same day as Carolene Products, Chief Justices Hughes’s decision in
Morgan v. United States (Morgan II) 147 surprised many New Deal administrators by announcing that the mixing of prosecutorial and judicial
functions within an agency could violate “fundamental requirements of
fairness” and thus render an agency’s action unconstitutional.148 Since
the early twentieth century, the combination of prosecutorial and judicial
functions had been a distinctive feature of many agencies, including the
NLRB, and Hughes had passed over this feature in silence while
upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act the previous year. But
now Hughes announced that, in order to protect “the liberty and
property of the citizen,” courts should review administrative
decisionmaking for its conformity with an indeterminate set of
“fundamental requirements” summed up by the shibboleth “fair play.”149
“Fair play,” Chief Justice Hughes concluded, did not permit the mixing
of prosecutorial and judicial functions that the Department of
Agriculture had used in determining the maximum price that stockyard
agents could charge farmers for the privilege of selling their animals.150
How much mixing was too much mixing remained unclear, but the
substantive outcome was the invalidation of the Department’s economic
intervention on behalf of farmers and against stockyard agents. As
Morgan II demonstrated, a regulated party’s right to “fair play,” though
not an economic right in itself, could serve to frustrate the government’s
efforts to restructure the nation’s political economy.151
Joining Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion in Morgan II, Justice Stone
also added a ﬁrst paragraph to Carolene Products’s Footnote Four.152
Tracking the Chief Justice’s approach to constitutional facts, this
paragraph did not distinguish between economic and noneconomic
rights and left it to judges to determine when legislation facially
infringed upon constitutional text: “There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a speciﬁc prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the ﬁrst ten amendments, which are deemed equally
speciﬁc when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”153 Meanwhile,
the second two paragraphs of the Footnote, as Justice Stone had
explained to Chief Justice Hughes, aimed to “avoid the possibility of
147. 304 U.S. 1 (1938). The Court ﬁrst heard the Morgan case in 1936, remanding for
further development of the record. Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468
(1936).
148. Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 19–20; see also Ernst, supra note 141, at 71–74.
149. Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 15–16, 19–20.
150. Id. at 15.
151. Id.
152. See Linzer, supra note 15, at 283.
153. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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having . . . the presumption of constitutionality in the ordinary run of
due process cases applied as a matter of course to . . . more exceptional
cases” when there arose “possible restraints on liberty and political rights
which do not fall within those speciﬁc prohibitions [of the constitutional
text] and are forbidden only by the general words of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”154
Yet Justice Stone’s inclusion of the Hughesian ﬁrst paragraph
introduced a fundamental ambiguity into the Footnote’s reasoning:
“[T]he ordinary run of due process cases”155 marginalized by the body of
the Carolene Products opinion included those cases that jurists had long
seen as involving regulations that “appear[ed] on [their] face[s] to be
within a speciﬁc prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the ﬁrst
ten amendments”156—namely, the Fifth’s protections of property.157 Even
the third paragraph undermined the clean break with the Court’s earlier
economic jurisprudence that the body of Carolene Products seemed to
announce.158 The precedents on which Justice Stone relied for
heightened review of regulation affecting politically vulnerable “discrete
and insular minorities” were cases in which the Court had rejected a
state’s economic “discrimination” against out-of-state businesses.159 Criticism of this speciﬁc kind of “class” legislation could be nicely reconciled
with the New Deal Court’s expansive reading of the Commerce Clause
and its nationalizing ambitions. But such criticism also recalled the
broader, anti-redistributionist interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause that had long undergirded the Court’s opposition to “class”
legislation favoring the interests of wage laborers over those of property
owners.160 It was on this economically libertarian interpretation of equal
protection that Justice Sutherland had initially wished to ground
Grosjean, only acquiescing to the First Amendment approach to appease
his more progressive colleagues.161

154. Hughes to Stone (Apr. 18, 1938), supra note 137, at 180.
155. Id.
156. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
157. Cf. Ackerman, supra note 137, at 743–44 (“In calling the Bill of Rights ‘speciﬁc,’
Justice Stone doubtless wished to emphasize that the Court had learned its lesson in 1937
and would not use the Constitution’s grand abstractions to revive the laissez faire
capitalism of the Lochner era. Nonetheless, by framing its pledge of judicial restraint in this
way, Carolene added a distortion of its own.”).
158. See 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
159. See id. (citing South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819); and cases cited therein).
160. See William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–1920, in 2
The Cambridge History of Law in America 643, 645–46 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008); Claudio J. Katz, Protective Labor Legislation in the Courts:
Substantive Due Process and Fairness in the Progressive Era, 31 Law & Hist. Rev. 275, 275
(2013).
161. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
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In 1937, the Associated Press minority’s effort to transform Grosjean
into an expansive, economically libertarian interpretation of the First
Amendment had failed to carry the day. A year later, however, the shadow
that Footnote Four cast over Carolene Products’s “presumption of
constitutionality” raised new questions about the distinction between
economic liberty and civil liberty and about which institutions—the
political branches or the judiciary—would determine the boundaries of
that distinction.
II. POPULARIZING THE ANTI–NEW DEAL FIRST AMENDMENT
When anti–New Dealers failed to secure an expansive, economically
libertarian reading of the First Amendment in Associated Press, New Deal
politics were in a state of transition. On the one hand, President
Roosevelt had recently scored resounding presidential and congressional
victories in the fall of 1936, thanks in part to his populist attacks on the
ALL’s patrician, constitutional formalism.162 On the other hand, the
President’s postelection announcements of an ambitious executive
reorganization plan and an even more radical judicial reorganization
plan sparked a new phase of legal and political resistance to the New
Deal.163 In the spring and summer of 1937, this growing discontent with
President Roosevelt’s efforts to strengthen administrative governance
coincided with economic collapse at home and a surge in fascist
aggression abroad.164 Precisely at the moment President Roosevelt had
chosen to cash in his electoral mandate, executive rule looked both more
ineffective and more dangerous than ever before. The judiciary might
once more have an important role to play in safeguarding democracy.
A. The Jehovah’s Witnesses and the American Bar Association
It was within this legal and political context that the Jehovah’s
Witnesses confronted a particularly painful period in their own history,
both domestically and internationally. Shortly after Hitler’s rise to power,
an administrative order made the Nazi salute compulsory during the
singing of the National Anthem, and by 1934 the regime had established
special tribunals to try violators.165 German Witnesses systematically
refused to salute, and whole families were imprisoned or sent to the

162. See Wolfskill, supra note 32, at 247; Goldstein, supra note 32, at 321–24.
163. See Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy State 139, 154–58 (1983); Polenberg, supra note
32, at 55–78.
164. See Joanna L. Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State 21–24 (2012); Karl, supra
note 163, at 168; Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself 173–82 (2013).
165. Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich 60 (2d ed.
2001); Allert Tillman, The Hitler Salute: On the Meaning of a Gesture 61 (Jefferson Chase
trans., 2009).
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earliest concentration camps.166 Things only got worse when Hitler reinstituted conscription in 1935. Most draft-eligible Witnesses refused to
serve, in keeping with their commitment to ﬁght only for Jehovah’s
kingdom.167 German authorities summarily imprisoned all resisters and
eventually shot most of them.168
In the summer of 1935, Joseph Rutherford, the leader of the
American Witnesses, called on his congregation to stand in solidarity
with their German brethren.169 Witnesses across the country responded
to Rutherford’s call, launching a campaign of massive resistance to
compulsory ﬂag-salute laws in the American public schools.170 Between
the summer of 1935 and June 1940, “the public school ﬂag-salute
ceremony became an issue in at least twenty states, leading to actual or
imminent expulsions in sixteen.”171 The Witnesses would not, however,
be satisﬁed with mere martyrdom. Confrontation with religious and
secular governments, from Catholic churches to school boards, was a
core part of the sect’s mission.172 Accordingly, the Witnesses wanted the
expulsions of their children overturned and the compulsory-ﬂag-salute
laws invalidated.173
Their leader, Rutherford, was himself a lawyer, fond of mixing
biblical and constitutional argument. He viewed the ﬂag-salute laws as a
particularly acute example of the ungodly—and illegitimate—totalitarianism that had seized both sides of the Atlantic during the 1930s and
considered Social Security numbers to be “the mark of the beast”
foretold by the Book of Revelation.174 A legal challenge to the ﬂag-salute
laws could serve as an exemplary attack on the demonic character of the
entirety of the New Deal state. Working out of their Brooklyn
headquarters, Rutherford and his general counsel, Olin Moyle,
spearheaded the legal campaign to exempt Witness schoolchildren from
saluting the American ﬂag.175

166. Peter Brock, Conscientious Objectors in Nazi Germany, in Challenge to Mars:
Essays on Paciﬁsm from 1918 to 1945, at 370, 370–71 (Peter Brock & Thomas P. Socknat
eds., 1999) [hereinafter Brock, Conscientious Objectors].
167. Peter Brock, Jehovah’s Witnesses as Conscientious Objectors in Nazi Germany, in
Against the Draft: Essays on Conscientious Objection from the Radical Reformation to the
Second World War 425, 426 (2006).
168. Brock, Conscientious Objectors, supra note 166, at 371–72.
169. Peters, supra note 33, at 24–25.
170. Id. at 26–28, 260. At the time, the American ﬂag salute, like the “Heil Hitler,”
incorporated an outstretched right arm. See Richard A. Primus, The American Language
of Rights 198–200 (Quentin Skinner et al. eds., 1999).
171. David R. Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy 79
(1962).
172. See Peters, supra note 33, at 32–34.
173. See infra section II.B.
174. Gordon, supra note 33, at 21–29.
175. Manwaring, supra note 171, at 84; Peters, supra note 33, at 38.
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Early on, this campaign met with defeat after defeat in the courts.176
Between 1937 and 1939, the Supreme Court rejected four Witness
appeals from adverse ﬂag-salute decisions, dismissing three state court
appeals for want of a substantial federal question177 and affirming one
federal court decision.178 In ﬁnding no substantial federal question, the
Court usually cited its 1934 decision in Hamilton v. Regents,179 a
unanimous decision holding that a state could require all public
university students, even those religiously opposed to war, to take classes
in military training without violating Fourteenth Amendment due
process.180 Although the Court would not apply the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause to the states until May 1940,181 Justices Cardozo,
Brandeis, and Stone ﬁled a concurrence in Hamilton “assum[ing] for the
present purposes” that it was so incorporated and that the First
Amendment right was no bar to compulsory military training in the
public university.182
The Witnesses’ ﬁrst effort to challenge a ﬂag-salute regulation in a
federal district court—Johnson v. Deerﬁeld 183—brought their plight to the
attention of the ABA’s Special Committee on the Bill of Rights.184
Formed in September 1938, the ABA’s Bill of Rights Committee was the
brainchild of the well-connected Wall Street lawyer Grenville Clark.185
Clark conceived of the Committee as a way of wresting civil liberties law
from the control of the labor movement and the legal left—the ACLU
and the National Lawyers Guild.186 As he explained to fellow leaders of
the corporate bar in a June 1938 call to arms, “conservative and middle
elements” had “a tremendous stake in the maintenance of civil liberty”
176. Manwaring, supra note 171, at 56–80.
177. Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U.S. 621 (1939); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303
U.S. 624 (1938); Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937).
178. Johnson v. Deerﬁeld, 306 U.S. 621, reh’g denied, 306 U.S. 650 (1939).
179. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
180. Id. at 265.
181. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding “[t]he fundamental
concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment” included the First
Amendment’s right to free exercise of religion).
182. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 265 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
183. 25 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939).
184. See Letter from Zechariah Chafee to Grenville Clark (Jan. 17, 1939) [hereinafter
Chafee to Clark (Jan. 17, 1939)] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Grenville Clark
Papers, Rainer Library, Dartmouth Coll., series VIII, box 2 [hereinafter GCP].
185. See Dunne, supra note 32, at 105–06; ABA, The American Bar Association’s
Committee on the Bill of Rights, 1 Bill Rts. Rev. 1 (1940), in GCP, supra note 184, series
VIII, box 11.
186. For early statements of his vision, see Letter from Grenville Clark to Arthur
Garﬁeld Hays 1–2 (Jan. 22, 1938) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra
note 184, series VI, box 1 [hereinafter Clark to Hays (Jan. 22, 1938)]; Memorandum from
Grenville Clark 2 (June 21, 1938) [hereinafter Clark, Memorandum (June 21, 1938)] (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VI, box 1; see also
Weinrib, Civil Liberties, supra note 29, at 412–29.
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and “the maintenance of civil liberty [would], in the long run, mainly
depend” upon them.187
Clark’s discovery of the “tremendous stake” that he and his
colleagues had in “the maintenance of civil liberty” was a quite recent
development, dating to President Roosevelt’s 1937 effort to redesign the
Supreme Court.188 A moderate Republican, Clark had supported
Roosevelt’s reelection bid in 1936 but became incensed months later
when the victorious President announced his court-packing plan.189 Over
the next six months, Clark spearheaded elite legal resistance to the
President’s vision, forming the National Committee for Independent
Courts (NCIC) to coordinate anti-court-packing efforts.190
Like so many of his colleagues, Clark interpreted President
Roosevelt’s plan as a totalitarian assault on the rule of law.191 But Clark’s
reaction was distinct in two respects. First, he insisted on the bipartisan
nature of the anti-court-packing cause, going so far as to give NCIC ﬂiers
the subtitle: “A Committee of Citizens, All of Whom Favored the
President’s Election in 1936, and All of Whom Are Opposed to the
President’s Supreme Court Proposal.”192 Opposition to court packing did
not mean opposition to President Roosevelt or the Democratic Party—it
meant defense of a prepolitical legal order. Second, Clark would go
further than perhaps any lawyer of his generation in synthesizing the
defense of judicial review with the defense of civil rights and civil
liberties. In the summer of 1937, as the court-packing bill went down to
defeat, Clark’s advocacy transitioned almost seamlessly into a more
general campaign for civil libertarian reform.193
An early indication of Clark’s pivot to civil liberties came in an article
he wrote for the May 1937 “Supreme Court” issue of the Yale Review.194
187. Clark, Memorandum (June 21, 1938), supra note 186, at 2. Clark forwarded this
planning memorandum to leading New York attorneys, including Henry Shattuck, Elihu
Root, Jr., and C.C. Burlingham. See Memorandum Cover Sheet from Grenville Clark
(June 27, 1938) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VI,
box 1; see also Grenville Clark, Conservatism and Civil Liberty (June 11, 1938)
[hereinafter Clark, Conservatism and Civil Liberty Speech] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series XXI, box 5.
188. Dunne, supra note 32, at 97 (“Prior to his confrontation with the President, Clark
had given little to the speciﬁc subject of Bill of Rights guarantees, aside from some
collaboration with [President James] Conant of Harvard in opposing teachers’ oaths.”).
189. Id. at 78–80.
190. Id. at 80–81.
191. For the antitotalitarian climate that deﬁned the court-packing debate, see
Benjamin, L. Alpers, Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture 129–56 (2003);
Victoria Nourse, In Reckless Hands 116–20 (2008).
192. Dunne, supra note 32, at 81.
193. Id. at 98 (“[T]actical defense of the Supreme Court led necessarily in Clark’s
mind to a defense of the Constitution in general terms and constitutional guarantees in
particular.”).
194. Grenville Clark, The Supreme Court Issue, 26 Yale Rev. 669 (1937) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series XXI, box 1.
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Clark’s contribution took up the court-packing debate and sought to
show that the Hughes Court, then being assailed as irredeemably
backward, had actually been “reasonably ﬂexible in construing the
Constitution to enable both federal and state action to meet new
needs . . . .”195 The ultimate target of the Court’s detractors, Clark
implied, was not the pace of policy but constitutionalism itself—and its
vital adjunct, judicial review.196 Salient to this argument was the Hughes
Court’s civil libertarian record. Noting liberal criticisms of the Court for
“unduly magnif[ying] the scope of the ‘due process’ clause so as unduly
to restrict government regulation,” Clark insisted on the “important fact”
that not all due process cases were about economic regulation.197 Due
process jurisprudence also encompassed “the decisions involving civil
liberties—the personal rights of the individual guaranteed by the First
Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights.”198 When it came
to “free press,” “free speech and the right of assembly,” and “cases
involving the right to a fair trial,” the Hughes Court was a liberal court
and “little reasonable criticism” could be leveled at it.199 Surely, the
Court’s detractors did not wish to check this important work?
After reading the Yale Review piece, Clark’s college classmate and old
friend Felix Frankfurter, who had refused to condemn court packing,
responded with a warning: “[Y]our view of the Supreme Court, as the
great safe-guard of those democratic institutions that you and I so
passionately care about, is much too romantic and too simpliﬁed.”200 To
Frankfurter’s dismay, Clark would spend the next year publicly
celebrating robust judicial review as the cornerstone of civil liberties and
American democracy. His ﬁrst major campaign stop, in January 1938, was
a series of lectures at the New School for Social Research titled “The Bill
of Rights.”201 These lectures laid out Clark’s vision of the federal judiciary
as privileged guardian of the Bill of Rights—both against the federal
government and against the states.
Zechariah Chafee, Frankfurter’s Harvard Law School colleague and
the leading First Amendment theorist of the day, also thought that
Clark’s vision of judicial civil libertarianism was ﬂawed, though for more
technical reasons. As Chafee cautioned Clark, the ﬁrst eight amendments
195. Id. at 669.
196. Id. at 670.
197. Id. at 681.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Grenville Clark (July 1, 1937) [hereinafter
Frankfurter to Clark (July 1, 1937)] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra
note 184, series VI, box 1. For Clark and Frankfurter’s court-packing correspondence, see
Dunne, supra note 32, at 84–88.
201. Grenville Clark, The Constitution: The Bill of Rights, Six Lectures Delivered at
the New School for Social Research (Jan.–Feb. 1938) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series XXI, box 5.
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of the Constitution were far from fully incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the contemporary federal courts did not seem eager to
become the police of state government.202 While sounding a note of
deference to Chafee’s expertise, Clark demurred, writing that “virtually
everything in the ﬁrst eight amendments is protected against state
infringement.”203 While Chafee’s understanding of the case law was more
accurate than Clark’s, he and Clark would soon be working together to
make the latter’s vision a reality.
It was also around this time that Clark began to assemble a small
group of “pretty cautious and conservative” lawyers to promote the cause
of civil liberties.204 To this end, two months after concluding his New
School lectures, he gave a speech to ANPA.205 As discussed in Part I,
ANPA and its general counsel Hanson were early innovators in using the
language and law of civil liberties to critique federal and state regulation,
even when such regulation primarily targeted economic activity.206 ANPA
had cast considerable constitutional doubt on circulation taxes in the
1936 Grosjean case and in 1937, had worked with Davis to challenge the
NLRB on First Amendment grounds.207 A year after the Court turned
back this challenge in Associated Press, Clark gave ANPA the red meat it
wanted, endorsing the free speech rights of employers as a shield against
the New Deal’s prolabor machinations.208
Clark’s campaign for a moderate-to-conservative civil libertarian
front against New Deal threats to the rule of law reached its climax in
a June speech before the Nassau County Bar Association. Titled
“Conservatism and Civil Liberty,” the speech linked Clark’s call for a
neutral civil libertarianism that protected rich and poor, employee and
employer alike, to the previous year’s court-packing ﬁght.209 The ABA
had managed to defeat President Roosevelt’s designs then, Clark
explained, because of the “conviction, arrived at both by reason and
instinct, that the proposal . . . was fundamentally a threat to our civil
liberties.”210 He argued that the same “zeal and power that manifested
202. Letter from Grenville Clark to Zechariah Chafee (Jan. 25, 1938) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) in GCP, supra note 184, series VI, box 1; Letter from Zechariah
Chafee to Grenville Clark (Jan. 29, 1938) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP,
supra note 184, series VI, box 1.
203. Letter from Grenville Clark to Zechariah Chafee (Jan. 31, 1938) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VI, box 1.
204. Clark to Hays (Jan. 22, 1938), supra note 186.
205. Grenville Clark, The Relation of the Press to the Maintenance of Civil Liberty
(Apr. 27, 1938) [hereinafter Clark, Relation of the Press] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series XXI, box 5; see also Dunne, supra note 32, at 99.
206. See supra section I.A.
207. See supra section I.A.
208. Clark, Relation of the Press Speech, supra note 205.
209. Clark, Conservatism and Civil Liberty, supra note 187. For an analysis of the
speech, see Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra note 32, at 412–15.
210. Clark, Conservatism and Civil Liberty Speech, supra note 187.
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itself in the crisis of a year ago . . . should be better organized for
opposition to other attacks on civil liberty that are constantly
occurring.”211 The success of this speech spurred the ABA into action. In
August, the Journal of the American Bar Association reprinted the speech
and the ABA’s House of Delegates approved the formation of a new
Special Committee on the Bill of Rights, the committee that Clark had
been envisioning, in one form or another, for the past, frantic year.212
On the cusp of becoming chairman of the new venture, Clark wrote
to Douglas Arant, cofounder of the previous year’s National Committee
for Independent Courts and future member of the Bill of Rights
Committee.213 Clark mused about writing a short book on this “civil
liberties business” and explained that the two interests that had occupied
him and Arant for some time now—“independence of the courts” and
“sound national ﬁnance”—were “aspects . . . of the broader subject.”214
Like ANPA’s civil libertarian advocacy on behalf of an independent and
ﬁnancially powerful press, Clark and Arant’s vision of strong judicial
enforcement of civil libertarian rights was inextricably bound up with a
political economic outlook increasingly anxious about New Deal
experiments.215 While more moderate on this point than Hanson or
Davis, Clark’s appeal to the relatively conservative American Bar to
embrace civil liberties in order to safeguard its own social status was far
from politically or economically neutral. Indeed, in an October 26
planning memorandum, Clark identiﬁed the “regulation of the radio
and the screen” and the “procedure of administrative tribunals” as the
top two emerging civil libertarian problems.216 Noting the Bar’s
increasing impatience with New Deal agency procedures, Clark wrote:
There is widespread and serious complaint that the practice of
permitting a tribunal to make an investigation, ﬁle a complaint,
prosecute the complaint, and also try it and pronounce judg-

211. Id.
212. Grenville Clark, Conservatism and Civil Liberty, 24 A.B.A. J. 640, 640 (1938);
Letter from Arthur Vanderbilt, President, ABA, to Grenville Clark (July 6, 1938) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VI, box 2 (describing praise
for the speech among the Nassau Bar and saying he hoped “to have something to say
along the same line in my Annual Address”); see also Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra
note 32, at 412–17.
213. Letter from Grenville Clark to Douglas Arant (July 15, 1938) [hereinafter Clark
to Arant (July 15, 1938)] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184,
series XXI, box 5.
214. Id.
215. Clark’s 1938 civil libertarian campaign coincided with the trough of the 1937–
1938 recession. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text (discussing the political
economic context).
216. Memorandum from Grenville Clark to Committee Members as to Meeting in
New York, November 17–18, 1938, at 8–9 (Oct. 26, 1938) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 2.
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ment on it, violates principles of justice and is contrary to the
spirit if not the letter of the Bill of Rights.217
Where Clark and the Bill of Rights Committee really differed from
earlier civil libertarian challenges to New Deal administration was in
terms of tactics. Just as Clark had insisted that the opponents of court
packing present themselves as a group of disillusioned Roosevelt voters,
he thought it wisest for the Bill of Rights Committee to emphasize the
defense of underdogs. By building common ground with marginal
litigants and left-wing civil libertarians, Clark hoped to articulate a set of
general principles—a civil libertarian sensibility—that would, in the end,
redound to the beneﬁt of more powerful social actors threatened by
administrative government. As he explained to Douglas Arant, the goal
was to establish a “line of thought”: “one of ﬁrm resistance to authoritarian ideas . . . whether in suppressing assembly, or censoring the radio
or unnecessarily regimenting the children or intimidating employers
from speaking their minds or impairing the independence of the courts
or in any other way tending towards the undue subordination of the
individual to the State.”218
The ﬁrst opportunity to “educat[e] the opinion of the Bar and
public” came in the fall of 1938 when the Committee ﬁled an amicus
brief in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, opposing the efforts
of a corrupt Jersey City mayor to shut down prolabor protests and
leaﬂeting.219 The following January, as the Hague brief was making the
rounds in elite legal circles,220 Harvard Law School Professor George K.
Gardner was closely following the saga of three Jehovah’s Witness
schoolchildren who had been expelled from a public school in western
Massachusetts.221 When the Supreme Court declined to consider these
217. Id. at 9. That same fall, Roscoe Pound of the ABA’s Special Committee on
Administrative Law denounced such “administrative absolutism.” Report of the Special
Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Ann. Rep. A.B.A., 1938, at 331, 343–68.
218. Letter from Grenville Clark to Douglas Arant 2 (Mar. 31, 1939) [hereinafter
Clark to Arant (Mar. 31, 1939)] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note
184, series VIII, box 1.
219. Dunne, supra note 32, at 103–09.
220. The Hague brief elicited early praise from across the political spectrum,
applauded by former Liberty Leaguer Davis as well as New Deal die-hards Justice Douglas
and Justice Frankfurter. See Letter from John W. Davis to Grenville Clark (Jan. 1, 1939)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 2 (“It is
well done and I am glad the Bar Assn. under your leadership has taken this stand.”); Letter
from William O. Douglas, Chairman, SEC, to Grenville Clark (Jan. 5, 1939) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 2 (“[T]his contribution
to civilized government is memorable.”); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Grenville Clark
(Dec. 31, 1938) [hereinafter Frankfurter to Clark (Dec. 31, 1938)] (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 2 (“It’s a very good brief,
intrinsically, and of course its symbolic signiﬁcance makes it a document of ﬁrst
importance.”).
221. Letter from George K. Gardner to Zechariah Chafee (Jan. 12, 1939) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 3.
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Witnesses’ appeal in Johnson v. Deerﬁeld, Gardner reached out to his
colleague Chafee, whom Clark had since coaxed into joining the Bill of
Rights Committee and who had coauthored the Hague amicus brief.222
The day after Chafee received Gardner’s letter, he wrote Clark.223
Enclosing Gardner’s letters summarizing the entrenched anti-Witness
legal situation, Chafee concluded, “[I]t is clear that the Court will not act
unless some new factor enters. I feel strongly we ought to be that new
factor and hope that the rest of the Committee will agree.”224 Unsettled
by the formidable, countervailing case law, the Committee’s members
compromised, ﬁling a jurisdictional brief supporting a rehearing on the
cert petition but taking no position on the merits.225 Nonetheless, Johnson
put the ﬂag-salute issue on the Committee’s radar and established a
connection between the beleaguered Witness legal team and the new
crown jewel of the public interest bar. This was just the sort of collaboration through which Clark hoped to establish a new “line of thought.”
As Clark explained to Gardner in April 1939, the “ﬂag salute problem”
should not be understood as a minor dispute between local officials and
a handful of religious eccentrics: The case presented “deep questions
[about] the conﬂict between liberty and authority.”226
B.

Flag Salutes and Footnote Four

During the summer and fall of 1939, Clark kept in touch with
Gardner about developments in the Massachusetts ﬂag-salute case. It was
through this correspondence that Clark ﬁrst learned of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ new counsel, “a big breezy young man from Texas,” the thirtytwo-year-old Hayden Covington.227 Covington split time with Gardner
during the later stages of the Deerﬁeld oral arguments, and he would soon
become involved in a parallel litigation in Minersville, Pennsylvania—the
case of Walter, Lillian, and Billy Gobitas. In November 1939, the Third
Circuit affirmed a district court order invalidating the Gobitas children’s
expulsion from the Minersville public schools, creating a circuit split on
the ﬂag-salute issue.228 The Bill of Rights Committee agreed to ﬁle an

222. Id.
223. Chafee to Clark (Jan. 17, 1939), supra note 184.
224. Id. at 2.
225. See Letter from Grenville Clark to Louis Lusky (Mar. 28, 1939) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 4.
226. Letter from Grenville Clark to George K. Gardner (Apr. 19, 1939) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 3.
227. Letter from George K. Gardner to Grenville Clark (Sept. 22, 1939) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 3.
228. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939), rev’d, 310 U.S. 586,
586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barette, 319 U.S. 624, 624 (1943).
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amicus brief in Minersville School District v. Gobitis229 if the Supreme Court
granted the school district’s cert petition.230
While waiting on word from the High Court, Gardner met with
Covington in New York. The young Texan had just replaced Olin Moyle
as the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ general counsel, and Gardner reported that
“it was just beginning to dawn on [Covington] that the issues in the
Gobitis case were controlled by four earlier decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Mr. Covington has no legal assistance, and at the
moment is a rather lonely, harassed and anxious young man.”231 Gardner
offered to assist Covington directly, but Covington felt bound to respect
the wishes of the Witness leader, Rutherford, who wanted to argue the
case himself.232 On March 6, 1940, two days after the Supreme Court
agreed to hear Gobitis, Clark took matters into his own hands, organizing
a luncheon with Covington, Gardner, and Louis Lusky, an associate at
Clark’s law ﬁrm.233 The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate legal
strategy. Notably, Lusky had clerked for Justice Stone two years earlier
and had helped him draft Footnote Four of Carolene Products.234
Two weeks later, Lusky and Clark sent a ﬁrst draft of their amicus
brief to Covington; a week after that, Chafee sent Clark edits.235 Chafee
was particularly exercised by one point that he felt had “carrie[d] our
argument in the Hague case”:
At a time when governmental functions are expanding rapidly,
it seems to me essential to impress officials with a concept
rather novel to them, namely, that the government resembles a
public utility and is under obligations to give reasonable service
to all. The frequent claim that the government may impose any
conditions it pleases on what it does for the public is too often
echoed by courts.236

229. The court reporter misspelled the name “Gobitas.” See Gordon, supra note 33,
at 227 n.76.
230. Letter from Grenville Clark to George K. Gardner (Feb. 16, 1940) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 3; Letter from Grenville
Clark to George K. Gardner (Jan. 4, 1940) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP,
supra note 184, series VIII, box 3.
231. Letter from George K. Gardner to William Fennell (Feb. 29, 1940) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 3.
232. Id.
233. See Letter from Grenville Clark to George Gardner (Mar. 6, 1940) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 3.
234. See Linzer, supra note 15, at 281–85.
235. Letter from Grenville Clark to Hayden Covington (Mar. 21, 1940) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 2; Letter from
Zechariah Chafee to Grenville Clark (Mar. 28, 1940) [hereinafter Chafee to Clark (Mar.
28, 1938)] (on file with the Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series VIII,
box 3.
236. Chafee to Clark (Mar. 28, 1938), supra note 235.
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Although Chafee’s reference to public utilities law recalled an old
progressive preoccupation, he was right that his rhetorical reconﬁguration of that jurisprudence was quite novel. Indeed, it posed a fundamental challenge to progressive and New Deal conceptions of the proper
distribution of power among the branches of government. The very
concept of “public utility” had emerged to describe the authority of the
political branches to regulate ostensibly private service providers.237 In
Chafee’s analogy, however, the political branches became the service
providers and the courts became the regulators. Conceiving of the
government as a public utility sounded progressive, but it actually
inverted the progressive preference for political as opposed to judicial
control of the nation’s political economy.
It was just this inversion of progressive legal theory that Justice Felix
Frankfurter targeted in his 8-1 majority opinion in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, which rejected the arguments of the Witnesses and the
ABA.238 In the June 1940 decision, Frankfurter explained that to secondguess the Minersville School District’s ﬂag-salute policy “would in effect
make us the school board for the country.”239 “That authority has not
been given to this Court,” Frankfurter cautioned, “nor should we assume
it.”240 While the ABA Committee’s championship of civil liberties derived
from a commitment to the “independence of the courts”241 and the
resuscitation of judicial review, Frankfurter insisted that “to the
legislature no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of
deeply-cherished liberties.”242 In this regard, government was not a public
utility, but a public: “To ﬁght out the wise use of legislative authority in
the forum of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than
to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the selfconﬁdence of a free people.”243
Many of Frankfurter’s old civil libertarian comrades were shocked
and disappointed by his apparent insensitivity to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
plight—surely the “forum of public opinion” was cruelly stacked against
a minuscule religious minority!244 Just as many historians and legal
237. See generally William Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern
Business Regulation, in The Corporation and American Democracy (Naomi Lamoreaux &
William Novak eds., 2015).
238. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
239. Id. at 598.
240. Id.
241. Clark to Arant (July 15, 1938), supra note 213.
242. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
243. Id. For Frankfurter’s defense of the constitutional authority of the political
branches, see generally Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 343 (2013).
244. See Peters, supra note 33, at 46–71 (discussing the Gobitis opinion); Melvin I.
Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties 52–58 (1991)
(same).
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scholars do today, contemporary critics of Gobitis attributed Frankfurter’s
betrayal to the deteriorating situation in Europe, hysteria about national
security, and sympathy for his German Jewish brethren overcoming the
Justice’s civil libertarian instincts. Yet Frankfurter’s correspondence with
Clark in the three years between the court-packing crisis and Gobitis
suggests that the Justice’s opinion grew out of a political and legal
struggle both longer running and closer to home.
As Frankfurter had written to Clark time and again, while he
celebrated his friend’s recent discovery of civil liberties, he did not think
that civil liberties necessitated a commitment to robust judicial review.245
Bolstered by his experience in the WWI War Department, where he had
successfully promoted an accommodating approach to conscientious
objectors to the military draft, Frankfurter viewed reasonable administration and legislation as the best hope for both democracy and civil
liberty.246 While Clark resisted court packing and assailed the threat that
administrative tribunals posed to the Bill of Rights, Frankfurter defended
the New Deal’s redistribution of power from the judiciary to the
administrative state. And he emphatically rejected the idea that a special
carve out for judicial protection of civil liberties was compatible with this
redistribution.
It was just such a carve out that Justice Harlan Fiske Stone proposed
in his lone dissent, circulated only days before Gobitis was slated for
publication. Frankfurter hurriedly wrote Stone a four-page memorandum, asking him to shelve the dissent and warning of its epochal
implications.247 In doing so, Frankfurter invoked an earlier era of
245. See, e.g., Frankfurter to Clark (Dec. 31, 1938), supra note 220; Letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Grenville Clark (Nov. 16, 1938) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in
GCP, supra note 184, series VIII, box 2; Frankfurter to Clark (July 1, 1937), supra note
200; see also Dunne, supra note 32, at 84–88 (discussing an exchange between Justice
Frankfurter and Clark in which Justice Frankfurter explained the reasons for his silence
regarding the court-packing plan).
246. See Kessler, Administrative Origins, supra note 29, at 1111–23. Taking a different
tack, Professor Richard Danzig has offered a perceptive analysis of Justice Frankfurter’s
understanding of the relationship between reason, democracy, and pluralism as grounded
in his own experience as a young Jew navigating the elite legal worlds of Harvard Law
School and government service:
Felix Frankfurter interpreted his experience as demonstrating that prejudice fell
away over the long term when minorities confronted it—that rational persuasion
was a reliable vehicle for assimilation. In the ﬂag salute cases, he seems to have
unselfconsciously conceived the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the world in which they
functioned—persons and arenas he did not know—in the image of his own
experience.
Richard Danzig, Justice Frankfurter’s Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending Logic
and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 675, 705 (1984).
247. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan Fiske
Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 27, 1940) [hereinafter Frankfurter to
Stone (May 27, 1940)] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Harlan Fiske Stone
Papers, Library of Cong., container 65 [hereinafter HFSP].
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aggressive judicial protection of private economic power from public
safety regulation:
Just as Adkins v. Children’s Hospital had consequences not merely
as to the minimum wage laws but in its radiations and in its
psychological effects, so this case would have a tail of
implications as to legislative power . . . were it to deny the very
minimum exaction, however foolish as to the Gobitis children,
of an expression of faith in the heritage and purposes of our
country.248
Progressives had long seen the 1923 Adkins decision,249 which
rejected the constitutionality of a minimum wage for women in the
District of Columbia, as marking the Taft Court’s rightward turn and as a
brutal setback for social and economic experiment; Justice Frankfurter
himself had argued and lost the case as a young law professor.250
Seventeen years later, in his letter to Justice Stone, Justice Frankfurter
invoked the case as a warning about the damage that rights-obsessed
judging could do to sound public policy. He also appealed to Justice
Stone’s own recent dissent from the Court’s 1936 decision in United States
v. Butler.251 There, Justice Stone had criticized the majority for its
cramped reading of the federal government’s power to secure the
“general welfare.”252 Praising Justice Stone’s Butler dissent as “a lodestar
for due regard between legislative and judicial powers,” Justice
Frankfurter emphasized that the main goal of his approach in Gobitis was
to avoid a judicial overreaction to the undoubtedly “foolish” treatment of
a religious minority, an overreaction that might upset the fragile balance
between political and judicial power achieved during the past few
years.253
At this point in his plea, Justice Frankfurter had to confront the
difference between the rights at stake in a case like Adkins (economic)
and those at stake in Gobitis (civil)—especially given Justice Stone’s
recent authorship of Carolene Products,254 a decision that seemed to
emphasize just that difference. Yet according to Justice Frankfurter,
neither the different substance of the rights at issue nor Footnote Four
itself changed the basic philosophy to which both he and Stone had long
adhered. The political branches remained the “primary resolvers” of
“the clash of rights,” even when that clash involved “ultimate civil
liberties.”255 “For resolving such clash we [as judges] have no calculus,”

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 4.
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Id. at 526.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Id. at 86–88 (Stone, J., dissenting).
Frankfurter to Stone (May 27, 1940), supra note 247, at 4.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Frankfurter to Stone (May 27, 1940), supra note 247, at 1–2.
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Justice Frankfurter wrote to Justice Stone.256 “But there is for me, and I
know also for you, a great makeweight for dealing with this problem,
namely, that we are not the primary resolvers of the clash. We are not
exercising an independent judgment; we are sitting in judgment upon
the judgment of the legislature.”257
How should judges judge the “primary resolvers” of the “clash of
rights”? Here, Justice Frankfurter explained, he regarded “as basic”
Footnote Four, “particularly the second paragraph of it,” which proposed
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation that itself interfered with the
political process.258 Explicitly downplaying the ﬁrst paragraph (about
textually enumerated constitutional rights) and the third paragraph
(about discrete and insular minorities), Justice Frankfurter sought to
interpret the Footnote narrowly lest it lead down a slope that ended in
Adkins, Butler, and the judicial restraint of public power in the name of
private rights.259 Compulsory-ﬂag-salute laws in no way impeded the
Witnesses’ ability to participate in politics. What’s more, the sect’s refusal
to salute the ﬂag looked to Justice Frankfurter like a rejection of political
participation, an exercise of exit rather than voice.
Although selective, Justice Frankfurter’s narrow reading of Footnote
Four was not outlandish at the time. A month earlier, Justice Murphy’s 81 majority decision in Thornhill v. Alabama,260 the ﬁrst Supreme Court
opinion to cite Footnote Four, had emphasized the second paragraph’s
political process logic. Striking down a law that prohibited labor
picketing, Justice Murphy wrote: “Abridgment of freedom of speech and
of the press . . . impairs those opportunities for public education that are
essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through
the processes of popular government.”261 When a regulation threatened
“the effective exercise of rights so necessary to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, . . . courts should ‘weigh the circumstances’ and
‘appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced’ in support of the
challenged regulations.”262
Justice Stone’s dissent in Gobitis, however, elevated Footnote Four
above this proceduralist and functionalist terrain. It was only the second
Supreme Court opinion to cite the Footnote and the ﬁrst to refer to the
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. In doing so, Justice Frankfurter previewed the approach to Footnote Four that
would be championed decades later, in the wake of the Warren Court’s jurisprudential
innovations. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 75–77 (1980); Gilman, supra note
15, at 214–25; Linzer, supra note 15, at 285–88.
260. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
261. Id. at 95.
262. Id. at 96 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)). Schneider v. State,
struck down a blanket prohibition on street and door-to-door distribution of literature
making no reference to Footnote Four. 308 U.S. at 161.
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third paragraph’s discussion of “discrete and insular minorities.”263 Yet
even here, Justice Stone had to acknowledge that the third paragraph, as
written, focused on prejudice only to the extent that it “tend[ed] to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
on to protect minorities.”264 For the authority to “scrutinize legislation
restricting the civil liberty of racial and religious minorities although no
political process was affected,”265 Justice Stone cited not Footnote Four
but a string of 1920s substantive due process decisions striking down
prohibitions on foreign language instruction and private school
attendance, decisions rooted in the economic liberty of educators and
parents.266 Nonetheless, by juxtaposing Footnote Four with these cases
from an earlier era of guardian review, Justice Stone did what Justice
Frankfurter had begged him not to do: identify Footnote Four with a
conﬂation of the judicial protection of civil liberties and the judicial
protection of substantive due process.
Professor Richard Danzig has argued that Frankfurter “inﬂated” the
stakes in Gobitis, needlessly insisting that a school board’s ex post facto
adoption of a compulsory-ﬂag-salute regulation be given the same
deference “as though the legislature of Pennsylvania had itself formally
directed the ﬂag-salute,” almost as though the U.S. Congress itself had
done so.267 Yet the ABA’s strategy was itself inﬂationary, using a test case
involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses to roll back the “undue subordination
of the individual to the State.”268 As Justice Frankfurter knew from his
correspondence with Clark during the late 1930s, the goal of the ABA
and its allies was to use the language of civil liberties to resuscitate
judicial review and restrict the political branches’ newfound autonomy.269
And it was clear both to Justice Frankfurter and to the ABA that Justice
Stone’s Gobitis dissent advanced that goal. For instance, shortly after the
decision, Louis Lusky, Stone’s former law clerk and the coauthor of the
ABA’s amicus brief, wrote to his old boss: “It certainly took me down a
peg to see with how much more insight and skill you were able to
expound the same position [as developed in the amicus brief] after
working only a few days at the most.”270

263. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
264. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
265. Id.
266. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generally Robert C. Post,
Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. Rev.
1489 (1998) (reviewing the jurisprudence of the Taft Court in the 1920s).
267. Danzig, supra note 246, at 682 (citing Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597).
268. Clark to Arant (Mar. 31, 1939), supra note 218, at 2.
269. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing Frankfurter’s debate with
Clark).
270. Mason, supra note 15, at 620.
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The press also recognized the high-stakes nature of the Frankfurter–
Stone debate, while almost unanimously adopting the ABA’s point of
view in interpreting it. Although the Washington Post agreed with Justice
Frankfurter that “the Bill of Rights did not license ‘any group to
interfere with legitimate functions of the state under the guise of
practicing their religion,’” at least 170 other newspapers celebrated
Justice Stone’s lone dissent for resisting “hysteria” in the name of
fundamental American values.271 The Christian Century opined that
“[c]ourts that will not protect even Jehovah’s Witnesses will not long
protect anybody.”272 And in an editorial titled simply Frankfurter v. Stone,
the New Republic warned that the Supreme Court was “dangerously close”
to “adopting Hitler’s philosophy in the effort to oppose Hitler’s
legions.”273 This association of judicial deference with totalitarianism was
the linchpin of Clark and the ABA’s new brand of civil libertarianism.
They had won more than they had lost in Gobitis; their depiction of
judges as the privileged guardians of a free society shone through the
gloomy prewar atmosphere and dazzled the American public.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM IN THE 1940S
A.

The 1942 Peddling-Tax Cases

The negative press that rained down on the Supreme Court in the
wake of Gobitis was particularly hard to bear for the avowed civil
libertarians whom President Roosevelt had recently appointed—Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy. In the fall of 1940, when Justice Douglas
told Justice Frankfurter that Justice Black was reconsidering his position
in Gobitis, Frankfurter asked if Black had been reading the Constitution
over the summer. Douglas responded, “No—he has been reading the
papers.”274 It could not have helped that these papers were reporting not
only legal and political criticisms of the decision but also a wave of
violent attacks on Witnesses. In the summer of 1940, the Witnesses
responded to the unfavorable result in Gobitis—and the seemingly
apocalyptic war in Europe—with increasingly aggressive proselytizing.
Local mobs, in turn, responded with vigilantism, and the American
Legion declared the Witnesses a “subversive” sect, along with other
allegedly pro-Nazi or pro-Soviet ethnic and political groups.275
Yet if some members of the Gobitis majority were shaken by the
criticism of media elites and news reports of anti-Witness violence, they
did not immediately search out an opportunity to side with the
Witnesses. One mitigating factor may have been that in August 1940, a
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Peters, supra note 33, at 67–68.
The Court Abdicates, Christian Century, July 3, 1940, at 845–46.
Frankfurter v. Stone, Editorial, New Republic, June 24, 1940, at 843.
Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy: The Washington Years 187 (1984).
Peters, supra note 33, at 72–99.
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Jehovah’s Witness gunned down a sheriff’s deputy in North Windham,
Maine.276 Newspapers interpreted the murder as evidence of the real
dangers those “disloyal” to the ﬂag posed to law-abiding Americans.277
Another reason was that the next two Witnesses cases that came before
the Court presented particularly ornery litigants and unsympathetic facts.
In the early spring of 1941, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a
unanimous court, upheld the conviction of over sixty Jehovah’s Witnesses
who had held a raucous, traffic-stopping parade without securing a
permit.278 No Justice who read the record in Cox v. New Hampshire was
prepared to question the propriety of time, place, and manner
restrictions on such disruptive public gatherings, even when securing a
permit came with a price tag. The following March, in the wake of
American entry into World War II, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire presented
what seemed to the Justices an even easier question involving a Witness’s
especially aggressive street preaching, culminating in his calling the town
marshal “a damned Fascist” for trying to defuse the situation.279 In
another unanimous opinion, the Court’s arch civil libertarian, Justice
Murphy, canonized the “ﬁghting words” exception to free-speech
protection, explicitly deferring to First Amendment theorist Chafee’s
approval of this carve out.280
Even as Murphy was drafting Chaplinsky, however, the Court heard
oral arguments in Jones v. City of Opelika and two other consolidated cases,
the ﬁrst set of Witness peddling-tax challenges.281 While Cox and
Chaplinsky had involved activities that resembled traditional breaches of
the peace—unpermitted parades and lewd or libelous speech—the
Witnesses’ refusal to pay taxes on their door-to-door distribution and sale
of religious literature seemed to merit both more and less judicial
regard. More regard for two reasons. First, the Witnesses characterized
the distribution and sale of religious pamphlets as their faith’s peculiar
mode of ministry, itself an act of worship.282 Second, they characterized
the distribution and sale of literature as an exercise of press freedom, the
most entrenched of First Amendment rights and the one championed by
276. Id. at 217.
277. Id. at 217–19.
278. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
279. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
280. Id. at 572 (citing Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 149
(1941)).
281. Opelika I, 316 U.S. 584 (1942). For the timing, see Peters, supra note 33, at 230.
282. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Opelika I, 316 U.S. 584 (No. 280), 1941 WL 52767.
Although the Witnesses had also tried to defend Cox’s parade and Chaplinsky’s
imprecations as religious exercise, their characterization of the sale and distribution of
literature as ministerial was systematic and well attested. See Nathan T. Elliff, Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Selective Service Act, 31 Va. L. Rev. 811, 813–18 (1945); Deputy Dir.
Hershey, Vol. III, Op. 14, Ministerial Status of Jehovah’s Witnesses (June 12, 1941) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review), in National Archives, College Park, Md., container 7, RG
147.
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the widest range of political constituencies—from communist radicals
seeking access to the mails to the newspaper magnates who had funded
the epochal victories in Near and Grosjean.
Two other features of the peddling-tax challenges, however,
militated for prompt judicial dismissal. First, the laws at issue—taxes on
the sale of goods and services—were general commercial regulations, in
the heartland of the New Deal Court’s “presumption of constitutionality.”
Second, two months before Opelika I was decided, a unanimous Court
had drawn a line in the sand with respect to what would come to be
called “commercial speech.” In Valentine v. Chrestensen,283 a case involving
the New York City Sanitary Code’s prohibition on commercial advertising
in public thoroughfares, Justice Roberts distinguished the string of
decisions that, since 1938, had struck down prohibitions on leaﬂeting as
violations of free speech, free press, and in the case of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, free exercise.284 In those cases, Justice Roberts explained, the
Court had “unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion” and that, accordingly, state and municipalities could
“not unduly burden or proscribe” leaﬂeting.285 Yet, Justice Roberts went
on, “[w]e are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”286
Going further, the unanimous Valentine opinion held that “[w]hether,
and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in
the streets . . . are matters for legislative judgment.”287 Even though the
respondent, F.J. Chrestensen, had combined in one handbill an
advertisement for his submarine touring business and a protest against
the city for its boat-docking regulations, the Second Circuit had erred in
ﬁnding this mix of commercial and political speech sufficient to bring
Chrestensen’s activity within the ambit of the First Amendment.288 If the
Second Circuit’s ruling were to stand, “every merchant who desires to
broadcast advertising leaﬂets in the streets need only append a civic
appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law’s
command.”289
Although Valentine had not yet been decided when the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ general counsel Covington was brieﬁng and arguing the
peddling-tax cases, he knew he faced an uphill battle given the general
commercial nature of the challenged regulations. Confronting the Court
for only the second time since Pearl Harbor (the ﬁrst had been in the
283. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
284. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 164 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
285. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 55.
289. Id.
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unfavorable context of Chaplinsky), Covington framed the peddling-tax
issue in world historical terms: “In today’s perilous hours men’s hearts
are failing them for fear of what they see coming upon the human family.
This great fear has driven rulers and judges of every land into
desperation and perplexity, resulting in a breaking down of justice and
morality.”290 To make the stakes as vivid as possible, Covington’s brief
asked the Justices to imagine how the peddling taxes would function in a
Nazi invasion:
Let us assume that the Nazis and Fascists were moving in secret
to invade the Gulf shore of Alabama, and some good citizen
learning this fact printed millions of pamphlets or leaﬂets for
distribution throughout Alabama. In Opelika, under this
ordinance, both he and every loyal citizen aiding him to
distribute such printed matter could be convicted for their
failure to pay the tax and secure a license.291
This thought experiment might be read as suggesting that the
Witnesses’ primary objection to the peddling taxes was process-based—
that it blocked avenues of democratic deliberation and defense. Yet
Covington’s brief took a more formalist and absolutist stance, one that
echoed the ideology featured in newspaper criticisms of Gobitis. “The
only factor which distinguishes this country as a republic with a
democratic form of government . . . is that American heritage epitomized
as the Bill of Rights,” Covington insisted.292 “Once the freedom anchored
and secured thereby is gone, the reason is lost for ﬁghting Nazism and
allied totalitarian tyranny.”293 According to this logic, if the Court upheld
the license taxes, the difficulties they posed to the defense of Opelika
from Nazi attack would be irrelevant, as there would be nothing worthy
left to defend.
The ﬁrst half of Covington’s brief focused on the Witnesses’ free
exercise claim, arguing that literature distribution was, for the sect’s
members, a ministerial activity and that the work of ministers of other
religions was not so taxed.294 The second half developed a press-freedom
claim largely reliant on Grosjean. Noting that “[t]his right and liberty [of
freedom of the press] . . . embrace the right to distribute, to circulate
printed informative matter, to disseminate ideas in recorded form,”
Covington contended that, as in Grosjean, the taxes at issue in Opelika
restricted circulation and threatened the viability of the Witnesses’
informative enterprise.295 Covington copied almost verbatim from Justice
Sutherland’s unanimous Grosjean opinion in arguing that the peddling
taxes impermissibly “encumber[ed] and smother[ed] distribution and
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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circulation” of literature: “This is plain enough when we consider that if
[the tax] were increased to a high degree, as it could be, it well might
result in completely suppressing both distribution and even publishing to
[the] point of destruction.”296 Finally, Covington concluded by recommending a passage from Sutherland’s dissent in Associated Press:
Do the people of this land—in the providence of God,
favored as they sometimes boast, above all others in the
plenitude of their liberties—desire to preserve those so carefully
protected by the First Amendment: liberty of religious
worship . . ? [sic] If so, let them withstand all beginnings of
encroachment.297
Notably, Covington emphasized those aspects of Justice Sutherland’s
Grosjean and Associated Press opinions that suggested that even incidental
burdens on First Amendment exercise, regardless of regulatory intent,
were unconstitutional. The Witnesses did not claim that the peddling
taxes were discriminatory in intent or prohibitive in application. The
ACLU, by contrast, placed considerable emphasis on discrimination
against the Witnesses in its peddling-tax amicus brief.298 Indeed, the
organization characterized the “basic question” in Opelika I as “whether a
municipality, under the guise of collecting license fees for carrying on of
various occupations,” may impose such a fee on “any person who, even
on a single occasion, offers for sale a pamphlet containing an expression
of opinion.”299 The phrase “under the guise” echoed what was arguably
the actual holding in Grosjean:
The tax here involved is not bad because it takes money
from the . . . appellees . . . . It is bad because, in the light of its
history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and
calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of
information . . . .300
Writing for Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, Byrnes, and Jackson (who
had joined the Court in July 1941), Justice Reed found the question of
discrimination to be critical. In rejecting the Witnesses’ challenge, Justice
Reed insisted on a fundamental “distinction between nondiscriminatory
regulation of operations which are incidental to the exercise of religion
or the freedom of speech or the press and those which are imposed upon
the religious rite itself or the unmixed dissemination of information.”301
Given that the Witnesses had not even alleged discrimination, this
296. Id. at 32 (citation omitted); cf. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245
(1936).
297. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 282, at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 141 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting)).
298. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 2–3, Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584 (1942) (No. 280), 1942 WL 53575.
299. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
300. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added).
301. Opelika I, 316 U.S. 584, 596 (1942).
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distinction, plus the commercial aspect of their peddling activity,
resolved the free-speech and free-press issues outright. Citing the
Associated Press majority opinion and the Court’s decision two months
earlier in Valentine v. Chrestensen, Justice Reed concluded:
It would hardly be contended that the publication of
newspapers is not subject to the usual governmental ﬁscal
exactions, or the obligations placed by statutes on other
business. The Constitution draws no line between a payment
from gross receipts or a net income tax and a suitably calculated
occupational license. Commercial advertising cannot escape
control by the simple expedient of printing matter of public
interest on the same sheet or handbill.302
As for the free exercise issue, Justice Reed refused to distinguish
between the Witnesses’ sale of their religious tracts and a teacher or
preacher’s “need to receive support for themselves”: “[W]hen, as in
these cases, the practitioners of these noble callings choose to utilize the
vending of their religious books and tracts as a source of funds, the
ﬁnancial aspects of their transactions need not be wholly disregarded.”303
Exacting a “reasonable fee” from “religious or didactic group[s]” for
their “money-making activities,” Justice Reed continued, “does not
require a ﬁnding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It is
enough that money is earned . . . .”304
The shadow of Valentine loomed large over Justice Reed’s reasoning,
as did the more general principle of judicial deference to commercial
regulation that New Dealers like Reed—President Roosevelt’s former
solicitor general—had spent many years championing. The Roosevelt
appointees in the peddling-tax majority were not entirely unsympathetic
to the burden that taxation might place on marginal expressive communities such as the Witnesses. But precisely because of their experience
with progressive and New Deal state building, these Justices insisted the
solution lay in political reform, not judge-driven constitutionalism. “It
may well be,” Justice Reed allowed, even hoped, “that the wisdom of
American communities will persuade them to permit the poor and weak
to draw support from the petty sales of religious books without contributing anything for the privilege of using the streets and conveniences
of the municipality.”305 But “[s]uch an exemption . . . would be a voluntary, not a constitutionally enforced, contribution.”306
With respect not only to free exercise, but also to free speech and
free press, then, the majority saw an inescapable nexus between the
commercial aspect of the Witnesses’ peddling and the state’s “right to
employ the sovereign power explicitly reserved . . . by the Tenth
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
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Amendment to ensure orderly living without which constitutional
guarantees of civil liberties would be a mockery.”307 Justice Reed’s
invocation of the Tenth Amendment was a pointed reminder that there
was more to the Bill of Rights than individual protections from state
interference. He combined this bit of counterformalism with a call for
New Deal deference to political reason in the realm of economy: “When
proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary commercial
methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a natural and
proper exercise of the power of the state to charge reasonable fees for
the privilege of canvassing.”308
Two years earlier, the Washington Post had lauded the Gobitis majority
for preventing “any group [from] interfer[ing] with legitimate functions
of the state under the guise of practicing their religion.”309 Yet the paper
saw the Opelika I majority’s deference to state economic regulation in a
very different light. That Opelika I explicitly raised the possibility of broad
First Amendment limits on economic regulation—a long-cherished goal
of the newspaper industry—helps to explain the Post’s change of heart.
So does the increasingly hegemonic status of antitotalitarian ideology in
wartime America.310 To the extent that this ideology was previously
associated with opposition to the Roosevelt Administration, it might have
seemed ill fated in the wake of the President’s declarations of war against
imperial Japan and Nazi Germany in December 1941, six months before
Opelika I was decided. Yet the United States’s entry into World War II, and
its ideologically awkward alliance with the Soviet Union, simply shifted
the emphases of antitotalitarian critique. Pro-war public intellectuals
such as Reinhold Niebuhr played an important role in associating the
wartime oppression of dissenters—including the Witnesses—with the
overly regimented societies that young Americans were now ﬁghting to
defeat.311 So did the U.S. Office of War Information, which described the
conﬂict as one against a “system” in which “the individual is a slave,” “a
cog in a military machine, a cipher in an economic despotism.”312 The
Washington Post sounded similar notes when it warned that the Opelika I
majority’s reasoning
seem[ed] to be an opening wedge . . . for the taxation of
ecclesiastical and academic property, which . . . would . . . have
the ultimate effect of bringing all education under the control
of the state, and thus of placing in the hands of the state the

307. Id. at 593.
308. Id. at 597.
309. Religion and Taxation, Wash. Post, June 10, 1942, at 8.
310. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 136, at 121–37; Primus, supra note 170, at 224–33.
311. See Peters, supra note 33, at 106–07 (describing Niebuhr and other religious
leaders’ commendation of the ACLU’s pro-Witness legal agenda “to all liberty-loving
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most potent of all instruments of regimentation and
indoctrination.313
Time magazine likewise called Opelika I an “ominous decision,” while
the Yale Law Journal lamented that “with the exception of the West Coast
Japanese Americans, the Witnesses are already the most persecuted
minority in America.”314
The press also praised the dissents of Chief Justice Stone and Justice
Murphy—both of which Justices Black and Douglas joined—as antidotes
to the totalitarian implications of the majority opinion.315 Each dissent
rejected the majority’s emphasis on the nondiscriminatory nature of the
challenged taxes. Neutrality, Stone announced, meant nothing when
“preferred” First Amendment freedoms were concerned:
The First Amendment is not conﬁned to safeguarding freedom
of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory
attempts to wipe them out. On the contrary, the Constitution,
by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put
those freedoms in a preferred position. Their commands . . .
extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a
condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being
used to control or suppress it.316
According to the dissenters, the Witnesses did not have to show that
the challenged regulations were discriminatory in intent or that they
imposed prohibitive burdens on the expression of ideas or religious
beliefs. Rather, it was up to the respondents to “show that the instant
activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses create special problems causing a drain
on the municipal coffers, or that these taxes are commensurate with any
expenses entailed by the presence of the Witnesses.”317 Only a narrowly
tailored regulatory tax could pass constitutional muster. “In the absence
of such a showing,” the dissenters argued, “no tax whatever can be levied
on petitioners’ activities in distributing their literature or disseminating
their ideas.”318
In addition to the two dissents, Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy
appended what the Post called an “extraordinary memorandum”—an
expression of “singular humility and intellectual honesty”—repudiating
their earlier support for Gobitis.319 Describing the majority opinion in
Opelika I as “a logical extension of the principles upon which [Gobitis]
rested,” the three converts announced that “this is an appropriate
313. Religion and Taxation, supra note 309.
314. Peters, supra note 33, at 232–33.
315. Id. at 232; see also William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Cong., Washington,
D.C., container 65 [hereinafter WODP] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (collecting
clippings).
316. Opelika I, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
317. Id. at 620 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
318. Id.
319. Religion and Taxation, supra note 309.
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occasion to state that we now believe that it also was wrongly decided.”320
Mirroring Covington’s call for democracy to submit to the dictates of
liberty, they concluded that “our democratic form of government,
functioning under the historic Bill of Rights, has a high responsibility to
accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however
unpopular and unorthodox those views may be.”321 To do otherwise
would place “the right freely to exercise religion” in a “subordinate”—
rather than a “preferred”—position to democratic decisionmaking.322
This repudiation of Gobitis by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy in
the ﬁrst set of peddling-tax cases likely doomed the constitutionality of
compulsory-ﬂag-salute laws. This was because one member of the 1942
peddling-tax majority, Justice Jackson, had already made clear his
disagreement with Gobitis. As discussed below, while Justice Jackson
believed that the Witnesses’ peddling-tax arguments represented a signal
threat to the New Deal order, he viewed the ﬂag-salute controversy as
entirely distinguishable. In 1941, shortly before Jackson joined the
Supreme Court, he had publicly singled out Gobitis as departing from the
Court’s limited but important role in “stamping out attempts by local
authorities to suppress the free dissemination of ideas, upon which the
system of responsible democratic government rests.”323 Indeed, Justice
Jackson had become convinced during his tenure as Attorney General
that Gobitis was a boon to local malcontents and a threat to the nascent
war effort.324 His authorship of West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette,325 which ﬁnally reversed Gobitis in June 1943,326 surprised almost
no one.
Accordingly, the close First Amendment question in the early 1940s
was not whether school children could be compelled to salute the
American ﬂag. Rather, the close and critical question was whether private
economic actors engaged in expressive conduct should be exempted
from nondiscriminatory health, safety, and commercial regulations on
civil libertarian grounds. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, the opposing
authors of Gobitis and Barnette, were in total agreement that the answer to
this second question had to be “no.”327 The D.C. Circuit Judge Wiley
Rutledge, however, saw things differently. In February 1943, when
Rutledge took the seat of Justice Byrnes, who stepped down to join the
American war effort, the Court ﬂipped. On May 3, 1943, Justice Rutledge
and the four former peddling-tax dissenters vacated Jones v. City of Opelika
320. Opelika I, 316 U.S. at 623–24 (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., dissenting).
321. Id. at 624.
322. Id.
323. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 284 (1941).
324. See Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership,
86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 363, 397–99 (2008).
325. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
326. Id. at 642.
327. See infra section III.B.

2016] EARLY YEARS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM

1965

less than a year after it had been decided, striking down a host of other
peddling taxes in the process.328 The New Republic described these 1943
peddling-tax decisions as an “outright about-face . . . one of the most
notable acts in the entire span of the 154 years of Supreme Court
history.”329
B.

The 1943 Peddling-Tax Cases

On August 31, 1942, Covington moved for rehearing in Jones v. City
of Opelika, describing the decision as “the most serious denial of liberty
within history of the nation” and warning that “[l]iberty is destroyed by
people who do not know they are destroying it.”330 Covington’s core
argument tracked a line of thought that anti–New Deal lawyers had spent
more than a decade developing: “Taxed speech is not free speech. It is
silence for persons unable to pay the tax. Nor is taxed distribution of
literature a free press . . . . Nor is taxed dissemination of Bible literature
freedom of worship.”331 Notably, the only Supreme Court authorities that
Covington could cite for these propositions were Justice Sutherland’s
majority opinion in Grosjean v. American Press Co. and his dissent in
Associated Press v. NLRB.332 Just as notably, this entire passage was lifted
without attribution from then-Judge Rutledge’s D.C. Circuit dissent in
Busey v. District of Columbia, an April 1942 decision upholding a similar
tax levied by the District of Columbia.333 Justice Murphy had cited thenJudge Rutledge’s circuit opinion in his own dissent in Opelika I, and now
Judge Rutledge’s language was before the Court, months before his
appointment as a Justice.
Just as the ABA had sought to give the Witnesses a boost after their
initial ﬂag-salute failures back in 1939, the ANPA ﬁled an amicus brief in
support of rehearing the peddling-tax cases. ANPA’s general counsel,
Hanson, had argued Grosjean and submitted an amicus brief in Associated
Press, a brief on which Justice Sutherland had drawn heavily in dissent.
Now, Hanson’s task was to convince a Supreme Court dominated by New
Dealers to resuscitate the civil libertarian vision championed by the
stalwart anti–New Dealer Sutherland but rejected by Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion in Associated Press. Indeed, ANPA’s general counsel drew
a direct connection between the “subtle encroachments on the freedom
328. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Opelika II, 319 U.S. 103 (1943)
(mem.) (per curiam).
329. Dilliard, About-Face, supra note 18, at 693–94. Dilliard was a frequent
correspondent of Clark’s and wrote a proﬁle of him for the American Scholar shortly before
his death. See Irving Dilliard, Grenville Clark, Public Citizen, Am. Scholar (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in GCP, supra note 184, series I, box 1.
330. Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing at 3, Opelika II, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (Nos. 280,
314, 966).
331. Id. at 18.
332. Id. at 18, 26, 36.
333. See 129 F.2d 24, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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of the press to which the [peddling-tax] majority opinion . . . lends
support” and some “misconceptions attributable to a dictum of this
Court in Associated Press.”334 The “dictum” to which Hanson referred was
Justice Robert’s statement that:
The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
application of general laws. He has no special privilege to
invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for
libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. He is subject
to the anti-trust laws. Like others, he must pay equitable and
nondiscriminatory taxes on his business.335
Hanson allowed that “newspapers are not immune from the
ordinary forms of taxation.”336 Nonetheless, he insisted that Grosjean,
which Associated Press had in no way overruled, did render newspapers
immune from any tax or regulation that had a “prohibitory or censorial
quality” or “operate[d] as a condition precedent to the publication or
circulation of newspapers.”337 This included any regulation that lowered
advertising revenue because, as Grosjean had recognized, “every newspaper depends upon advertising revenue” and “[d]ecreased revenue . . .
seriously impairs the operation of the press.”338 Most importantly, contrary to the Opelika I majority’s emphasis on the nondiscriminatory
nature of the peddling taxes, Hanson insisted that “[t]he rationale of the
Grosjean case was not rested upon the fact that a selected group of
newspapers was singled out for attack.”339 Rather, “[t]he Grosjean case
condemn[ed] every form of restraint upon the circulation of
newspapers,” however neutral or generally applicable.340
Hanson reminded the Court that Justice Sutherland had nine votes
for the proposition that since the taxes challenged in Grosjean
“curtail[ed] the amount of revenue realized from advertising,” they
operated as a restraint on press freedom.341 “This is plain enough,”
Justice Sutherland had reasoned, “when we consider that, if it were
increased to a high degree, as it could be if valid, [the tax] well might
result in destroying both advertising and circulation.”342 This aspect of
Justice Sutherland’s Grosjean opinion was no less “dictum” than the
narrowing construction that Justice Roberts had placed upon the
Grosjean opinion in Associated Press. But in the end, a new “liberal”
majority would ﬁnd the reasoning of the anti–New Dealer Sutherland
334. Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 8, Opelika II,
319 U.S. 103 (1943) (Docket Nos. 280, 314, 966), 1942 WL 54231.
335. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937).
336. Brief of the American Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, supra note 334, at 9.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 10.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
342. Id. at 245.
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more congenial than that of the New Deal’s judicial savior, Justice
Roberts.
In addition to the petition for rehearing in Opelika I, the Witnesses
also ﬁled a new set of cert petitions seeking review of adverse peddlingtax decisions in Pennsylvania and a failed challenge to a prohibition on
door-to-door solicitation in Ohio. Crucially, oral argument in all these
cases was delayed until March 10 and 11, 1943, one month after Wiley
Rutledge joined the Court. Justice Rutledge had already made his views
clear while on the D.C. Circuit, and at the initial conference vote, he was
happy to fall in with the dissenters from Opelika I. Reminding his
colleagues that the peddling taxes were “a generalized imposition not
[directed] against anybody,” Justice Frankfurter lamented that “Jefferson
and Madison would have been ‘shocked’ to discover what the Court was
doing in the name of freedom of religion.”343 The new majority was
unmoved, and Chief Justice Stone assigned the task of making sense of
the Court’s rapid reversal to Justice Douglas, who overruled Opelika I in
the course of his opinion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania.344 Chief Justice
Stone himself wrote the Court’s opinion in Douglas v. City of Jeanette,
which affirmed a circuit court’s dismissal of another of the Witnesses’
Pennsylvania challenges for jurisdictional reasons.345
Meanwhile, the dissenters huddled. On April 9, Justice Frankfurter
wrote to Justices Roberts, Reed, and Jackson emphasizing the long-term
implications of the peddling-tax cases and encouraging as many dissents
as possible: “[T]hese cases are probably but the curtain raisers of future
problems of such range and importance that the usual objections to
multiplicity of opinions are outweighed by the advantages of shedding as
much light as we are capable of for the wisest unfolding of the subject in
the future.”346 That same month, Justice Jackson’s law clerk, John
Costelloe, also emphasized the potential impact of the majority’s
expansive interpretation of the First Amendment and its relationship to
the Court’s earlier substantive due process jurisprudence:
[T]he difference between the activities here revealed and the
usual sort of religious activity should be pointed out . . . . This
Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of the law,
and the temples have a way of collapsing in toto when one story

343. Fine, supra note 274, at 379 (quoting Justice Murphy’s conference notes).
344. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943); cf. Opelika II, 319 U.S. 103,
104 (1943) (referring to Murdock for the majority opinion).
345. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 165–66 (1943).
346. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Stanley Reed, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Owen Roberts, Assoc. Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court & Robert Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 9, 1943) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Robert Jackson Papers, Library of Cong.,
Washington, D.C., container 127 [hereinafter RJP].
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too many is added to them. Thus, the liberty of contract stuff
got built up too far, and it is now completely collapsed.347
Costelloe worried that the majority’s emerging approach to the First
Amendment represented a return to an earlier era of formalism, blind to
the social and economic impact of aggressive rights protection. “[Y]ou
can do a real service,” Costelloe told Justice Jackson, “by pointing out
that . . . the Court should not decide cases by some abstract concept of
‘religious liberty,’ to the exclusion of consideration of the facts.”348 And
the facts were that “[t]hese peddling ordinances” were protective in
nature, aimed at “crews of magazine salesmen who swoop into a small
town and . . . then depart, leaving a trail of angry, frightened, seduced, or
assaulted people.”349 A Catholic, Costelloe also cautioned Justice Jackson
that the majority’s abstract and absolutist civil libertarianism would
inevitably require further, more expansive accommodations—or anger
those who did not receive them:
Something that may have been overlooked by the writers of the
pro-Jehovah’s Witness opinions is the situation with reference to
Catholic parochial schools . . . . The Catholic doesn’t believe in
sending his children to secular schools, so he wants to establish
his own. Many times this is not feasible because starting your
own school doesn’t give you an exemption from maintaining
the public schools . . . . So far the Catholics have had to work
and pay for their crochets or go without them. I suppose,
though, that it is more vital to the maintenance of the Church
that her members be exempt from supporting schools they will
put no stock in than for the Witnesses to be exempt from sales
taxes.350
Costelloe assured Justice Jackson that “[o]f course I maintain no
sentiment for exempting Catholics.”351 “But,” Costelloe predicted, “there
will be a whole lot of people who will, and will be pretty noisy about
the matter.”352 Costelloe’s discussion of the relationship between accom347. Memorandum #2 from John F. Costelloe, Clerk to Assoc. Justice Jackson 2 (Apr.
1943) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in RJP, supra note 346, container 127.
348. Id. at 3.
349. Id.
350. Memorandum #1 from John F. Costelloe, Clerk to Assoc. Justice Jackson 1–2
(Apr. 1943) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in RJP, supra note 346, container 127.
351. Id. at 2.
352. Id. In his Barnette dissent later that spring, Justice Frankfurter would make
Costelloe’s point about the slippery slope of accommodation, using the same parochial
school example:
All citizens are taxed for the support of public schools, although this Court has
denied the right of a state to compel all children to go to such schools and has
recognized the right of parents to send children to privately maintained schools.
Parents who are dissatisﬁed with the public schools thus carry a double
educational burden. Children who go to public school enjoy in many states
derivative advantages such as free textbooks, free lunch, and free transportation
in going to and from school. What of the claims for equality of treatment of
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modating Witnesses and Catholics was not simply an example. The
communities in which the Witnesses operated tended to be majority
Catholic, and Witnesses were themselves famously antipapist in their
theology.353 Striking down the peddling taxes would thus deprive majority
Catholic communities—whose own religious practices were arguably
burdened by general ﬁscal policy—from using ﬁscal policy to regulate
the Witnesses’ activities.
Joining in Justices Reed’s and Frankfurter’s dissents from Justice
Douglas’s majority opinion holding the peddling taxes unconstitutional,354 Justice Jackson added a concurrence in Douglas v. City of
Jeanette,355 which all Justices agreed should be affirmed for lack of
jurisdiction.356 He did so because that case included the most detailed
record. This record allowed Justice Jackson to develop the empirical and
doctrinal points Costelloe had raised. Empirically, Justice Jackson documented Jeannette’s majority Catholic population357 and the aggressively
anti-Catholic nature of the tracts the Witnesses had peddled there.358
Doctrinally, he pointed out that the question of First Amendment
enforcement in the peddling-tax cases was unavoidably a distributional
question, the granting of expansive rights to some necessarily eroding
the rights of others.
These Witnesses, in common with all others, have extensive
rights to proselyte and propagandize. These of course include
the right to oppose and criticize the Roman Catholic Church or
any other denomination . . . . The real question is where their
rights end and the rights of others begin. The real task of
determining the extent of their rights on balance with the rights
of others is not met by pronouncement of general propositions
with which there is no disagreement . . . . A common-sense test
as to whether the Court has struck a proper balance of these
rights is to ask what the effect would be if the right given to
these Witnesses should be exercised by all sects and
denominations . . . . Can we give to one sect a privilege that we
could not give to all, merely in the hope that most of them will
not resort to it? Religious freedom in the long run does not
come from this kind of license to each sect to ﬁx its own limits,
but comes of hard-headed ﬁxing of those limits by neutral
authority with an eye to the widest freedom to proselyte

those parents who, because of religious scruples, cannot send their children to
public schools?
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 660 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
353. See Fine, supra note 274, at 372–73; Peters, supra note 33, at 34.
354. Opelika II, 319 U.S. 103, 117 (1943).
355. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
356. Id. at 166; see also id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
357. Id. at 167 (majority opinion).
358. Id. at 167–73.
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compatible with the freedom of those subject to proselyting
pressures.359
Borrowing his clerk’s insight and metaphor, Justice Jackson likened
the majority’s disregard for the third-party consequences of First
Amendment “transcendentalism” to a previous generation’s overzealous
enforcement of economic liberty:
This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of
constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing
when one story too many is added. So it was with liberty of
contract, which was discredited by being overdone. The Court is
adding a new privilege to override the rights of others to what
has before been regarded as religious liberty.360
Just over a month after publishing this concurrence, Justice Jackson
invoked its distributional theory of First Amendment enforcement in his
majority opinion in the second ﬂag-salute case, West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette.361 There, “[b]efore turning to the Gobitis case,”
Justice Jackson wrote that it was “desirable to notice certain characteristics by which this controversy is distinguished.”362 These “certain
characteristics” were that “[t]he freedom asserted by these appellees
does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other
individual.”363 Echoing his insistence in Douglas that “[t]he real question
is where [the Witnesses’] rights end and the rights of others begin,”
Justice Jackson explained that it was those “conﬂicts” in which individual
rights collided that “most frequently require intervention of the State to
determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin.”364
But the ﬂag-salute challenge was not that kind of case:
[T]he refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony
does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so . . . .
The sole conﬂict is between authority and rights of the
individual. The State asserts power to condition access to public
education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at
the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent
and child. The latter stand on a right of self-determination in
matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude.365
According to Jackson’s logic, not all “intervention[s] of the State” in
the First Amendment context raised equal suspicion. The absence of
such intervention would, in fact, be worrisome in any context in which
an individual’s exercise of First Amendment rights impinged upon the

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 178–80.
Id. at 179, 181–82.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 630–31.
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rights of another.366 Unsurprisingly, Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy
all issued concurrences in Barnette, pushing back against Justice Jackson’s
treatment of the ﬂag-salute controversy as a relatively special case in
which state coercion was obviously inappropriate. For Justices Black and
Douglas, only those state interventions that were “either imperatively
necessary to protect society as a whole from grave and pressingly
imminent dangers or which . . . merely regulate[d] time, place or
manner of religious activity” merited the restraint of free exercise.367 For
Justice Murphy, only “essential operations of government [required] for
the preservation of an orderly society,” such as the “compulsion to give
evidence in court,” could validly limit the “right of freedom of thought
and of religion.”368
Earlier that spring, however, even some in the new peddling-tax
majority were apparently worried about the implications their decisions
could have for the relationship between public regulation and private
conscience. Days before Justice Douglas handed down the Murdock
decision, he reportedly told Justice Roberts that he was “very much
troubled about these Jehovah’s Witnesses.”369 According to a memorandum in Justice Frankfurter’s papers, Douglas conﬁded in Roberts
that:
I am afraid that our decisions in these cases may lead [the
Witnesses] to believe that they can violate any law simply
because their religious convictions sanction such violation. And
I wish we would say somewhere, somehow that people cannot
break laws simply because their consciences tell them to do
so.370
Despite his earlier strong language on the D.C. Circuit, even Justice
Rutledge was unclear about the majority’s reasoning and anxious about
its extent. On March 27, he wrote to Justice Douglas with two possible
theories motivating First Amendment critique of the license taxes:
(a) That “selling” the literature is itself a religious
practice—like taking communion—and therefore free from any
taxation.

366. Cf. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 15–16 (1927) (deﬁning a
“public”—the proper object of state administration—as “all those who are affected by the
indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have
those consequences systematically cared for”). For an alternative interpretation of what
made Barnette special for Jackson, see Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, in Constitutional Law Stories 433 (Michael C. Dorf
ed., 2004).
367. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643–44 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
368. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring).
369. Memorandum of Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 1 (Apr.
22, 1943) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law Sch.,
reel 7.
370. Id.
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(b) That “selling” the literature, while not necessary itself a
religious practice, is so necessary for the exercise of the rituals
and practices of the religion (because it furnishes the group
with funds) that it is protected from taxation.371
Justice Rutledge worried that “[t]he former theory is perhaps too
narrow and may be vulnerable both to attack and to abuse.”372 If
salesmanship could be a sacrament, the scope of free exercise threatened
to swallow the marketplace itself. “The latter,” Rutledge went on, “if it is
the basis of the opinion, should be articulated more clearly—and, if so,
in such a manner as not to protect from taxation large accumulations of
property or funds by the more affluent religious bodies.”373 Here, Justice
Rutledge mirrored Justice Jackson’s clerk’s concerns about the relationship between an expansive accommodation of the Witnesses and the
government’s treatment of much larger religious communities, such as
Catholics. Indeed, Justice Rutledge was “not sure the opinion as it stands
will not be taken to imply that no house publishing religious literature,
on however wide a scale, can be taxed in a non-discriminatory
manner.”374 Accordingly, Rutledge recommended that “both theories, (a)
and (b) . . . be used, but probably should be separately stated, and each
then somewhat more speciﬁcally guarded against possible too extensive
application.”375
In the end, Justice Douglas did try to set some limits on the majority’s decision, noting that “we do not intimate or suggest in respecting
their sincerity that any conduct can be made a religious rite and by the
zeal of the practitioners swept into the First Amendment” and insisting
that “[t]he cases present a single issue—the constitutionality of an
ordinance which as construed and applied requires religious colporteurs
to pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities.”376 As
for Justice Rutledge’s “a” and “b” theories, Justice Douglas at times
emphasized “a,” holding that “spreading one’s religious beliefs or
preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and
through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high
a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types.”377
Yet elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Douglas was much more
expansive. Because “[f]reedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom
of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own
371. Memorandum from Wiley Rutledge, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
William Douglas, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 1 (Mar. 27, 1943) [hereinafter
Rutledge to Douglas (Mar. 27, 1943)] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in WODP,
supra note 315, container 89.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1–2.
375. Id. at 2.
376. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109–10 (1943).
377. Id. at 110.
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way,” Justice Douglas reasoned, ﬁnancial burdens on their exercise had
to be understood as “restrain[ing] in advance those constitutional
liberties . . . and inevitably tend[ing] to suppress their exercise.”378 Most
striking of all, Justice Douglas repeated nearly verbatim the argument
ﬂoated by Justice Sutherland in Grosjean and trumpeted time and again
by Hanson, Davis, and other anti–New Deal civil libertarians: that the
mere potential for a tax to become prohibitive constituted an
impermissible restraint on press and religious freedom. “The power to
tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment,” Justice Douglas wrote.379 “Those who can tax the exercise of
[the Witnesses’] religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to
deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance.”380
These poignantly Lochnerian sentences adopted wholesale the
argument put forward by Hanson in ANPA’s amicus brief, namely that
Grosjean was not a case about discriminatory taxation but rather about
the thin line between economic regulation and the suppression of First
Amendment activity.381 The single innovation of the “liberal” majority in
this respect was to marry ANPA’s view of the issue to an even more
rigorous constitutional formalism:
The fact that the ordinance is “nondiscriminatory” is
immaterial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment is
not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire
constitutional validity because it classiﬁes the privileges
protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all
alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance.
Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are
in a preferred position.382
This “preferred position” doctrine not only cast suspicion on any
general economic regulation that could be said to incidentally burden
the exercise of First Amendment rights, but also put immediate pressure
on the Court’s recent exclusion of commercial speech from First
Amendment protection in Valentine v. Chrestensen.383 In his 1942
peddling-tax opinion, Justice Reed had read Valentine as bolstering the
Court’s rejection of the Witnesses’ claim.384 The Witnesses were engaged
in the mass sale of religious pamphlets, and while the publication and
distribution of religious literature was undoubtedly a First Amendment
activity, the peddling taxes primarily affected the commercial aspect of
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Id. at 112.
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this activity.385 They recouped a portion of peddlers’ proﬁts for the
purpose of municipal maintenance.386 The facts of Valentine—in which
the owner of a submarine museum was prohibited from distributing a
pamphlet soliciting ticket purchases on one side and protesting a wharf
regulation on the other—certainly permitted this reading.387
But Justice Douglas sharply distinguished the cases and in doing so,
inserted an economic logic into those rights that now occupied a
“preferred position.”388 “Freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay
their own way,” Justice Douglas reasoned.389 “It is plain that a religious
organization needs funds to remain a going concern.”390 To hold that
“the mere fact that the religious literature is ‘sold’ . . . transform[s]
evangelism into a commercial enterprise” would be to subject “itinerant
preachers” to the same “standards governing retailers or wholesalers of
books,” Justice Douglas argued.391 But this argument simply begged the
question—what distinguished moneymaking evangelism from book
retailing? Justice Douglas did not face this question squarely. Instead, he
pursued two somewhat contradictory lines of argument.
First, he reasoned that when a “religious venture” included the
solicitation of funds necessary for that venture “to remain a going
concern,” the taxation of such funds deprived the religion’s adherents of
their free exercise rights.392 Second, he insisted that the “selling
activities” of the Witnesses were “merely incidental and collateral to their
main object which was to preach and publicize the doctrines of their
order.”393 Without reconciling these two positions—one of which
emphasized the inextricable relationship between the Witnesses’
commercial and religious activities, the other of which dismissed the
commercial aspect as insigniﬁcant—Justice Douglas concluded that “it
plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial
rather than a religious venture.”394 The possibility that a venture could be
both commercial and religious was best avoided, as the venture
prohibited in Valentine had been both commercial and political in
nature.
In a dissent joined by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson,
Justice Reed—the author of the now-overturned 1942 peddling-tax
385. Opelika I, 316 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1942).
386. Id. at 607 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
387. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942).
388. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
389. Id. at 111.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Mead, 300 N.W.
523, 524 (Iowa 1941)).
394. Id. at 111.
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decisions—described the enormous legal and political economic
implications of the new majority’s approach to First Amendment
enforcement. “The Court now holds that the First Amendment wholly
exempts the church and press from a privilege tax, presumably by the
national as well as the state government.”395 Echoing Justice Rutledge’s
own worries about the majority decision’s “too extensive application,”396
the dissenters warned that the “withdrawal of the power of taxation over
the distribution activities of those covered by the First Amendment” was
“capable of indeﬁnite extension” to other modes of regulation and other
less sympathetic regulated parties.397
What line between economic and civil liberty could now be drawn?
As Justice Reed noted, the Witnesses had alleged neither that the
peddling taxes were “so excessive in amount as to be prohibitory” nor
that “discrimination is practiced in the[ir] application.”398 “Is subjection
to nondiscriminatory, nonexcessive taxation in the distribution of
religious literature, a prohibition of the exercise of religion or an
abridgment of the freedom of the press?” Justice Reed asked.399 The
dissenters’ answer was a resounding “no.” Indeed, Justice Reed suggested
that the autonomy of economic regulation depended on ﬁnding that, as
a matter of law, the “freedom” implicated in the First Amendment was
unaffected by economic burdens. The “free” in free press and free
exercise, he reasoned, “cannot be held to [mean] without cost but rather
its meaning must accord with the freedom guaranteed. ‘Free’ means a
privilege to print or pray without permission and without accounting to
authority for one’s actions.”400 This analysis of “freedom” was strikingly
antirealist in character, but it was an antirealism made necessary by the
equally antirealist elevation of textually enumerated constitutional rights
to a “preferred position,” superseding other individual and collective
rights.
As for Grosjean, Justice Reed dismissed as dicta Justice Sutherland’s
argument that a regulation limiting newspaper revenue was, in effect, a
prior restraint because it tended to limit newspaper circulation. This was
the argument that Justice Douglas’s peddling-tax opinion so clearly
echoed. Yet, as Justice Reed insisted, the actual holding in Grosjean
seemed to lie elsewhere—in the determination that the challenged
circulation tax was “a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to
limit the circulation.”401 This interpretation of Grosjean as a case about
intentional efforts to suppress political dissent reﬂected how the ACLU
395. Id. at 133 (Reed, J., dissenting).
396. Rutledge to Douglas (Mar. 27, 1943), supra note 371, at 2.
397. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 133 (Reed, J., dissenting).
398. Id. at 118 (majority opinion).
399. Id. at 121.
400. Id. at 122.
401. Id. at 128 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
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and the Hughes Court’s progressives—Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and
perhaps Stone—understood the decision back in 1936. The 1943
peddling-tax majority, however, had unwittingly recovered Grosjean’s
roots in conservative concerns about the dangers that government
regulation posed to economic freedom.402
IV. A LONG HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM?
By recovering the early years of First Amendment Lochnerism, this
Article does not seek to tell a simple history of continuity. Civil libertarian
jurisprudence in the 1930s and 1940s did not constrain economic
regulation to the degree that it does today. We are witnessing both
political and doctrinal innovations in the use of civil libertarian
argument. These innovations may well build on the legacy of the
peddling-tax cases, but that argument will have to be explored more fully
in a future article. This Part seeks only to establish that the peddling-tax
cases’ entanglement of judicial civil libertarianism and judicial review of
economic regulation proved remarkably difficult to unknot. In doing so,
it also demonstrates how implausible it is to attribute this entanglement
to the conservative politics of Roosevelt appointees or their successors, or
to any consistent judicial belief in the “naturalness”403 or “neutrality”404
of a common law regulatory “baseline.”405 Rather, as the 1943 peddlingtax dissenters had warned and as the anti–New Deal civil libertarians of
the 1930s had hoped, midcentury jurists confronted a basic, structural
antagonism between judicial civil libertarianism and judicial deference to
political regulation of the economy.
Section IV.A describes how the Supreme Court confronted this
antagonism in the immediate wake of the peddling-tax cases. Some
“liberal” Justices were ready to embrace the antagonism fully, sacriﬁcing
the autonomy of economic regulation on the altar of the First
Amendment; others struggled to rein in the economically libertarian
tendencies of the peddling-tax cases, their “preferred position” doctrine,
and the Carolene Products framework of bifurcated review that
undergirded that doctrine. Section IV.B places these judicial struggles in
the context of contemporaneous scholarly warnings about the
economically libertarian tendencies of putatively “bifurcated” review.
Section IV.C demonstrates the failure of these judicial and scholarly
attempts to shut the “Pandora’s Box” of bifurcated review, sketching the
402. See supra section I.A. See generally Olken, supra note 45.
403. Shanor, supra note 6, at 136; see also Sepper, supra note 6, at 1460; Tebbe, supra
note 6, at 41, 58.
404. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 4, at 874; see also Sepper, supra note 6, at
1464; Tebbe, supra note 6, at 58.
405. Gedicks & Van Tassell, Burdens and Baselines, supra note 6, at 13; Sepper, supra
note 6, at 1457; Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 4, at 874–75; Tebbe, supra note 6, at
52–58.
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persistence of the peddling-tax cases and their conﬂation of civil and
economic libertarianism during the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s,
particularly in the doctrinal contexts of free exercise and commercial
speech. As the evidence demonstrates, it is difficult to attribute this
persistence to judicial conservatism or to judicial beliefs about the
superiority of common law property and contract rights. Rather, as in the
1940s, politically liberal concerns for socially and economically disadvantaged litigants led Justices to use the First Amendment to attack
economic regulation and protect the economic autonomy of private
actors.
A.

Regretting the Peddling-Tax Cases

The 1943 peddling-tax majority did not have to wait long to confront
the Lochnerian Pandora’s Box it had opened. Less than a year after
Justice Rutledge provided the crucial ﬁfth vote in the peddling-tax
decisions, he was forced to place the ﬁrst limiting condition on the
expansive First Amendment doctrine they had announced. In Prince v.
Massachusetts, the Jehovah’s Witnesses sought to extend their recent
victories, challenging a state’s child-labor law that prevented a Witness
child from participating with her mother in the sale and distribution of
religious literature.406 Writing for a badly divided Court, Justice Rutledge
upheld the safety regulation on the narrow ground of the state’s general
responsibility to protect children. “Concededly a statute or ordinance
identical in terms with [the instant one] except that it is applicable to
adults or all persons generally, would be invalid,” Justice Rutledge
explained, nodding to the peddling-tax decisions of the previous year.407
But, he went on, “[t]he state’s authority over children’s activities is
broader than over like actions of adults.”408
Justice Murphy dissented, arguing that “vague references to the
reasonableness underlying child labor legislation in general” were not
sufficient to justify a regulation impinging on “the human freedoms
enumerated in the First Amendment.”409 Citing Footnote Four, Justice
Murphy insisted that such a regulation was not aided by “any strong
presumption of . . . constitutionality” and was, indeed, “prima facie
invalid.”410 Justice Rutledge himself later told Thomas Reed Powell that
he almost had “to write [Prince] the other way”: The Court was
“dodging . . . between points pretty closely packed . . . . [I]t was one of
those situations where almost a toss of the coin could have turned the
trick for me.”411
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

321 U.S. 158, 161–62 (1944).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 173 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Fine, supra note 274, at 384.
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Agreeing with the result as a matter of policy, Justice Jackson, joined
by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, nonetheless characterized his
separate opinion as a dissent. If the Murdock majority had been right in
equating the Witnesses’ sale and distribution of literature with “worship
in the churches,” then the Prince majority laid the foundation “for any
state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in
religion, provided it is done in the name of their health or welfare.”412
This reductio ad absurdum, Justice Jackson reasoned, revealed “the real
basis of disagreement among members of this Court in previous
Jehovah’s Witness cases.”413 Making clear that Barnette had not signaled a
departure from his more general approach to the relationship between
public regulation and civil liberty, Jackson reiterated the analysis of the
First Amendment he had ﬁrst outlined in his Douglas v. City of Jeanette
concurrence: “I think the limits [on religious freedom] begin to operate
whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of
the public.”414
Just as Barnette did not indicate Justice Jackson’s retreat from
balancing First Amendment claims with third-party rights, Prince did not
indicate the “liberal” majority’s retreat from striking down economic
regulations on First Amendment grounds. Later that spring, Justice
Douglas issued an opinion invalidating another town’s door-to-door
peddling tax. Unlike in Murdock, in which there was a mixed record with
respect to the question whether itinerant Witnesses wholly supported
themselves through the sale of literature, in Follett v. Town of McCormick,
the Witness petitioner was a resident of the town and admitted that book
selling was his sole occupation.415 The majority argued that these facts
made no difference—so long as book selling was an exercise of the
petitioner’s religion, the First Amendment’s “preferred position”
trumped the commercial regulation.416 Citing now to Grosjean and
Murdock in tandem, Justice Douglas wrote that “[t]he exaction of a tax as
a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendments is as obnoxious as the imposition of censorship or a
previous restraint.”417
Justices Jackson, Roberts, and Frankfurter dissented in unison,
assailing Follett as a further expansion of the power of private economic
actors and judges to interfere with political economic decisionmaking in
the name of the First Amendment.
The present decision extends and reaches beyond what was
decided in Murdock v. Pennsylvania . . . . There the community
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Prince, 321 U.S. at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 574 (1944).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
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asserted the right to subject transient preachers of religion to
taxation; there the court emphasized the “itinerant” aspect of
the activities sought to be subjected to the exaction. The
emphasis there was upon the casual missionary appearances of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in the town and the injustice of subjecting
them to a general license tax. Here, a citizen of the community,
earning his living in the community by a religious activity, claims
immunity from contributing to the cost of the government
under which he lives. . . .
If the First Amendment grants immunity from taxation to
the exercise of religion, it must equally grant a similar
exemption to those who speak and to the press. . . . If exactions
on the business or occupation of selling cannot be enforced
against Jehovah’s Witnesses they can no more be enforced
against publishers or vendors of books, whether dealing with
religion or other matters of information. The decision now
rendered must mean that the guarantee of freedom of the press
creates an immunity equal to that here upheld as to teaching or
preaching religious doctrine. Thus the decision precludes
nonoppressive, nondiscriminatory licensing or occupation taxes
on publishers, and on news vendors as well, since, without the
latter, the dissemination of views would be impossible.418
Predicting the kinds of cases that today ﬁll the state and federal
courts in the form of Religious Freedom Restoration Act litigation, the
dissenters concluded by insisting that, “in the ﬁeld of religion alone, the
implications of the present decision are startling”:
Multiple activities by which citizens earn their bread may, with
equal propriety, be denominated an exercise of religion as may
preaching or selling religious tracts. Certainly this court cannot
say that one activity is the exercise of religion and the other is
not. . . . It would be difficult to deny the claims of those who
devote their lives to the healing of the sick, to the nursing of the
disabled, to the betterment of social and economic conditions,
and to a myriad other worthy objects, that their respective
callings, albeit they earn their living by pursuing them, are, for
them, the exercise of religion.419
Back in November 1943, Donald Richberg, the architect of the New
Deal’s National Industrial Recovery Act, had praised Justice Jackson’s
Douglas v. City of Jeanette opinion as a perfect expression of their shared
New Deal “faith”—“that liberty is only preserved by restraints on liberty,
and that therefore the imposition of restraints is an essential part of
preserving freedom.”420 Four months later, Justice Jackson and the other
Follett dissenters argued that the new “liberal” majority’s “preferred
418. Id. at 581–82 (Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
419. Id. at 582–83.
420. Letter from Donald R. Richberg to Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court (Nov. 24, 1943) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in RJP, supra note
346, container 127.
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position” doctrine had severed this link between liberty and the restraint
of liberty. The First Amendment now “entitle[d] believers to be free of
contribution to the cost of government, which itself guarantees them the
privilege of pursuing their callings without governmental prohibition or
interference.”421 Looking back at the Jehovah’s Witness cases in 1951, the
education law expert Ralph Dornfeld Owen would more explicitly, if
ironically, identify the Supreme Court’s “preferred position” civil
libertarianism as a deﬁnitive break with President Roosevelt’s New Deal
regime.422 Whereas President Roosevelt had famously declared “Four
Freedoms” to be equally fundamental—freedom of speech, freedom of
worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear—the “preferred
position” doctrine enshrined an alternative set of “four freedoms”:
“freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, all of
them guaranteed by the Constitution, and freedom to invade the rights
of others, guaranteed . . . by the majority of the members of the Supreme
Court.”423 These “four freedoms” clearly disregarded freedoms from
want and fear, which depended on affirmative government action to
protect society as a whole. In their place stood “the freedom of the
press”—always a sore spot for President Roosevelt given his political
battles with the newspaper industry—and the anarchic “freedom to
invade the rights of others.”
The ﬁnal 1940s case involving Witness peddling, Marsh v. Alabama,424
provided a peculiar coda to the New Deal politics that had simmered in
the background of the Court’s foundational First Amendment jurisprudence. In Marsh, a Witness challenged his conviction for trespassing
on a company town’s property. Justice Black, who had made a name for
himself in part by investigating corporate lobbyists, happily applied the
Court’s newly expansive First Amendment doctrine to the public
enforcement of the company town’s prohibition on solicitation.425 Justice
Frankfurter himself concurred in the opinion, writing that:
[s]o long as the views which prevailed in Jones v. Opelika . . .
[and] Murdock v. Pennsylvania . . . express the law of the
Constitution, I am unable to ﬁnd legal signiﬁcance in the fact
that a town in which the Constitutional freedoms of religion
and speech are invoked happens to be company-owned.426
This time it was Chief Justice Stone—the author of Footnote Four
and the originator of the “preferred position” doctrine—who joined
421. Follett, 321 U.S. at 583 (Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
422. See Ralph Dornfeld Owen, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Four Freedoms, 14 U.
Det. L.J. 111, 133 (1951).
423. Id. at 134.
424. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
425. Id. at 509 (“When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property
against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we
remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.”).
426. Id. at 510 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

2016] EARLY YEARS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM

1981

Justices Reed and Burton in repudiating the majority’s “novel
Constitutional doctrine.”427 Justice Jackson took no part in the decision,
being in Nuremberg at the time, but the dissenters offered a version of
his own political economic analysis of rights. In this case, though, the
analysis was invoked primarily to defend private property rather than
public authority from civil libertarian attack.
Our Constitution guarantees to every man the right to
express his views in an orderly fashion. An essential element of
“orderly” is that the man shall also have a right to use the place
he chooses for his exposition. The rights of the owner, which
the Constitution protects as well as the right of free speech, are
not outweighed by the interests of the trespasser, even though
he trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech.428
Of course, Justice Jackson’s point in Douglas, Barnette, and Follett had
been that almost every rights holder will trespass to some extent on the
rights of others. What was needed was “hard-headed ﬁxing of . . . limits
by neutral authority,” by which Jackson meant, at least in the ﬁrst
instance, legislators and administrators, not judges.429 Chief Justice Stone
had disagreed with Justice Jackson when it came to the rights of ordinary
townspeople to public order and ﬁscal solvency; the rights of large-scale
private-property owners, it turned out, were a different manner. Yet
Stone’s worst fears would not be realized—in the ensuing decades, civil
liberties did not vitiate the rights of private property. Indeed, the
Supreme Court gradually marginalized the Marsh doctrine.430 As Justices
Jackson, Frankfurter, and Roberts had intuited in Follett, the more
baffling problem was and would remain those cases in which the rights of
the property holder coincided with, rather than cut against, the rights of
the civil libertarian trespasser. This was the situation the peddling-tax
cases had presented and the paradigm of First Amendment Lochnerism.
Chief Justice Stone died a few months after his dissent in Marsh.
Three years later, in Kovacs v. Cooper,431 Justice Frankfurter attempted to
bury what he saw as the pernicious legacy of Stone’s civil liberties
jurisprudence, from Footnote Four through the discourse of “preferred
position” that it had spawned. In Kovacs, the Court upheld an ordinance
prohibiting the use of sound ampliﬁcation equipment in the streets.432
Justice Frankfurter agreed with the result but was disturbed by the
majority opinion’s invocation of the phrase “preferred position” and its
citation to Footnote Four of Carolene Products. Accordingly, he ﬁled a
427. Id. at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 516.
429. Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 180 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring).
430. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516–21 (1976); Christopher W. Schmidt,
The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 767, 794–95 (2009).
431. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
432. Id. at 77.
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concurrence reconstructing the doctrinal history of both.433 First,
Frankfurter argued that Footnote Four itself “did not have the
concurrence of a majority of the Court,” as Justice Black did not concur
in Part III of the opinion, which included the famous Footnote.434
Frankfurter then reviewed all those cases either citing the Footnote or
invoking the First Amendment’s “preferred position.”435 The conclusion
of this review was that “the claim that any legislation is presumptively
unconstitutional which touches the ﬁeld of the First Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . has never commended itself to a majority of
this Court.”436
But Justice Frankfurter was simply wrong. In Murdock, Justice
Douglas had a majority for the proposition that: “A license tax certainly
does not acquire constitutional validity because it classiﬁes the privileges
protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers, and treats them all alike.”437
Implicit in this proposition was precisely the presumption that Justice
Frankfurter considered anathema: a presumption of unconstitutionality
when general social and economic regulation “touche[d] the ﬁeld of the
First Amendment.”438 As the peddling-tax majority had insisted, “equality
in treatment does not save” such regulation because “[f]reedom of press,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”439
After the death of Chief Justice Stone, the “liberal” block that had
made these words law no longer had the ﬁve votes necessary to sustain
their full force. Nonetheless, the Kovacs dissenters—Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge—were correct to note that Justice
Frankfurter’s review of the case law “demonstrates the conclusion
opposite to that which he draws, namely, that the First Amendment
guaranties of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and religion
occupy preferred position not only in the Bill of Rights, but also in the
433. Id. at 89 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
434. Id. at 91; cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 (1938). This
argument was recently reiterated by Justice Scalia. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1644 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e should not design our jurisprudence to conform
to dictum in a footnote in a four-Justice opinion.”); see also David A. Strauss, Is Carolene
Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1251, 1252 n.2 (“Justices Cardozo and Reed did not
participate in the case. Justice Black concurred in the majority opinion except for the part
that included the footnote. Justice McReynolds dissented. Justice Butler concurred only in
the result.” (citations omitted)). The argument for Footnote Four’s minority status is
debatable. Even without Justice Black, there were four votes for the Footnote and only
seven Justices voting in the case. Footnote Four was thus endorsed by a majority of voting
members of the Court.
435. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 91–94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
436. Id. at 94–95 .
437. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (emphasis added).
438. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
439. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115.
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repeated decisions of this Court.”440 However accurate, this testament to
the post–New Deal judiciary’s ﬁrst era of aggressive civil libertarianism
would read more like a eulogy a few months later, when both Justices
Rutledge and Murphy followed Chief Justice Stone to the grave.
President Truman replaced these “liberal” hard-liners with jurists
who were more comfortable with balancing individual free expression
and free exercise against broadly shared public interests.441 In the
context of early Cold War hysteria, the consequent retreat from
aggressive First Amendment enforcement was hard to view as anything
but reactionary.442 Yet while Justices Tom Clark and Sherman Minton
were generally regarded as more “conservative”443 than their predecessors, they were actually more sympathetic than Justices Rutledge and
Murphy to the New Deal’s fundamental commitment to judicial
deference in matters of political economy.
The votes of Justices Clark and Minton tipped the balance in Breard
v. City of Alexandria,444 a 1951 case that gave Justice Reed the opportunity
to mitigate the economically libertarian implications of the old “liberal”
majority’s First Amendment jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that had
overturned Reed’s original 1942 disposition of the Witnesses’ challenge.
That opinion had upheld the peddling taxes on the ground that
incidental economic burdens on the exercise of First Amendment
rights—especially when that exercise had a commercial aspect—did not
violate the Constitution.445 Now, nearly a decade later, Justice Reed
sought to return the Court to this pre-“liberal” First Amendment
jurisprudence, one that was more compatible with the New Deal’s
rejection of judicial regulation of the economy.
Jack Breard, a door-to-door seller of magazine subscriptions, was
convicted of violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting “the practice of
going in and upon private residences . . . by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers,
itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise not having
been requested or invited so to do.”446 This blanket prohibition looked
more restrictive than the taxes levied on peddling in the 1943 Witness
440. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 106 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
441. See generally George D. Braden, Mr. Justice Minton and the Truman Bloc, 26
Ind. L.J. 153 (1951).
442. See Robert M. Lichtman, The Supreme Court and McCarthy-Era Repression 24–
36 (2015); Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America 190–200
(1998). But cf. Linda C. Gugin & James E. St. Clair, Sherman Minton: New Deal Senator,
Cold War Justice 257 (1997) (noting that Minton told former President Truman that
Republican obsession with domestic communism was a “diversionary tactic so that people
would not notice the problems in the economy”).
443. David N. Atkinson, From New Deal Liberal to Supreme Court Conservative: The
Metamorphosis of Justice Sherman Minton, 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 361, 361.
444. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
445. Opelika I, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
446. Breard, 341 U.S. at 624.
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cases, and Breard argued, on this basis, that “the distribution of
periodicals through door-to-door canvassing [was] entitled to First
Amendment protection”: “[T]he mere fact that money [was] made out
of the distribution [did] not bar the publications from First Amendment
protection.”447
Echoing Justice Jackson’s peddling-tax dissent eight years earlier,
Justice Reed drew attention to the distributional character of rights
claims: “All declare for liberty and proceed to disagree among themselves as to its true meaning. . . . Everyone cannot have his own way and
each must yield something to the reasonable satisfaction of the needs of
all.”448 Particularly when the exercise of First Amendment rights involved
commercial activity, the expressive nature of that activity did not
necessarily tip the scales in its favor:
[O]pportunists, for private gain, cannot be permitted to arm
themselves with an acceptable principle, such as that of a right
to work, a privilege to engage in interstate commerce, or a free
press, and proceed to use it as an iron standard to smooth their
path by crushing the living rights of others to privacy and
repose.449
Reed allowed that “the fact that periodicals are sold does not put
them beyond the protection of the First Amendment;” nonetheless,
“[t]he selling” aspect of an expressive activity “brings into the transaction
a commercial feature.”450 It was on the basis of this “commercial feature”
of the expressive activity that Reed distinguished Breard’s case from
Martin v. Struthers, a case decided the same day as the 1943 peddling-tax
cases, in which the Court had struck down an ordinance prohibiting even
noncommercial door-to-door leaﬂeting.451
Notably, Justice Reed ignored those cases that were most on point:
the 1943 peddling tax cases themselves, which had shielded the door-todoor sale of magazines not only from an outright ban but also from
incidental ﬁnancial burdens, despite the “commercial feature” of the
activity. He simply concluded that “[i]t would be . . . misuse of the great
guarantees of free speech and free press to use those guarantees to force
a community to admit the solicitors of publications to the home premises
of its residents.”452
The remaining two members of the old “liberal” majority vigorously
dissented. Joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Black decried Reed’s
absolute silence with respect to the peddling-tax cases and condemned

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id. at 641–42.
Id. at 625–26.
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 642–43 (discussing Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)).
Id. at 645.
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his covert repudiation of the “preferred position” doctrine on which they
rested:
Today a new majority adopts the position of the former
dissenters [including Reed himself] and sustains a city
ordinance forbidding door-to-door solicitation of subscriptions . . . . Since this decision cannot be reconciled with the
[peddling-tax cases] . . . , it seems to me that good judicial
practice calls for their forthright overruling. . . . Today’s
decision marks a revitalization of the judicial views which
prevailed before this Court embraced the philosophy that the
First Amendment gives a preferred status to the liberties it
protects. I adhere to that preferred position philosophy.453
Justice Black’s precedential argument was a powerful one, and it is
unclear why Justice Reed and the new majority did not overrule the 1943
peddling-tax cases. Alternatively, Reed might have distinguished those
cases on the ground that the degree of commerciality differed, as the
Witnesses were a poor religious organization trying to make ends meet,
while Breard represented a corporation with “an annual business of
$5,000,000.”454 Yet such a distinction would have involved the Court in
precisely the sort of political economic decisionmaking that, for New
Deal stalwarts like Reed, was beyond the Court’s authority. In any event,
the Breard Court took neither course, simply passing over the peddlingtax cases in silence. Accordingly, those cases remained in all their
ambiguity on the books, leaving unresolved the proper relationship
between judicial civil libertarianism and judicial deference to political
regulation of the economy.
B.

Regretting Footnote Four

The effort by Justices Frankfurter and Reed in the late 1940s and
early 1950s to marginalize the peddling-tax cases, the “preferred
position” doctrine, and the Carolene Products framework that undergirded
both is puzzling in light of the widely held view that Footnote Four of
Carolene Products was little noticed until the 1960s or 1970s.455 Only then,
it is contended, did lawyers and judges embrace the Footnote—
particularly its second two paragraphs, concerning obstructions to the

453. Id. at 649–50 (Black, J., dissenting).
454. Id. at 644 (majority opinion).
455. See Evan Gerstmann, The Constitutional Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the
Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection 35–36 (1999); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren
Court and American Politics 487–89 (2000); Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can
Process Theory Restrain Courts?, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 923, 926–27 (2001); Edward J. Erler,
Equal Protection and Personal Rights: The Regime of the “Discrete and Insular Minority,”
16 Ga. L. Rev. 407, 409, 419 (1982); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene
Products Dead? Reﬂections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights
Legislation, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 685, 691–94 (1991); L.A. Powe, Jr., Does Footnote Four
Describe?, 11 Const. Comment. 197, 197 (1994) [hereinafter Powe, Footnote Four].
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political process and “discrete and insular minorities”—in order to justify
(or explain) the Warren Court’s jurisprudential innovations.456
From one perspective, this argument about the belated invention of
Footnote Four’s signiﬁcance is insupportable. By 1948, legal scholars
could speak matter of factly about Carolene Products’s “now famous
footnote”457 and cite it as the origin of the Supreme Court’s “reject[ion],
even revers[al], [of] the normal presumption of constitutionality” in
cases involving civil liberties.458 That same year, the Supreme Court cited
the Footnote for the sweeping proposition that:
[Legislative] judgment does not bear the same weight and is not
entitled to the same presumption of validity, when the
legislation on its face or in speciﬁc application restricts the
rights of conscience, expression and assembly protected by the
Amendment, as are given to other regulations having no such
tendency. The presumption rather is against the legislative
intrusion into these domains.459
Yet, from another point of view, the thesis of Footnote Four’s belated
invention—or at least its reinvention—has merit. As the previous quotes
suggest, judges and scholars in the ﬁrst decade of the Footnote’s
existence associated it not with the principal legacy of the Warren
Court—equal citizenship—but with the First Amendment; with the
notion that some rights occupied a “preferred position” in the
constitutional order (principally those rights protected by the First
Amendment); and with the related notion that judges should treat
certain kinds of governmental action as presumptively invalid because
certain kinds of rights were presumptively inviolable. In the 1940s,
Footnote Four was not neglected but it also did not represent a set of
tools for building a more egalitarian democracy. Rather, it represented a
set of libertarian checks on majoritarian decisionmaking.
In the 1940s, Footnote Four of Carolene Products, “when it was cited,
stood for ‘preferred position.’”460 Furthermore, while those Justices who
most ﬁercely endorsed the “preferred position” doctrine—Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge—“associated Carolene Products with
democracy,” they did not associate it with “the modern procedural
notion of democratic representation-reinforcement” but rather “the idea
that democracy involves certain substantive values and substantive
freedoms.”461 As Felix Gilman has argued, “because [Footnote Four] was
generally associated with preferred position[,] [i]t was not seen as an
argument for the compatibility of judicial review with the democratic
456. See Erler, supra note 455, at 409; Powe, Footnote Four, supra note 455, at 204.
457. Braden, Search, supra note 36, at 579; see also Wechsler, supra note 15, at 769
n.28 (citing “the famous Carolene Products footnote”).
458. Emerson & Helfeld, supra note 143, at 84.
459. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 140 & n.18 (1948).
460. Gilman, supra note 15, at 188.
461. Id. at 189.
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process, but as an argument for the necessity of judicial review from
fundamental values.”462
It was for this reason that Justices Reed and Frankfurter sought to
marginalize Footnote Four, the closely associated “preferred position”
doctrine, and the peddling-tax cases that had formulated that doctrine.
Scholars have generally attributed Frankfurter’s interventions in
particular to an almost mechanical dedication to judicial deference—
to the formalized conception of institutional roles soon to be
developed by the “legal process” school, whose members admired
Frankfurter deeply.463 Yet this was not the critique of the “preferred
position” doctrine that Frankfurter, Reed, and the other dissenting
Justices had offered in the 1943 peddling-tax cases. Rather, they attacked
the “liberal” majority’s endorsement of “preferred position” from the
perspective of legal realism. Since economic regulation invariably
imposed burdens on regulated parties’ exercise of expressive rights, the
dissenters reasoned, to say that these rights were presumptively inviolable
was to say that economic regulation was presumptively invalid: subject to
searching judicial review whenever challenged on First Amendment
grounds or, potentially, on any of the myriad other grounds contemplated by Footnote Four.464 The “preferred position” gloss of Footnote
Four threatened to negate the “presumption of constitutionality” that
the body of Carolene Products had announced, not simply because the
gloss encouraged judicial review but because it ignored the political
economic character of all rights claims. Put more simply, the 1943
peddling-tax dissenters saw little difference between the libertarianism of
the “preferred position” doctrine and the economic libertarianism that
the New Deal Court had so recently repudiated.
Throughout the 1940s, prominent legal scholars echoed this
skepticism, wondering at the strange predicament that a putatively “left
wing”465 majority of Roosevelt appointees was creating for itself. As early
462. Id. at 202.
463. For the argument that judicial deference was the hard core of Frankfurter’s
jurisprudence, see Urofsky, supra note 244; Joseph P. Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in From
the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter 3 (Joseph P. Lash ed., 1974); Michael E. Parrish, Felix
Frankfurter, the Progressive Tradition, and the Warren Court, in The Warren Court in
Historical and Political Perspective 51 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993); G. Edward White, The
Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 576 (1995). For a contrasting interpretation, see Snyder, supra note 243, at 350–51
(redescribing Frankfurter’s commitment to judicial deference as a method of judge-driven
popular constitutionalism). For Frankfurter and the rise of the legal process school, see
Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 220–84 (1995); Laura Kalman, Legal
Realism at Yale 1927–1960, at 145–228 (1986); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
The Making of the Legal Process, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2031, 2032–34 (1993).
464. For realism’s analysis of the legally constructed nature of the economy, see
generally Barbara Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire (1998); Morton Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960, at 193–246 (1992).
465. Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 140, 140 (1949).
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as 1941, Yale Law School Professor Walton Hamilton—one of the
founders of legal realism—unhappily predicted the emergence of a
preferred-position-like doctrine from the Hughes Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence:
A few years ago a bench headed by the present Chief Justice
read “liberty of contract” out of the due process clause and
promptly read freedom of speech into its place. The current
bench, accentuating a trend which for a decade has been in the
making, has in effect set up a presumption of
unconstitutionality against all legislation which on its face
strikes at freedom of speech, press, assembly, or religion.466
Hamilton and his student coauthor George Braden467 argued that
there was a worrisome tension between this civil libertarian trend and a
parallel “revolution”—the Supreme Court’s ostensible abandonment of
its role as arbiter of the fairness of the nation’s political economy.468 On
the one hand, President Roosevelt’s recent appointees, Justices Black,
Reed, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Murphy, could each “through concrete
experience . . . testify to the mischief which had been done by an attempt
of the [old] Court to impose its rigid dogma upon the seething activities
of society.”469 They all surely recognized that “if, in nation and state, the
economy is to be kept ﬂexible enough to preserve personal opportunity,
the dominant reliance must be upon the legislature.”470 Yet in practice,
the new Court had proven “unwilling to make deﬁnitive its presumption
that a statute is constitutional.”471 Indeed, by creating a “presumption of
unconstitutionality” in matters of “civil rights” as opposed to “the
liberties of property,” the new Court was embracing “th[e] very process”
that had characterized the old Court’s approach to property rights:
“[T]he action of the state must be measured against the invasion of
private right, and the issue becomes a matter of more or less.”472

466. Hamilton & Braden, supra note 36, at 1349; see also id. at 1352 & n.145. For
Hamilton’s intellectual and institutional signiﬁcance, see Kalman, supra note 463, passim.
The year before Hamilton and Braden wrote their article, an anonymous note in the
Columbia Law Review had reached a similar conclusion. Note, Recent Cases, Constitutional
Law—Presumption of Constitutionality Not Applicable to Statutes Dealing with Civil
Liberties, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 531, 532–33 (1940) (“[Schneider] lends authoritative substance
to the theory that there may be no room for the presumption of constitutionality, usually
accorded state or municipal legislation, where [it] interferes with a civil liberty . . . . This
notion—rooted in conjecture, then accorded footnote recognition . . . has now
culminated in deﬁnitive assertion . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
467. Graduating from law school in 1941, Braden would go on to clerk for Justice
Minton before joining the Yale Law faculty in 1947 as a late defender of legal realism.
Kalman, supra note 463, at 149.
468. Hamilton & Braden, supra note 36, at 1319.
469. Id. at 1322.
470. Id. at 1349.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 1350–51.
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The problem, Hamilton and Braden argued, was not simply that the
Court was applying a procedure once used to protect economic liberty in
order to protect civil liberty. The deeper problem was the substantive
ambiguity between the two kinds of liberty:
A couple of generations ago, in an America which was on the
make, personal freedom was esteemed as opportunity in a land
of promise. To the mind of Mr. Justice Field, liberty-andproperty was a single word and he did not hesitate to read the
right to get ahead into the Fourteenth Amendment. But the
idiom of ultimates changes and common-sense goes along. A
peaceful picketing, for which ﬁfty years ago the law would have
been hard put to ﬁnd a place, is today an attribute of freedom
of speech . . . . Today there are persons, whom the members of
the Court would not consider unreasonable men, who regard
the matter [of labor picketing] as an aspect of a clash between
economic groups which the state should regulate. And men not
devoid of reason argue that when the National Labor Relations
Board forbids an employer to send anti-union pamphlets to his
own employees, there is no denial of the traditional freedom of
the individual.473
The blurred nature of the line between economic and civil liberty
created a kind of “Step Zero” question,474 the answer to which would
embroil the Court in the same sort of economic reasoning that it had
purportedly abandoned in the late 1930s. In any given case, “[t]he Court
must . . . exercise independent judgment in deciding whether an issue is
one of civil rights” or one of economic liberty and therefore whether to
apply the “presumption of unconstitutionality” or the “presumption of
constitutionality.”475 But “[t]o accept the thesis that such questions fall
within the discretion of the Court, is to accord deference to an
ultimate.”476 “[D]iscretion as to what presumptions will be indulged”
meant that the “door” of judicial scrutiny was “capable of being ﬂung
wide open.”477
Hamilton and Braden interpreted Footnote Four of Carolene Products
as an indication that “[m]embers of the Court have been bothered by
their own dichotomy” between economic and civil liberty.478 And they
found some merit in the distinction suggested by the Footnote’s second
paragraph—namely that some “rights . . . have unique importance
because their denial tends to restrict ‘those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legis473. Id. at 1352.
474. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006)
(describing “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all”).
475. Hamilton & Braden, supra note 36, at 1352.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 1350.
478. Id. at 1352 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
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lation.’”479 Echoing the interpretation of Footnote Four that Justice
Frankfurter had offered to Justice Stone during their Gobitis debate,
Hamilton and Braden argued that the Footnote’s second paragraph, on
its own, might effectively synthesize judicial deference to political
decisionmaking with heightened scrutiny in cases where there was
evidence that the normal pathways of political debate and decision had
been obstructed. The second paragraph “would keep open the right of
intellectual search and maintain a free forum for the interchange of
ideas and the resulting action. That done, it is not of judicial concern
that mistakes are made, provided the rules of the game are followed.”480
While Hamilton and Braden may have been short-sighted in
thinking that “[s]uch a rationale has relatively easy going so long as it is
limited to the democratic process,”481 they were certainly correct that
Footnote Four “encounters obstacles as soon as it leaves its procedural
orbit.”482 Unlike the Footnote’s second paragraph, its ﬁrst and third
paragraphs posited substantive categories—textually enumerated rights,
“discrete and insular minorities”—that merited special judicial
guardianship. Neither category suggested an obvious means of
distinguishing economic from noneconomic matters or of shielding the
former from heightened judicial scrutiny. As Hamilton and Braden
emphasized, reasonable persons could and did differ as to the question
whether a labor picket was a First Amendment activity to be zealously
protected by the judiciary or one maneuver in a larger economic conﬂict
to be reasonably regulated by legislators and administrators.
The troublingly “economic” character of many “civil liberties”
claims was a frequent theme in the contemporaneous writings of the
historian and public intellectual Henry Steele Commager. A few months
before Hamilton and Braden’s article, Commager asked the readers of
the New York Times, “What is a law dealing with ‘economic problems,’ and
who is to decide whether a particular act falls into this or into some other
category? . . . [F]ew laws fall into neat or clear categories . . . . A law
providing heavy taxes on newspaper advertising is an ‘economic’ law.”483
Commager expanded on the point in his book Majority Rule and Minority
Rights, published months after the 1943 peddling-tax decisions.484 “The
dust of confusion hangs heavily over the discussions of [Roosevelt’s court479. Id. at 1353 (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
480. Id. This “political process” argument for heightened judicial scrutiny of the
regulation of (publicly valuable) speech would be famously elaborated by Alexander
Meiklejohn later in the decade. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation
to Self-Government 26–27 (1948).
481. Hamilton & Braden, supra note 36, at 1353. See generally Robert C. Post,
Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (2014) (discussing the
dilemmas of judicial review of the democratic process).
482. Hamilton & Braden, supra note 36, at 1353.
483. Henry Steele Commager, The Constitution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1941, at 16.
484. Commager, Majority Rule and Minority Rights, supra note 36.
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packing plan] and of the numerous Jehovah’s Witnesses cases,”
Commager lamented.485 “Misunderstanding,” he went on, “is no monopoly of conservatives who celebrate judicial review as a bulwark of
republicanism; it distinguishes equally liberals who for the most part
deprecate judicial intervention in the economic realm but rejoice
exceedingly at judicial intervention on behalf of civil liberties.”486 The
problem for liberals, Commager explained, was that “the distinction
between so-called civil-liberties laws and other laws is by no means clearcut, that it may even be artiﬁcial and misleading”:
Was the Louisiana law imposing a heavy tax upon newspapers
with large circulations an exercise of the taxing powers, or was it
a badly concealed attempt to penalize opposition papers and
thus an interference with freedom of the press? . . . Is the law
forbidding doctors to give out contraceptive information a
proper exercise of the police power—or an illegal interference
with the rights of the medical profession?487
Ambiguity between the economic and the noneconomic was also rife
when it came to the protection of “discrete and insular minorities.”
Commager reminded his readers that it was “conservatives, fearful
especially for the sanctity of property,” who ﬁrst championed “the
protection of minority rights,” “formulated a philosophy of the ‘tyranny
of the majority[,]’ and took refuge in the denial of the majority will”
through the “institution of judicial review.”488 Hamilton and Braden had
similarly noted that a discrete and insular minority “may refuse, or be
unable, to entertain commerce in ‘reason’ with the mass of persons
whose will guides the state.”489 Was such a minority entitled to special
judicial protection? Expanding on this point a few years later, Braden
asked, “What are ‘discrete and insular minorities’? Racial and religious
groups, yes. Public utilities? Had Chief Justice Stone sat on the Court in
the days of Granger legislation against the railroads, would he have held
the railroads to be such a minority?”490
The peddling-tax cases exempliﬁed this slippery boundary between
“economic” and “noneconomic” minorities. The Jehovah’s Witnesses
were both a religious minority and an economic minority, a socially
disfavored religious sect that engaged in an economically disfavored
mode of commerce: mass door-to-door sale and distribution of
aggressively sectarian literature. Furthermore, the Witnesses’ legal victory

485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 79.
Hamilton & Braden, supra note 36, at 1353.
Braden, Search, supra note 36, at 581.
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arose through a distinct process of interest group convergence,491 in
which the asserted rights of a disfavored religious and economic minority
achieved judicial recognition when they aligned with the asserted rights
of elite economic and expressive minorities—speciﬁcally, the newspaper
industry and the corporate bar.492 Contrary to majoritarian accounts of
minority-rights enforcement,493 the crucial dialectic at work in the
peddling-tax cases was not majority–minority, but disfavored-minority–
elite-minority. As scholars noted during the 1940s, this dialectic was
immanent within the logic of Footnote Four itself: The third paragraph
underdetermined the social and economic character of the minorities in
need of judicial protection; and the ﬁrst paragraph was entirely neutral
with regard to the social and economic power of the claimant of any
particular textually enumerated constitutional right.
These early, skeptical interpretations of “bifurcated” review were not
simply the product of backward-looking jurists’ misplaced anxieties. The
inextricably economic nature of civil liberties claims continued to plague
the Supreme Court in the wake of its encounter with the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ peculiar hybrid of expressive and commercial activity.
C.

The Persistence of the Peddling-Tax Cases

In hindsight, the 1951 decision by Justice Reed and the Breard Court
to pass over the peddling-tax cases in silence—suggesting that their
reasoning was inapt but declining to overrule them directly—looks
fateful. Although Justice Black, in dissent, criticized what he saw as a
cowardly, covert overruling of the peddling-tax cases and the abandonment of the “preferred position philosophy,”494 the peddling-tax cases
and their “preferred position” approach to First Amendment enforcement were not dead. As Michigan Law Professor Paul G. Kauper
summarized in his 1960 overview of “constitutional trends”:
Although it appeared with the death of Justices Rutledge and
Murphy, who, along with Justices Black and Douglas, had
491. Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 528 (1980) (arguing that “the interests of the races
converged to make the Brown decision inevitable”).
492. To an extent, then, the history of the peddling-tax cases supports Professor Bruce
Ackerman’s pluralist critique of Footnote Four—but only to the extent that one
acknowledges both the power differential between interest groups and the formalism that
obscures this power differential. See Ackerman, supra note 137, at 718–31; see also Ganesh
Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101
Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing the failure of pluralist theory to take
disparities in economic power into account). It is not that all discrete and insular
minorities have outsized inﬂuence on the political process but rather that powerful
minorities that do have outsized inﬂuence can further secure their interests in the courts
by piggybacking on the claims of disfavored minorities.
493. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1996).
494. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 649–50 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
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formed a solid bloc on the Court during the 1940–1950 decade
to elevate [First Amendment] freedoms to the highest level
under the Constitution, that the emphasis thereafter would be
somewhat abated[,] . . . it is now apparent that with the appointment to the bench of Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan,
men whose views coincide largely with those of Murphy and
Rutledge, we again have a very solid bloc on the Court
committed to the preferred freedoms theory in the
interpretation of the First Amendment.495
Over the course of the 1950s, the peddling-tax cases themselves
reappeared at the Court, usually invoked by narrow liberal majorities for
the proposition that incidental economic burdens on expressive activity
might violate a litigant’s First Amendment rights, or that the commercial
nature of expressive activity did not deprive that activity of First
Amendment protection.496 By 1962, the political scientist Robert
McCloskey could remark that bifurcated review—in its “preferred
position” interpretation—was alive and well and causing as much trouble
as ever.497
The “modern Court,” Professor McCloskey explained, “has fairly
consistently held to the ‘dual standard’ enunciated by [Justice] Stone in
the Carolene Products case.”498 But “[f]rom the ﬁrst the modern Court has
been troubled by a recurring problem: how does the dichotomy stand up
when economic matters and personal rights are involved in a single
governmental action?”499 “Examples abound,” McCloskey continued:
“statutes that strike at picketing, which may be both free speech and . . .
economic activity; State-supported professional dues-paying requirements[;] . . . labor regulations that impinge on freedom of religion;
license requirements, and other restrictions with a secular purpose, that
nevertheless impose burdens on religious practice, to name only a
few.”500 This laundry list presaged a host of legal controversies that today
495. Paul G. Kauper, Supreme Court: Trends in Constitutional Interpretation, 24
F.R.D. 155, 176–77 (1960).
496. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522–25 (1960); Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 535–36 (1958); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461–62 (1958);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring). For an
alternative perspective on the imbrication of civil and economic liberties in this period,
see generally Karen M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor : Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and
the Making of “New Property,” 26 Law & Hist. Rev. 379 (2008).
497. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34, 54.
498. Id. at 45.
499. Id. at 55.
500. Id. For examples of the case law that motivated Professor McCloskey’s argument,
see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 845–48 (1961) (avoiding the First Amendment
question by determining that the record did not support the lawyer’s contention that his
state bar association dues were being used to advocate for political positions with which he
disagreed); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768–69 (1961) (avoiding the
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are mistakenly seen as distinctive artifacts of the Roberts Court’s civil
libertarian adventurism.
Professor McCloskey reasoned that the most obvious solution to the
problem of distinguishing between civil and economic libertarianism
would be “to hold that . . . the law or an application of it will fall only if it
was aimed at or discriminates against personal rights [e.g., civil liberties]
as such.”501 Midcentury liberals, however, were unwilling to limit judicial
civil libertarianism to the policing of facial restrictions on textually
enumerated constitutional rights. “[T]he trouble with this formula,”
McCloskey explained, “is that it does permit the state to impose de facto
burdens on the exercise of personal rights, and this has disturbed some
of the Justices.”502 “A Court that has resolved to protect personal rights
because of their indispensability to democracy,” he reasonably
concluded, “is not likely to be content with a doctrine that allows them to
be frittered away, even though an otherwise legitimate . . . purpose can
be descried.”503
An alternative approach that the Court had tried was “to ﬁlter out
the personal-rights elements in the law and insist on their protection; the
economic-rights residue being left, as usual, to the chance of legislative
judgment.”504 But as Professor McCloskey noted, “this can involve very
nettling problems” of distinguishing between the “personal-rights elements” and the “economic-rights residue” lurking within a given First
Amendment claim.505
First Amendment question by interpreting the Railway Labor Act’s authorization of union
shops to prohibit a union from spending dues from an employee on a political cause to
which the employee objects); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 139–40, 143–44 (1961) (avoiding the First Amendment question by
interpreting the Sherman Act not to outlaw lobbying for legislation that would have
negative effects on business competitors); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958)
(holding a state could not deprive an individual of a tax beneﬁt simply because he refused
to swear that he had not engaged in criminal forms of speech); Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 243–47 (1957) (avoiding the First Amendment question by holding
that petitioner’s decades-old membership in the Communist Party was not reasonable
evidence of bad “moral character” on which to base denial of his application to practice
law); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345 (1955) (avoiding the First Amendment question
by holding that the executive order creating loyalty review boards did not allow “political
appointees who . . . might be more vulnerable to the pressures of heated public opinion”
to reverse an agency’s retention of an employee whose political associations allegedly
constituted a security risk); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 395–96 (1953)
(avoiding the First Amendment question by holding that Congress could not have
intended the deﬁnition of “minister” to preclude those who earned income from secular
work); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190–92 (1952) (avoiding the First Amendment
question by holding that the state lacked sufficient evidence to deprive an individual of
employment because of her allegedly disloyal political affiliations).
501. McCloskey, supra note 497, at 55.
502. Id. (emphasis added).
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
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A year after McCloskey’s article, the Supreme Court once again
ignored these “nettling problems” and explicitly invoked the 1943
peddling-tax cases to invalidate the denial of unemployment beneﬁts to
an individual whose religious refusal to work on Saturdays left her
without private-sector employment.506 That decision, Sherbert v. Verner,
cannot be described as vindicating common law property or contract
rights—it mandated more government interference in the market, not
less. Accordingly, contemporary critics often distinguish Sherbert from
today’s First Amendment Lochnerism, relying on Professor Cass
Sunstein’s narrow deﬁnition of “Lochnerism” as preservation of a
common law regulatory “baseline.”507 But the Sherbert Court did use the
First Amendment to protect a litigant’s economic interests—speciﬁcally,
her interest in the “new property”508 of statutorily created unemployment
insurance. In doing so, the decision built not only on the peddling-tax
cases but also on a series of 1950s cases in which the Court had secured
litigants’ access to publicly provided economic beneﬁts on civil libertarian grounds.509 In any event, the Sherbert Court’s application of strict
506. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963).
507. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 4, at 874; cf. Gedicks & Van Tassell,
Burdens and Baselines, supra note 6, at 326; Sepper, supra note 6, at 1486 & n.169; Tebbe,
supra note 6, at 54. These articles also argue that contemporary instances of free exercise
“Lochnerism” tend to shift burdens from exempted persons to third parties, especially
from employers to employees, in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Sherbert Court,
it is contended, was punctilious about avoiding such a violation, emphasizing that granting
unemployment insurance to the petitioner on First Amendment grounds did not burden
third parties. See, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassell, Burdens and Baselines, supra note 6, at 326
(arguing that in Sherbert, the Court “observed that the exemption would not burden
others”); Tebbe, supra note 6, at 54 (arguing that “the free exercise exemption that the
Court granted in Sherbert v. Verner did not burden any identiﬁable person or group”). But
this means of distinguishing Sherbert from contemporary free exercise “Lochnerism” may
overread the case. The Sherbert Court did not rule out the possibility that the free exercise
right to unemployment insurance placed third parties in an inferior economic position; it
simply noted that such a right did not “abridge any other person’s religious liberties.”
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409; cf. id. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The meaning of today’s
holding . . . is that the State . . . must single out for ﬁnancial assistance those whose
behavior is religiously motivated, even though it denies such assistance to others whose
identical behavior . . . is not religiously motivated.”).
508. Professor Charles Reich would coin the term one year after Sherbert was decided.
See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
509. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958) (holding that a tax
beneﬁt premised on petitioner’s speech could not be withheld “until the State comes
forward with sufficient proof to justify [the] inhibition” of that speech); Schware v. Bd. of
Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 246–47 (1957) (holding that the petitioner’s “past membership
in the Communist Party d[id] not justify an inference that he presently has bad moral
character” and thus did not support “denying him the opportunity to qualify for the
practice of law”); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 395–97 (1953) (holding that
evidence of petitioner’s part-time secular employment did not support the inference that
he was not entitled to a regulatory exemption as a “minister”); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (“We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the
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scrutiny to a facially neutral economic regulation for its incidental
burdens on free exercise—a model of review ﬁrst deployed in the
peddling-tax cases—would later receive statutory codiﬁcation in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a major source of contemporary
debates about First Amendment Lochnerism.510
Twelve years after Sherbert, the 1943 peddling-tax cases were once
again trotted out, this time to justify the extension of First Amendment
protection to “commercial speech.”511 Much like the “liberal” peddlingtax majority and the Sherbert Court, the Burger Court majorities that ﬁrst
conferred civil libertarian dignity on commercial speech were motivated
by politically liberal goals—women’s access to abortion and poor and
elderly Americans’ access to cheap medicines.512 These majorities did not
understand themselves to be vindicating any common law regulatory
baseline but rather the rights of consumers to gain information that was
essential to their welfare and to the exercise of independent
constitutional rights, such as Roe’s limited right to abortion.513 Yet the
early “commercial speech” decisions, like the 1943 peddling-tax decisions
on which they relied, refused to justify themselves on these relatively
narrow, pragmatic grounds. Rather, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinions
in Bigelow and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy touted the expansive reach
and constitutionally exalted character of the First Amendment.
In the process, Justice Blackmun cabined both Valentine, the
Supreme Court’s initial effort to distinguish commercial from
constitutionally protected speech, and Breard, Justice Reed’s effort to re-

public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or
discriminatory.”).
510. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b)(1) (2012) (describing the statute’s purpose as, inter alia, “to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and to guarantee its application
in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”). For further
discussion of RFRA and “Lochnerism,” see generally Sepper, supra note 6.
511. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976) (“Speech . . . is protected even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’
for proﬁt . . . .” (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943))); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (“The State [is] not free of constitutional restraint
merely because the advertisement involve[s] sales or ‘solicitations’ . . . .” (quoting Murdock,
319 U.S. at 110–11)); see also id. (“The existence of ‘commercial activity, in itself, is no
justiﬁcation for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment.’”
(quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966))). The Ginzburg majority had
itself noted that in Murdock “speech having the characteristics of advertising was held to be
an integral part of religious discussions and hence protected” under the First
Amendment. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 474 n.17.
512. For an excellent discussion of the liberal politics of “commercial speech” in the
Burger Court, see Graetz & Greenhouse, supra note 38, at 245–55.
513. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–66; Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822; Graetz
& Greenhouse, supra note 38, at 246, 248.
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instate that distinction in the wake of the 1943 peddling-tax cases.514
Once again, efforts by pro–New Deal Justices to limit the First
Amendment in the interests of preserving judicial deference to democratic regulation of the economy had failed. Whatever its initial political
motives, the Burger Court majority’s early commercial speech cases
opened the ﬂoodgates for the expansive commercial speech doctrine
that today is seen as a second major source of First Amendment
Lochnerism.515
In a telling historical continuity, it was Justice Jackson’s former law
clerk, Justice William Rehnquist, who most vociferously dissented from
the Burger Court’s early commercial speech decisions. Back in 1943,
Jackson had decried the “liberal” peddling-tax majority’s First
Amendment “transcendentalism” and warned that it repeated the mistakes of the Lochner era’s “liberty of contract” jurisprudence,
disregarding the superior ability of the political branches to balance the
competing rights and interests of different groups of citizens.516 In
remarkably similar terms, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy warned that:
The logical consequences of the Court’s decision in this case, a
decision which elevates commercial intercourse between a seller
hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain to the
same plane as has been previously reserved for the free
marketplace of ideas, are far reaching indeed. Under the
Court’s opinion the way will be open not only for dissemination
of price information but for active promotion of prescription
drugs, liquor, cigarettes, and other products the use of which it
has previously been thought desirable to discourage. Now,
however, such promotion is protected by the First Amendment
so long as it is not misleading or does not promote an illegal
product or enterprise . . . . This effort to reach a result which
the Court obviously considers desirable . . . extends the protection of [the First] Amendment to purely commercial
endeavors which its most vigorous champions on this Court had
thought to be beyond its pale.517
Justice Rehnquist went on to describe how the majority’s constitutional elevation of commercial speech was at odds with the Court’s
previous validation of not only advertising regulation but also a host of
514. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759 (deriding Breard’s “simplistic
approach” and noting that by the early 1970s it “was regarded as of doubtful validity”); id.
at 760 (implying that the Court’s present holding destroyed the last “fragment of hope for
the continuing validity” of Valentine).
515. See generally Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1202–06 (discussing the expansion of the
commercial speech doctrine); Shanor, supra note 6, at 142 (“[The Court] overruled
Christensen, thereby creating the modern commercial speech doctrine.”).
516. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179–82 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
517. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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other forms of government regulation essential to the welfare state, most
notably the regulation of employer speech in labor disputes.518 Rehnquist
also noted that even “so dedicated a champion of the First Amendment
as Mr. Justice Black,” who dissented from Justice Reed’s effort to roll back
the peddling-tax cases in Breard, had acknowledged as self-evident that
“the protections of that Amendment do not apply to a ‘merchant who
goes from door to door selling pots.’”519 Finally, echoing Justice Jackson’s
comparison of the 1943 peddling-tax decisions to Lochner-era “liberty of
contract” jurisprudence, Justice Rehnquist offered his own allusion to
Lochner itself. In that case, Justice Holmes had famously dissented from
the Court’s invalidation of a maximum-hours law as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment, writing that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” a popular text
advocating laissez faire economics.520 Justice Rehnquist similarly
dismissed the majority’s argument that Virginia’s ban on the
advertisement of drug prices violated consumers’ First Amendment
interest in “intelligent and well-informed decisions as to allocation of
resources”: “[T]here is certainly nothing in the United States
Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the
teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the
pharmacy profession.”521
Four years later, Justice Rehnquist made the comparison to Lochner
explicit. In the interim, the Burger Court had continued to extend the
commercial speech doctrine, redescribing a range of moneymaking
activities as exercises of First Amendment rights and continuing to rely
on the peddling-tax cases to do so.522 Then, in Central Hudson Gas and
Electric Corp., Justice Powell signaled an end to the piecemeal approach,
announcing the now-famous four-part test that places a heavy burden on
the government to justify its regulation of any commercial speech that
“concern[s] lawful activity” and is not “misleading.”523 In a lone, grave
dissent, Justice Rehnquist warned his colleagues that by “fail[ing] to give
518. See id. at 786.
519. Id. at 788 (quoting Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
520. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
521. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
522. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 630
(1980) (invalidating an ordinance barring door-to-door solicitation of funds by charities
that used less than seventy-ﬁve percent of their receipts for “charitable purposes” and
citing Murdock for the proposition that “the distribution of handbills [is] not transformed
into an unprotected commercial activity by the solicitation of funds”); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (invalidating a state bar association’s suspension of two
lawyers for soliciting business through newspaper advertisements and asserting that “[o]ur
cases long have protected speech even though it is . . . in a form that is sold for proﬁt”
(citing Smith v. California, 31 U.S. 147 (1959); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943))).
523. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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due deference to th[e] subordinate position of commercial speech,” they
had “return[ed] to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, in which it was
common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations
adopted by a State based on the Court’s own notions of the most
appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies.”524
This sharp critique was directed at, among others, the Court’s most
liberal Justices: Justice Marshall, who joined the majority opinion, and
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens, who concurred in the
judgment on the ground that the majority opinion risked being
underprotective.525 Each of these Justices, according to Rehnquist, had
helped “to resurrect the discredited doctrine of cases such as Lochner.”526
Each of these Justices had, four years earlier, “unlocked a Pandora’s Box”
when they joined Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, “‘elevat[ing]’ commercial speech to the level of traditional
political speech by according it First Amendment protection.”527
As this Article has shown, however, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
was not the ﬁrst time that a group of liberal Justices unlocked the
“Pandora’s Box” of commercially motivated, expressive activity. In
extending First Amendment protection to the advertisement of cheap
medicines (ostensibly for the beneﬁt of the poor and elderly), the
Virginia State majority invoked the authority of the ﬁrst generation of
post–New Deal liberals.528 Back in 1943, ﬁve “liberal” Justices had
elevated the commercial activities of the relatively poor, socially marginal
Witnesses to a “preferred position” in the constitutional order. In doing
so, they put the ﬁrst crack in the ediﬁce of the commercial–
noncommercial speech distinction—established only a year earlier in
Valentine v. Chrestensen—and revealed the instability of bifurcated review
as spelled out in Carolene Products. Once the Court held that a generally
applicable, nonprohibitive tax on the door-to-door sale of goods and
services could violate the First Amendment when levied on those who
believed it was their religious duty to sell apocalyptic pamphlets, the
framework of bifurcated review began to break down. It certainly did not
collapse all at once and, to this day, the “presumption of constitutionality” that the body of Carolene Products affords to “regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions” remains good
law.529 But the presumptions of unconstitutionality mooted in Footnote
Four of Carolene Products have gradually eaten away at the body of the

524. Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
525. See id. at 572–73 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 573–79 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); id. at 579–81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
526. Id. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
527. Id. at 598.
528. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
529. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 149–52 (1938).
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opinion, often at the behest of liberal majorities seeking to protect the
economically disadvantaged.
Perhaps most disturbingly for contemporary liberals, this process of
erosion from within—from within the Carolene Products framework and
from within the liberal legal community—was predicted from the
beginning. As discussed above, both the peddling-tax dissenters and a
number of pro–New Deal legal scholars raised red ﬂags about the
economically libertarian tendencies of judicial civil libertarianism
throughout the 1940s. Why then has contemporary First Amendment
Lochnerism caught so many by surprise? One answer is the popularity of
an unduly narrow deﬁnition of “Lochnerism,” one that reduces the
phenomenon to judicial suspicion of governmental interference with
common law contract and property rights. This definition of
Lochnerism, advanced by Professor Sunstein and adopted by many
contemporary critics of First Amendment Lochnerism,530 has worked to
obscure the long-term, economically libertarian tendencies of aggressive
judicial enforcement of the First Amendment. By identifying Lochnerism
with a politically conservative judiciary that seeks to preserve a common
law regulatory “baseline,”531 legal scholars are prone to overlook those
areas of First Amendment doctrine in which politically liberal judges
have defended the economic autonomy of religious and political actors:
either by relieving those actors of regulatory burdens, as in the peddlingtax cases and the Burger Court’s early commercial speech cases,532 or by
compelling the government to provide economic beneﬁts to religious
and political actors, as in the case of the unemployment insurance at
issue in Sherbert v. Verner or the other forms of “new property” protected
on civil libertarian grounds during the 1950s and 1960s.533
In the peddling-tax and commercial speech cases, the judicial
invalidation of regulatory burdens did in fact free religious and political
actors to exercise their common law property and contract rights without
governmental interference. The motivation of the Justices involved,
however, was certainly not reducible to an atavistic defense of common
law rights or a rabid commitment to the free market. These Justices
rather saw a free market in particular goods and services (the sale of
religious magazines, the advertisement of abortion services) as
inextricable from the free market in self-expression and self-determination that they sought to vindicate. Then again, the immediate
political motivation of the Justices hardly mattered; given the constitutional determination that First Amendment interests should override
governmental interests in health, safety, and ﬁscal integrity, an
economically libertarian outcome was all but assured.
530.
531.
532.
533.

See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, supra note 4, at 874.
See supra section III.B; supra notes 495–510 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 510–515 and accompanying text.
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Meanwhile, the narrow, Sunsteinian deﬁnition entirely misses the
signiﬁcance of another strand of First Amendment doctrine: those cases
involving the civil libertarian protection of “new property,” such as
Sherbert v. Verner. By compelling the government to provide religious and
political actors with economic beneﬁts, such as unemployment insurance
or public employment, the Supreme Court did not vindicate common
law contract and property rights in these cases. To the contrary, the
Court extended the reach of statutory schemes that displaced common law
“baselines,” ensuring religious and political actors’ access to goods and
services unavailable on the private market. For this reason, such First
Amendment “new property” cases escape the charge of Lochnerism,
narrowly deﬁned.
Yet these cases stand for the same proposition that animates the
peddling-tax cases, the commercial speech cases, and the cases that so
trouble liberal legal scholars today. This proposition is that civil libertarian interests—even when inextricable from private economic
interests—should override governmental interests in health, safety, and
ﬁscal integrity. The Supreme Court has happily cited First Amendment
decisions that protect common law economic rights in support of First
Amendment decisions that protect statutorily created economic rights,
and vice versa. Only a theoretical or ideological sleight of hand can
distinguish the civil libertarian defense of economic autonomy when it is
motivated by political liberalism or vindicates “new property” rights from
the civil libertarian defense of economic autonomy when it is motivated
by political conservatism or vindicates traditional property rights. Once
this ﬁction is dispensed with, a longer history of First Amendment
Lochnerism comes into view.
In light of this longer history, critics of contemporary First
Amendment Lochnerism might be wise to abandon their defense of an
illusory tradition of economically neutral First Amendment enforcement.
Instead, they could take up the banner of radical reform and seek to
break with a legal tradition that has long been insensitive to the tension
between judicial civil libertarianism and judicial deference to economic
regulation. Not only would the reformist position more accurately reﬂect
the economically libertarian character of a signiﬁcant subset of First
Amendment jurisprudence, it might also prove more effective in alerting
judges, political officials, social-movement activists, and other legal
scholars to the ambitious, reconstructive work that needs to be done.
Providing potential allies with such notice is especially important given
the relatively unconscious role that political liberals have played for over
seventy years in advancing economically libertarian applications of the
First Amendment.
As this Article has shown, the doctrinal blurring of civil and
economic libertarianism that drives First Amendment Lochnerism has
been, more often than not, the work of politically liberal judges and
activists. Accordingly, one of the easiest and most useful tactics that
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judges and legal scholars who oppose First Amendment Lochnerism
might adopt is simply a refusal to endorse civil libertarian doctrines that
risk further erosion of the autonomy and legitimacy of political
regulation of the economy.534 Thereafter, to the extent that critics of First
Amendment Lochnerism seek to vindicate such political control, their
focus may eventually have to shift from reforming the courts to building
more respected and more powerful political institutions. The peddlingtax dissenters and the legal-realist scholars who ﬁrst warned of the
Lochnerian tendencies of judicial civil libertarianism got at least this
much right: One task for which judicial review, no matter how “liberal,”
is especially ill-suited is enhancing political control of the economy.
CONCLUSION
First Amendment Lochnerism has been with us since the dawn of
aggressive judicial enforcement of the First Amendment in the late
1930s. The conﬂation of judicial civil libertarianism and economic
libertarianism was the brainchild of corporate lawyers critical of judicial
deference to the New Deal state. They diagnosed the government’s
increasingly unfettered regulation of economy and society as a
totalitarian threat to the civil liberties of all Americans and proposed a
remedy with bipartisan appeal: aggressive judicial enforcement of an
534. Ironically enough, this refusal would represent a partial recovery of the “old
police power doctrine” of the actual Lochner era, a doctrine according to which “no one
had an absolute right if its exercise interfered with the rights of others or with public
rights,” a doctrine that “required a balance between the needs of individuals and the
needs of the common welfare.” Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold
History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 Calif. L. Rev.
751, 798 (2009). For a recent example of what such a refusal might look like, see Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Regulatory programs almost always require content discrimination. And to hold that
such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for judicial
management of ordinary government regulatory activity.”). On the other hand, for a
recent example of a politically liberal Justice endorsing a civil libertarian doctrine that
risks undermining political regulation of the economy, see Justice Kagan’s concurrence,
with Justice Alito, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694, 711 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring, joined by Kagan, J.). This concurrence
called for an extension of the “ministerial” exemption from employment and labor law to
“any ‘employee’ who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or
important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith”
and argued that “[i]f a religious group believes that the ability of such an employee to
perform these key functions has been compromised, then the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom protects the group’s right to remove the employee from his or her
position.” Id. at 712. Similarly, Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion in Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., invalidating a Vermont statute on First Amendment grounds because it
“disfavor[ed] marketing, that is, speech with a particular content” and “disfavor[ed]
speciﬁc speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers,” while potentially providing
“academic organizations with prescriber-identifying information to use in countering the
messages of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in promoting the
prescription of generic drugs.” 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
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expansive First Amendment. These corporate civil libertarians found a
sympathetic partner in the Jehovah’s Witnesses. A small but transatlantic
religious sect that had suffered terribly under Nazi totalitarianism, the
Witnesses also viewed the New Deal as totalitarian and considered a
commercial activity—the door-to-door sale of religious literature—to be
an integral part of their faith.
The partnership between the corporate bar and the entrepreneurial
Witnesses intersected with the early reception and interpretation of
Footnote Four of Carolene Products. The work of the two Supreme Court
Justices with closest ties to Wall Street, Footnote Four reﬂected both
corporate anxieties about the New Deal and liberal anxieties about
totalitarianism. Early critics of the Footnote warned that this combination
blurred rather than clariﬁed the boundary between judicial civil
libertarianism and judicial oversight of the economy. These warnings
were conﬁrmed in 1943, when the Witnesses—supported by the anti–
New Deal American Newspaper Publishers Association—persuaded the
Supreme Court’s ﬁve most “liberal” Justices that municipal peddling
taxes placed an impermissible burden on the sect’s door-to-door
magazine sales. The challenged taxes were nondiscriminatory in form
and nonprohibitive in application, and the Witnesses’ peddling was a
commercial activity as well as a religious and expressive vocation. But the
Witnesses successfully argued that the taxes exempliﬁed the way in which
seemingly innocuous economic regulation could gradually suppress a
pluralistic civil society.
The “peddling-tax model” of judicial review—scrutiny of economic
regulation for its incidental burdens on the exercise of First Amendment
rights, even when that exercise takes the form of commercial activity—
did not come to dominate midcentury First Amendment jurisprudence.
But it did enjoy a signiﬁcant doctrinal afterlife. Future Supreme Court
majorities, generally motivated by concern for socially and economically
disadvantaged groups, relied on the peddling-tax precedents to overturn
regulatory schemes that denied economic beneﬁts to religious believers
and political dissenters, and to extend First Amendment protection to
commercial speech. These latter-day uses of the peddling-tax cases, in
turn, laid the doctrinal basis for today’s First Amendment Lochnerism.
This history suggests that contemporary critics of First Amendment
Lochnerism have underestimated the doctrinal resources available to
supporters of an economically libertarian First Amendment. It is the
habit and skill of lawyers to present their prescriptions as following
seamlessly from precedent, or as requiring only minor adjustments to
existing doctrine. But First Amendment Lochnerism has a surprisingly
long and distinguished pedigree. Successful attempts to shore up the
logic of bifurcated review—to formulate a workable distinction between
judicial defense of civil liberty and judicial supervision of the economy—
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have been few and far between in the courts and in the academy.535 It is
true that, until recently, the fuzziness of bifurcated review has more often
than not beneﬁted marginal dissenters rather than mainstream
corporations.536 But as scholars have periodically warned since the
1940s,537 neither Footnote Four nor the First Amendment itself has ever
offered a dependable doctrinal check on the judicial protection of
private economic power in the name of civil liberty.

535. See Suzanna Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional
Revolution, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1452, 1468–73 (2015) (reviewing Richard Epstein, The
Classical Liberal Constitution (2014)).
536. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 23, at 2520 (“In the free exercise cases
that RFRA invokes, claims were advanced by religious minorities who sought exemptions
based on unconventional beliefs . . . .”); Sepper, supra note 6, at 1510 (“For-proﬁt
corporations are not the insular or religious minority individuals of past
accommodations.”).
537. Compare Braden, Search, supra note 36, at 581–82, with Ackerman, supra note
137, at 718–31.

